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I I SEP \M 
Afghanistan is a SB»11, landlocked country vbose geo« 
political location has attracted great powar rivalry for centuries 
In the past and presently it has become a focal poSjit of super 
power rivalry ©speclall^r after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in Decemher 1979 and the continued presence of tens of thousands of 
Soviet troops on Afghan soil. Prior to the Second World War, 
Afghanistan had been subject to Anglo-Russian rivalry nearly for 
about seventeen decades but the former pursued a policy of strict 
neutrality while pursuing an Independent foreign policy and thus 
safeguarding its territorial iintegrlty and sovereignty. The 
conclusion of the Second World War witnessed the decline of 
traditional colonial powers leading to the emer«;ence of United 
States and Soviet Union as sUper powers vying each other for 
winning the Independent countries to their respective spheres of 
Influence, Thus the traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry gave way. 
t.0 the US-Sovlet rivalry. In the post-Second World war years 
too Afghanistan has renalned the focal point of super power rivalry. 
But until the advent of Soviet back coBMunist cpup in April 1978 in 
Kabul, Afghanlftan maintained a chequered history of genuine 
nonalignnent. Following the advent of coimunist SLSMStf K«bul 
regiae abandoned the traditi^al Afghan policy <^ genuine 
nonalignnent and made Afghanistan as a client state of the 
Soviet Union, The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979 virtually made Kabul as a satellite of Soviet eaplre. The 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been condewBid by the United 
Nations, nonaligned countries, aiesib^s of the lilaiilo oomunlty, 
European EaonomXe OommnnXty and other iJiternati^ iial foBiie* 
When the dotpenlng Afghanistan crisis has attracted the 
world wide attention, it has also formed the subject of serious 
academic research and general writing. There exists a plethora 
of literature which sheds aaiple light on Afghanistan from different 
peripectires. However there has been a paucity of serious 
academic literature which could shed analytical light on the 
action by one super power — invasion of Afghanistan by »^ oviet 
Union, and reaction by other super power — United States, to meet 
the challenge. Besides the existing available literature also 
does not present a dispassionate analysis of the response of the 
people of Afghanistan as to what they are struggling for, how they 
view the initiatives undertaken by the international cotnmunity to 
meet the Soviet challenge etc. 
All these aspects have been analysed in the present study 
which is divided into five main chapters and a conclusion. The 
first chapter traces out the emergence of Afghsnistan as a modern 
state under Ahmad Shah Abdall in the second half of elifhteenth 
century* Tlie chapter is further subdivided into four parts. TIMI 
first part deals with the period of consolidation of Afghan empire 
connwicing from 1747 to IBOO, The second part pertains to the 
period of foreign conflict which lasted from 1800 to 1880, The 
third part deals with the period of defensive Isolationism which 
lasted for about four decades from 1880 to 1?>19» The final phase 
being identified as the period of defensive neutralism covers the 
period from the conclusion of the First World War to the conclusion 
of the Second World W«r» 
During the first perled between 1747 to 1800, the Afghan 
rulers consolidated the Afghan empire. By the tine, Ahead Shah 
Ab4«ll died In 1773, the Afghan empire extended from the Atrek 
river to the Indus and from Tibet to the Arabian Sea, This part 
of the first chapter further examines the rise of French pover In 
Burope and Its Interest in the South West Asia which the British 
deemed as a threat to their rule in India* On the other hand the 
rise of Sikh power in Punjab which lasted upto the closing years of 
the third decade of the nineteenth century, had prevented any 
direct contact between British India and Afghanistan, Ttew Toy 
the end of the eighteenth century Afghanistan continued its onward 
march on the road to progress uninterruptedly. 
The chapter further proce-^ds to analyse the period of 
foreign conflict for Afghanistan which commenced with the dawn 
of nineteenth century and lasted for about eight decades. The 
rapid rise of Sikh power In Punjab was deemed as a threat to 
their Interests in British India, Consequently during the first 
decade of the nineteenth century, the British made friendly 
overtures of friendship to the Afghan rulers with a view to secure 
the British Interests against the possible threats from the Sikhs 
in Punjab and from Soviet Union, In 1809, both British India 
and Afghanistan signed a treaty in terms of which Afghanistan 
undertook to disallow French and Persian troops to pass through 
Afghan territory. However following the defeat of the then 
Afghan ruler Shah Shuja, the treaty could not be effected. 
Because of its borders with Soviet Union and Persia, Afghanistan 
had assumed Immense strategic importance in British defence 
strategy with regard to consolidation and protection of British 
rule in India, In 1809 and 1814, the British signed two treaties 
with Persia now called Iran under which the latter assured the 
British not to allow European forces to pass through Its territory. 
However In the raeanwhUe, Soviet Union had also gained considerable 
diplomatic, political and econoalc leverage In the region by virtue 
of Its treaties signed wlth^Iran In 1828 and with Ottosum Bnplre 
of Turkey In 1829. 
The chapter further analyses the growing Soviet Influence 
In the region, its implications for the security of British India 
through Afghanistan and Iran. It further proceeds to assess the 
circumstances leading to the outbreak of First Anglo-Afghan War 
which took place In 1838 in which the British suffered heavily. 
The Immediate impact of these developments was that the British 
followed a policy of non-intervention in Afghanistan for years. 
In view of the expanding Soviet Influence during 1860s in Central 
Asia when Russia gathered control of Khiva, Khokand, Samarkand 
and later Bukhara, the British really became alarmed over the 
potential Soviet threat. The Anglo-Russian rivalry dragged on 
to the borders of Afghanistan especially when the British tried 
to dictate their terms to Afghanistan under the pretext of forward 
policy. In 1878 the British launched another armed expedition 
against Afghanistan which is k n o ^ as the Second Anglo-Afghan 
War. In the aftermath of this war the British inipesed the 
treaty of Gandanak on Afghanistan in May 1879 under which the 
Afghan foreign policy was subjected to British interference. 
The chapter then deals with the third phase of defensive 
isolation in the Afghan foreign policy which lasted from 1S80 
till 1919. During this period Afghanistan asserted its national 
independence by pursuing a policy of strict neutrality. The 
Afghan rulers were very cautious about the iiai^ licationi of Anglo-
Russian rivalry and thus refrained from being hoodwitiked by either 
gr«at p@w«r* 
VKhen the First World War broke out, Afghanistan kept Itself 
aloof from the power politics of great powers and did not favour 
the either belligerents. Afghanistan* s steadfast pursuit of the 
policy of strict neutrality paid It good dividends. 
The chapter finally deals with the fourth phase of defensive 
neutralism which began In 1919 and continued upto the end of the 
Second World War. In February 1919 Anlr Aiaantillah became the 
new ruler of Afghanistan, He took steps to %rrlggle Afghanistan 
out of the British domlnanpe and to pursue an Independent foreign 
policy. In April May 1919, there occurred Third Anglo-Afghan 
War. the impact of the war was that the British recogniased 
Afghanistan as an Independent sovereign cotintry. 
The chapter makes an assessment of Afghan foreign policy 
under King Amanullah. Afghanistan's relations improved with its 
neighbours and with Turkey and Persia as well. Amantaiah 
succeeded in asserting Afghanistan's Independence in foreign 
affairs and secured the recognition of this assertion both from 
British and the Soviets. In 1921, Afghanistan and Soviet Union 
signed a treaty which recognized Afghan Independence and neutrality. 
It further analyses the foreign policy of Afghanistan under 
the regloe of King Nadir Khan from 1929 to 1933. The hallmark of 
Afghanistan's foreign policy during this period was the determination 
to vigorously pursue the policy of neutrality* 
When the Second World War broke out In 1939, Afghanistan 
had become heavily dep«ident on Axis powers especially Germany 
and Japan for econoalc and technical as$lstano»» Keeping in view 
Its traditional policy of auiintalnlng strict neutrality, Afghanistan 
declared In 1940 that it would remain neutral during the war. 
Thus Kabta ever abandoned the receipt of economic and technical 
assistance received from the Axis powers In the larger national 
Interest, At the same time, Afghimlstcm also matlntalned neutral 
posture towards the Allied powers. Thus the pursuit of strict 
neutral policy by Afghanistan during the war period won it 
appreciation from the Allied powers and at the same tinB 
Afghanistan could also safeguard its independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. 
The second chapter deals with the basic postulates of Afghan 
foreign policy. After having analysed the significance of foreign 
policy for a country^ the chapter further proceeds to assess the 
geo-political location of Afghanistan and its resultant inpact 
on Afghan foreign policy. The faith of the people of Afghanistan 
In Islam and trteir sense of nationalism have been instrumental in 
influencing the course of Afghan foreign policy, Tfc© Afghan 
national character is reflected in the liteirature and culture of 
that country. Despite the ethnic and linguistic diversities there 
has always prevailed a cohesive national unity in Afghanistan, 
Opposition to colonialism and neo-colonlalism in all iti 
Manifestation is another postulate of Afghan foreign policy. The 
chapter further analyses the statements made by the Afghan represeti* 
tatives in the UN General Assembly on colonial issues, Afghanistan, 
because of its strong opposition to colonialiflm and active support 
for the United Nations efforts in the process of decolonization, 
was made a member of the Special Committee with Regard to the 
Implenentatiim of the Declaration on the Orantljig of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples* 
Pull support to the natlonil liberation movements struggling 
for the attalnoent of Independence from the colonial domination 
has been another cornerstone of Afghan foreign policy. Afghanistan 
was the first country to recognize the freedom fighters of Algeria, 
when the latter was struggling for independenct. Besides, 
Afghanistan has also rendered full support for the liberation 
movements in South Africa, Namibia, Ztfab&bwe, Angola and has 
expressed solidarity with the people of Palestine in their 
struggle against Zionism* 
Afghanistan has also consistently opposed the racial and 
apartheid policies of the white minority regime of South Africa, 
It keenly watched the developments within r>outh Africa and 
supported the measures undertaken by the international community 
in this regard. In 1978, when the racist regime of South Africa 
resorted to massacres and massive repression against the Innocent 
people, Afghanistan not only condemned them but expressed Its whole-
hearted support to the legitimate struggle of the people of South 
Africa for self-determination and the eradication of the inhuman 
policy of the apartheid, 
Afghanistan has elso supported the people of Namibia in 
their struggle to attain independ«ic« from the racist regime of 
South Africa, After the First World War, the League of Nations 
had given the mandate over Namibia to the ITnion of South Africa, 
However after the Second World War, South Africa annexed the 
territory thus denying the independence to the people of Namibia. 
Rather Pretoria resorted to repressive measures* Afghanistan has 
frequently condemned the racial reglne of Pretoria and supported 
the struggle of Namlblan people* 
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Consistent and unqualified support to tht people of 
Palestine in their just struggle against the Zionist Israel also 
constituted a basic trait of Afghan foreign policy. The probleia 
of Palestine arose in 1947 when the tJN General Assembly 
recommended the partition of Palestine into two — home for the 
Palestinians and the home of the Jews, However the.Zionists 
unilaterally declared the establishment of Israel In Hay 1948 
and annered even the territory meant for the Palestinians thus 
making the latter to live as refugees. Since 1948» the people 
of Palestine have been struggling to regain their territory 
from Israel, The Arab-Israel wars of 1967 and 1973 and continued 
hostilities have added to the miseries of the people of Palestine, 
The formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and 
its recognition by the international community in 1974 as being 
the sole representative of the people of Palestine was welcomed 
by Afghanistan. Kabul also welcomed the admission of the PLO 
into the United Nations, Afghanistan has continuously reiterated 
that the total and complete withdrawal of Israel fro» all the 
occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the Inalienable 
rights of the Palestinian people including the right of »elf« 
determination and the establishment of a Palestinian State were 
the only means of resolving the problem, 
Afghanistan has consistently supported the right to self-
determination in the United Nations and other international 
forums, Afghanistan, for the first time, suggested that the 
right to self-determination, which prior to that was incorporated 
at a political principle in the Charter of the tJnltefl Nations 
and Universal Declaration on Human Rights to be treated as a 
fundamantal right. Consequently, the right to self-determination 
was incorporated In the first Article tooth in the UN Charter and 
tl^ UN Co7enant on H-oman Rights, 
Afghanistan has continuously championed the cause of 
dependent people throughout the world and pleaded for the 
exercise of the right to self-determination, 
Afghanistan has also strongly supported the New 
International Economic Order, The call for the NIEO was given 
by the Algerian NAM surrnit conference in 1973, which was later 
adopted as a Declaration and PrograiRme of Action on the 
Establishment of a Hew International BcoiX)inic Order by the 
General Assembly at its sixth special session held in April 1974» 
Ever since then, Afghanistan has not only supported the NIEO but 
has also called for its early and speedy icplementation, Kabul 
has also succeeded in focussing tlas attention of the world 
coBoianlty to the economic problems fac-d by the landlocked 
countries, 
Afghanistan has also rendered unqualified support for 
general and complete disarmament. Either in General Assembly or 
Disarmament Commission or any other international forum, 
Afghanistan has vigorously espoused the cause of disarmament, 
Afghanistan has strongly pleaded that|the resources exhausted 
on the armaments could be diverted to Invlsage the economic 
well being of the people. Afghan support for the nuclear 
disarmament measures undertaken by the Unilwd Nations has been 
lauded, 1 
The chapter further proceeds tb analyse the policy of 
T I 
nonalignment pursued by Afghanistan, ^ursult"6f the p61icy of 
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strict neutrality and genuine nonallgnment has been the 
hallmark of Afghanistan policy. Even at a time when 
Afghanistan was sandwiched between British India and Soviet 
Union and being the focal point of Anglo-Russian rivalry^ tim 
rulers of Afghanistan followed the policy of strict neutrality 
and tried to maintain friendly relations with all countries. 
Afghanistan is the oldest nonallgned countxy in Asia which 
played a notable role along with other countries in convening 
the first sunanit conference of the nonallgned countries at 
Belgrade in 1961, Afghanistan not only participated in the 
NAM Summit Conference but also played a constructive role in 
furthering the cause of t»nalignment. Until the fifth NAM 
summit held in Colomlxj, Sri Lanka in 1976, Afghanistan had 
striven hard to continue its active role in espousing the 
cause of nonallgnment. By the time the sixth NAM summit 
was held in Havana, Cuban capital, Afghanistan's status as a 
nonallgned country had been vastly eroded in the wake of the 
advent of Soviet back communist regime in Kabul in April 1978• 
The present day Afghanistan Is a client state of Soviet Union 
and no more a nonaligrjed country. 
The chapter finally deals with the Afghan objective of 
strengthening the United Nations. Afghanistan is one of the 
founding members of the United Nations and it has played a 
positive and constructive role by active participation in, the 
various organs of the world community. Though being a country 
with limited resources Afghanistan could not contribute 
economically in a big way but it has rendered noral support 
to the United Nations important decisions having bearing on 
the international peace and security. 
XI 
Tb* third chapter pras^ts an Indepth assessmtnt of 
Afghanistan* • rtlatlons with the Soviet Union since the 
conclusion of the Second World War till the advent of Soviet-
backed Coramunlst saiffi In Kabul in late April if**^ * The -
chapter begins with the declaration of the then Afghan 
Prime Minister, f hah Mahirrud, made in May 1?*46 in which he 
declared that the principles of establishing friendly relations 
with all countries, especially with the neighbouring countries, 
formed the bedrock of Afghan foreign policy. On 13 June 1946, 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to 
define the Amu River border. 
It further proceeds to analyse the developments leading 
to the partition of Indian subcontinent in August 1947 which 
led to the emergence of India and Pakistan as two Independent 
and sovereign countries and their intact on Afghanistan, The 
emergence of Pakistan gave rise to the issue of Pushtunlstan 
as an apple of discord between Pakistan and Afghanistan, In 
July 1949, Afghanistan abrogated all of its international 
treaties which supported the Durand Line as a border or 
which referred to th# status of the Pushtuns, The detailed 
analysis of the Pushtunlstan issue is not undertaken In this 
chapter but only referred to briefly in the contsact of Afghan-
Soviet relations. However, Moscow supported the Afghan stand 
on Pushtunlstan, 
In July 1950, Moscow and Kabul signed a four year 
trade agreement which envisaged Soviet petroleum products, 
cotton cloth, sugar and other commodtties in exchange for 
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Afghan goods like wool^ fur, raw cotton, fruits and nuts. In 
January 1954) Kabul and Moscow signed a major agre#ia«nt In 
terms of which the Soviets advanced a loan of ^  3*5 million 
few the construction of grain elevators at Kebija* Burlng 1954| 
Soviet Union advanced a loan worth ^ 5.3 mLlllon to Afghanistan 
under different agreements. 
The chapter then proceeds to analyse the visit of Soviet 
leaders - Khrushchev and Bulganln to Afghanistan In December 
1955 and Its influence on Soviet-Afghan relations. During 
their visit, the Soviet leaders affirmed their support to 
Afghanistan on pushtun Issue, This visit resulted In procuring 
a Soviet credit worth 0 100 million for Afghanistan to be 
repaid in thirty years at two per cent interest. In terms 
of an agreement signed in March l<556, regular air flights 
betwe^i Tashkent and Kabul were started. 
The chapter then proceeds to analyse the visit of Afghan 
Premier, Sardar Mohammad Daoud to Soviet Union in October 1956, 
Then In July 1957 the Afghan King Zahlr Shah visited Soviet 
Union, During this period, Moscow promised Kabul to advance 
a credit worth ^  15 million. The chapter also deals with the 
augmentation of Soviet military influence in Afghanistan during 
19501, In August 1956, Soviet Union offered military assistance 
to Afghanistan as well as to impart military training to Afghan 
personnel. Between 1950 to 1955, the Soviet assistance to 
Afghanistan amounted to ^  246,2 million. The underlying 
objective of Soviet economic and military assistance to 
Afghanistan was to gain a foothold in that country to 
perpetrate its long term strategic gains. 
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in March i960, the Soviet Premier, Nlklt« S. Khrushch«nr 
paid an official visit to Afghanistan which proved Instrumental 
In the conclusion of a cultural agreement between the two 
countries. The chapter's assessment about the Afghan foreign 
policy during 1953*63 when Sardar Moharainad Daoud wa« the Print 
Minister, Is that Soviet Union did rewier considerable economic 
assistance to woo Afghanistan to its fold, however, the latter 
did not fall a prey to Soviet overtures and pursued an independent 
and genuinely nonaligned foreign policy. 
Between 1963-73, the Soviet--Afghan relations continued on 
the friendly pattern. There was no major point at departure in 
the traditionally friendly relationship. In February 1968, 
Moscow and Kabul signed an agreement for economic and technical 
assistance. The chapter further examines the Soviet proposal for 
collective security in Asia advanced by Soviet leader Leonid 
Brezhnev In June 1968 and again enunciated in March 1972, 
However Afghanistan did not endorse the Soviet proposal for 
collective securily in Asia, 
The third chapter finally makes an assessment of Afghan-
Soviet relations from July 1973 to April 1978 during which 
Sardar Mohammad Daoud was at the helm of Afghan affairs* In 
early June 1974, Daoud visited Soviet Union. During I974t 
Moscow granted an Interest free ten years aoratorlum on a 
^ 100 million debt and promised another ^  428 Billion In 
development aid to Afghanistan, In December 1975, the Soviet 
President, Podgomy, visited Afghanistan, During 1974-75, 
Moscow tried to Increase Its sphere of Influence in Afghanistan 
but Daoud was cautious enough to foresee such an eventuality as 
detrlaental to Afghanistan, Consequently Daoud forged close 
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relations with nonallgned and Islamic countries to reduce Afghan 
econoraLc dependence on Moscow, The Daoud regiae was wooed \fy 
Soviet Union but Kabul did not encourage Moscow, The resultant 
liqaaet was the "cool off" stage in Afghan-Soviet relations during 
1977 and the early months of 1?>78« 
The fourth chapter provides a critical assessment of the 
Afghan-US relations since their advent till April 1978, Though 
the formal diplomatic relations between Kabul and Washington 
were established in 1940s but efforts in this direction were 
initiated during King Amanullah»s time. In July 1921, an Afghan 
mission headed by Mohammed Wall Khan visited the United Ttates to 
explore the possibilities of establishing diplomatic relations 
between Afghanistan and the United States, Despite his frequent 
meetings with the US officials and leaders, Walt Khan»s mission 
failed to get positive assurance. For subsequent four years, 
neither Washington nor Kabul took any initlabive to resume 
negotiations on establishing diplomatic ties between the two 
countries. The negotiations resumed in 1925 continued for about 
a decade without ai^ tangible outcome. It was in March 1936 
that the United States recognized the Afghan Government and on 
4 May 1936 that Homybrook was accredited as the first US 
ambassador to Kabul with his headquarters at Tehran* 
The outbreak of Second World War adversely affected the 
Afghan exports of Karakul to the West European countries. At 
this crucial juncture, the United States came to Afghanistan's 
rescue to help it export its Karakul in Aseriean maTkets* 
Despite the establishment of diplomatic ties between Washington 
and Kabul, the former had not yet opened any dlploaatic mission 
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In Afghanistan by the end of 1940• It vat on 6 Junt 1942 that 
the US diplomatic mission was inaugurated in Kabul* During the 
period of Second World War, the Afghan-US relations had become 
friendly and formal, Inanediately after the conclusion of the 
Second World War, the Afghan Government asked the United States 
to send American teachers and engineers. In 1946, the Afghan 
Government signed an agreement vith the Korrison-Knudsen Company 
of the United States worth ^ 17 million for repairing the dami 
and their reconstruction and the construction of 350 miles long 
highway. 
In 1949, the Afghan GoveminKit urged the US to provide 
economic assistance worth 0 118 million* However, Washington 
sanctioned only a loan of 0 21 million. At this stage, the 
Afghan request for arms supplies was not accepted by the United 
States* The US reluctance to provide substantial economic 
assistance and to supply of anrs to Afghanistan showed that 
Washington bad attached no strategic Importance to Afghanistan 
during the early 1950s, The US foreign policy during the Dulles 
era of early 1950s lad to the negligence of Afghanistan and the 
latter had to meet its defence requlren^nts by procuring arms 
mainly from the Soviet Union, The consequential intact of 
these developments was the augmentation of Soviet influence 
in Afghanistan, During 1956-57, United States provided ^onontc 
and technical assistance worth ^  14,4 million to Afghanistan, 
The chapter further proceeds to analyse the impact of 
Prime Minister Dauod's visit to the United States in late June 
and early July 1958, on Afghan-US jrelations. The US Governmanit 
evinced interest in the development of Afghan civil aviation, 
the Helmand Valley, surface transportation projects etc. In 
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DtCMiber 1959, the US President Bis«nbo%r«p, paid a abort visit 
to Afghanistan and exchanged views on bilateral Issues with 
Afghan leaders* 
Subsequently in early September 1963, the Afghan King, 
Zahir Shahy visited the tfnited States, Afghanistan was assured 
of tJS economic assistance to help develop Afghan econoE^r, The 
United States praised Afghanistan's pursuit of the policy of 
nonallgninMit, During March-April 1967, the Afghan Premier 
Mohammad Hashim Mainwandwal visited the United States• The 
Afgll:ian Premier exchanged views on regional and global issues 
with the US leaders and the latter appreciated Afghanistan's 
steadfast commitment to the policy of nonalignment. In July 
1967, both countries concluded an agreement for the sale of 
agricultural commodities. 
In early January 1970, the then US Vice President, Spiro 
Agnew visited Afghanistan, The US Vice President said that his 
country was Interested in the overall development of Afghanistan, 
He also assured AfghaA leaders of continued US support* 
The fourtb chapter further analyses the visit of US 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Afghanistan in November 1974 
and its iwpact on Afgh«n»U6 relations. Both the leaders while 
sharing the identical views on global issues reiterated their 
determination to further coBSolidate the bonds of friendly 
relations between the two countries. In early August 1976, 
Henry Kissinger again visited Afghanistan and held discussions 
on bilateral and global issues with the Afghan leaders. The 
US Secretary of State reiterated his governmnt's desire to 
participate closely tn Afghanistan* s economic develop»«it. The 
fourth chapter finally concludes that the pattern of Afghan-US 
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raX&tions r«iialned friendly until April ic>78 when the Soviet-
backed coBRunlst £su& was staged in Kabul. 
The fifth chapter critically examines the advent of 
Soviet-backed coOTsunist regime in April 1978. Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in Decenber 1979 and the international responw 
to get the Soviet aggression vacated. The People's Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) with the Soviet-backing seized power 
in Kabul on 27 April 1978 by overthrowing the government headed 
by Sardar Mohammad Daoud. Noor Mohammad Tarakl became the new 
Priae Minister of Afghanistan and Hafizullah Amln and Babrak 
Karmal were two other most pi-omlnent leaders. The pronouncements 
made by the Taraki regime in early May 1978 had mad© it evident 
that the post-coun Kabul was toeing pro-Moscow line In the realm 
of foreign affairs. 
The chapter further analyses the attitude of United States 
to the Taraki regime. There was no imnedlate response by the 
United States to the April 1978 coup in Kabul, The media in 
the US reacted very sharply to developments in Kabul but there 
was no official US reaction. 
The Soviet response to Taraki regime was very encouraging. 
On 3 May 1978, Moscow recognisied the new regime in Kabul. The 
pronouncements made by Moscow ar^ d Kabul stowed the mitual desire 
of both countries to forge close relations, in early December 1978, 
Kabul and Moscow signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. 
Under this treaty, though Moscow was not bound to prevwit the 
downfall of the new coimriunlst regime in Afghanistan, it was 
already preparing tjit possibility of saving it from failure 
and keeping that countiy under Soviet influence even by force 
if needed. 
Id 
on 14 February 1979, the US Ambassador In Kabiil Adolph Dubs, 
was assassinated by some unidentified persons. The coranunlst regime 
In Kabul held Its opponents responsible for Dubs* assassination 
while ^le Western and OS media blamed the Tarakl regime. This 
Incident led to the deterioration In Afghan-US relations and by 
August 1979, Washington suspended all economic and technical 
assistance to Kabul* 
In Septerber 1979, Haflzullah Amtn assumed the reins of 
power following Tarakl*s ouster. Both Soviet leaders as well as 
Amtn had harboured distrust towards each other since the emergence 
of Amln at the helm of affairs, Amln also served Soviet Interests. 
There was no change In US policy when Haflzullah Amln assumed the 
reins of power In Kabul, Though overtly, Amln tried to convince 
the United States of his desire to Improve the relations while 
he continued pushing Afghanistan into Soviet orbit. The United 
States expressed concern over the violation of human rights In 
Afghanistan. 
The chapter further proceeds to analyse the developments 
leading to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 28 December 1979. 
The Soviet forces in tens of thousands invaded Afghanistan in 
December end 1979 and help Install Babrak Karmal as the new head 
of conmunist regime in Kabul. The Soviet media Justified Soviet 
military aggression of Afghanistan on the plea that the Afghan 
Government "requested" Moscow to a&i& their armwJ forces and the 
latter complied it. The emergence of Karmal regime backed by 
Soviet forces pushed Afghanistan into Soviet orbit and its 
nonallgned status was completely undermined. 
The chapter than proceeds to analyse the US response to 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, During the first few days 
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preceding the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Washington watched 
with keen Interest the Afghan developirwmte. It was during the 
first week of January IPSO, the Carter Administration swung Into 
action to oppose and criticise Moscow for its military adventures 
in Kabul, On 4 January 1980, the Carter Administration imposed 
some sanctions against Povlet Union which clncluded blockade of 
supply of US grains to Moscow^ stopping of sale of high tectaology 
and boycott of the 1980 Summer Olj^pics in Moscow, The United 
States Implemented these sanctions but its other allies were 
reluctant. However the Soviet media was critical of US sanctions. 
The Carter Administration called upon the Soviet Union to vacate 
its aggression from Afghanistan, 
Following the advent of Reagan Administration In Washington 
in 1981, the US policy toward Soviet Union on the issue of 
Afghanistan became more critical and practical. The main elements 
of President Reagan's policy towards Afghan crisis included 
humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees seeking shelter 
In Pakistan, diplomatic support for a political settlement 
along the lines of the United Nations Resolution and the resolutions 
passed by the Islamic Conference and Nonallgned Summit Conference, 
The chapter also presents a detailed analysis of the pronouncements 
made by the US representatives in the UN General Assembly, Senators 
and Congressmen and the media on Afghan crisis. The US President 
has designed 21 March as "Afghanistan.Day" to express the soli-
darity of the United States with the people of Afghanistan In 
their just struggle against Soviet Invaslen, The US support 
has been Instrumental in boosing the morale of Afghan freedom 
fighters. 
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Tho chapter further analysit the response of the United 
Nations to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, In early January 
3SS0, a six-power draft resolution was introduced in the TTS 
Security Council. The resolution avoided "condennation" of 
S^iet military adventure in Afghanistan and called '*for the 
withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan**, However the 
Soviet Union vetoed it and consequently the question of Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan came up before the UN General Asswnbly, 
The draft resolution on Afghanistan was adopted by the General 
Assembly with overwhelming majority on 14 January 1980 with 104 
in favour, IS against and with 18 abstentions. The resolution 
deplored the armed intervention into Afghanistan as Inconsistent 
with the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and called for 
the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign 
troops. Again on 20 November 1980, the General Assembly adopted 
another resolution was was mild in its criticism of armed 
intervention into Afghanistan, The chapter makes as assessment 
of these resolutions passed by the General Assembly on Afghanistan 
and finds them similar in contents on which Soviet Union has not e\ \ 
cared to think. 
The chapter also examines the Geneva Talks <^ Afghanistan 
which came into the offing in June 1982 in pursuance of the 
resolutions passed by the General Assembly, The im Secretary 
General deputed his Special Representative to hold proxinilly 
talks with the Afghan Govemnent, Pakistan and Iran to find out 
means for defusing the Afghan crisis. The Special Representative 
has held various rounds of talks with the goveriments of 
Afghanistan and Paklftan while Iran has preferred to be kept 
21 
Inforned, The Geneva talks have veered round four main points — 
withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, non-Interference In 
the Internal affairs of states| International guarantees of non-
interference? and voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their 
hoses, fhere has been no outcone of Geneva talks as jret. 
The chapter further proceeds to analyse the response of 
the Organization of Islamic Conference to Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan, The extraordinary session of the Foreign Ministers 
of the OIC In Its session held In January end 1980 at Islamabad 
(Pakistan) condemned Soviet Union by name for Invading Afghanistan 
and called for the Ismedlate and unconditional withdrawal of 
Soviet troops stationed In Afghanistan, Besides, the Conference 
also suspended the mocbershlp of Afghanistan, However the 
subsequent resolutions passed by the OIC on Afghanistan Issue 
failed to mention Soviet Union by name but called for the 
unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, 
The response of the European Economic Comnunity (EEC) to 
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan is also analysed in this chapter. 
The BBC in its various resolutions passed since 1980 has 
express©* grave concern over the military operations by Soviet 
troops in Afghanistan and has called for the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan and restoration of latter»s nonallgned 
and Independent status. 
The chapter finally makes an assessment of the response of the 
nonallgned movement (NAM) to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, The 
Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the nonallgned countries 
held in February 1981 at New Delhi expressed concern over 
developments in Afghanistan and called for the withdrawal of 
g2 
*for«lgn troops*» fro* Afghanistan. The slallar stanct has be«n 
reiterated by the seventh NAM sunantt held In 1983 at N«vr Delhi 
and the eighth NAM suimalt held In 1986 at Harare (Zlmbahwe), 
The final chapter of the present study Is In the form of 
conclusion which critically exaatoes the presint state of affairs 
prevailing In Afghanistan In the wake of the continued presence 
of hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops In Afghanistan and 
the struggle waged by the Afghan freedon fighters to liberate 
their houeiand from Soviet occupation. The Soviet Union being 
a super power and the founding member of the United Nations 
owns a special responsibility In maintaining International peace 
and security. But the unprovoked and unwarranted Invasion of 
Afghanistan liy Soviet Union Is In utter violation of the eoclstlng 
norms and practices of the International law and the provisions 
of the UN Charter. 
The study suggests that the resolutions passed by the UN 
General Assembly should strongly condemn the Soviet Utolon by 
name as an aggressor and ensure the complete, Immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of Soviet military and civilian 
personnel from Afghanistan* Besides, the nonallgned, Independent 
and sovereign status of Afghanistan should be restored. It further 
observes that the Geneva talks are a futile exercise because neither 
of the belligerents •• Soviet Union as em Invader and Afghan 
Itojahldeen as defender are party to It, Thus It suggests the 
participation of the Afghan Iftijahldeen as the sole legitimate 
representative of the people of Afghanistan In the UN General 
Assembly and Geneva talks In order to facilitate an acceptable 
23 
solution of th« Affhftn proble»» Th© study also calif upon the 
EEC, Organization of I«lamlc Conference, NAM ani other 
international organizations to amend their resolutions on 
Afghanistan by strongly condenming the Soviet Wiion by name 
Q»-m ^tnm&mT^Orj^wlt^rof' ^ChT Iranediite, c o i p ^ e and 
unconditional withdrawal of Soviet military and civilian 
personn^ from Afghanistan. The study also suggests that 
the United States, anotl^r super power should impose strict 
econouilc, diplomatic and political sanctions against the Soviet 
Union to compel the latter to vacate the invasion. 
It has also suggested the various resistance groups of 
Afghan freedom fighters to close their ranks and forge unity. 
The study further makes the suggestion that the member countries 
of the HAM, Islamic Community and the United Nations should 
suggest and support the holding of an international conference 
on Afghanistan in which all the permanent members of the Security 
Council and the representatives of all the political parties of 
Afghanistan, including the Communist Party of Afghanistan as a 
political party, should be Invited to find a political solution 
of Afghan problem, Tlw study finally suggests the formation of 
*»Afghan Government in exile" which should be recognized by the 
freedom loving people of the world. Unless the political 
solution to Afghanistan problem is had, the Government in 
exile should worts: as the true representative of the people 
of Afghanistan* 
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PRSPABB 
Existence of a small nation In a multipolar world 
strewn with power rivalry between the Super Powers presents 
an Interesting study of Interaction of geopolitical forces 
in international re la t ions . Such a study assumes added 
significance when i t pertains to Afghanistan which has been 
subject to Super Power r ivalry since centuries and, since 
December 1979, i t has been the victim of Soviet Invasion. 
Afghanistan, which shares common border %Jlth Soviet Union, had 
been subject to Anglo-Russian r ivalry for about fifteen decades. 
In the wake of the emergence of cold war in the immediate after-
math of the conclusion of the Second World War, the Soviet-
United States r ivalry also spread i t s tentacles towards 
Afghanistan but, l ike the past, the rulers of Afghanistan 
maintained the independence, sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l 
integri ty of Afghanistan by pursuing the policy of s t r i c t 
neutra l i ty and genuine nonalignment* 
However, the traumatic po l i t i ca l events leading to the 
advent of Soviet-backed communist qqyxQ In Kabul in April 1978 
had triggered the process ©f rapid Soviet Inf i l t ra t ion Into 
Afghanistan which culminated in the Soviet Invasion of that 
country in December 1979. Since then hundreds of thousands of 
Soviet troops are present in Afghanistan, The Soviet Invasion 
was and has been opposed by the people of Afghanistan, Six 
mlUlon Afghans are living as refugees in Pakistan, Iran and 
other countries. The Afghan freedom fighters , also known as 
11 
AfghaiiM«3aMd©«n, are giving a tough resistance to the 
occupying forces* 
Thus, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
eontlBued pressnee of Soviet troops in that cotmtry has heen 
the focus of s trategic thinkers, policy makers, academicians, 
journalists and freedom loving people throughout the world. 
The resultant iBspact has been the appearance of plethora of 
l i t e r a tu r e on various aspects of Afghanistan» The bulk of 
l i t e r a tu re available on the subject deals with the analysis of 
the developnients loading to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
This l i t e r a tu re comprises the votk.8 of Western academicians 
and journalists who have written research-oriented books and 
a r t i c l e s , A close scrutiny of the available l i t e r a tu re reveals 
tha,t many pertinent questions have reaained unanswered. The 
questions l ike when a Super Power invades a nonaligned country 
l i ke Afghanistan, and how the other Super Power reacts to i t , 
how a Snail and nonaligned country l ike Afghanistan can exist 
in the wake of sever* Super Power r ivalry; afld how the 
international comsninity has responded in the wake of Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, All these questions have been deeply 
examined in the present study» 
The author owes his in te l lec tual debt to his supervisor. 
Dr. Akhtar Majeed, Associate Professor, Department of Po l i t i ca l 
Science, Aligarh Muslin University whose able guidance and 
constant encouragement enabled the author to s i f t chaff from 
the grain. His pro^und expertize on South and Southwest Asia 
and the Indian Ocean enabled me to understand the subtle 
ill 
iB|>licftti#»ir 0f Super Power rivalry for Afghanistan In a better 
way« The author Is also grateful to Dr. S,A,H» Bllgraml, 
Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, AMJ, 
for his keen Interest and encouragement, I also ove w 
gratitude to Professor A,F. Usnan, Professor In the 
Department of Political Science, for his benign cooperation 
and encouragemait, % thanks also go to ny other teachers 
at AM[J whose profound knowledge and experience enabled me to 
sharpen my tools of learning. 
X am also Intellectually Indebted to Abdur Rahman 
Pazhwak, the outstanding statesman and seasoned diplomat 
of Afghanistan who has served as Permanent Afghan 
Representative to the United Nations, as Afghan Ambassador 
to the United Kingdom, West Germany and India, for his valuable 
comments on the various con5)lex aspects of Afghanistan's 
foreign policy, I have also greatly benefitted from his 
writings. Despite his preoccupations, he has been kind 
enough to answer some of my queries which have unfolded unto 
me the great reservoir of his dispassionate analysis and deep 
understanding of Afghan diplomacy. The intact of his learning 
looms large in the present study, 
I am also beholden to Dr. Zamin Momand, an expert on 
Afghan diplomacy, currently with th& Voice of America, 
Washington D.C., for his constant encouragement and valuable 
comments on various aspects of Afghan diplomacy, I feel 
obliged to Zakarla Ferotan, a research scholar of Delhi 
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University for his cooperation, I am equally grateful to 
Adeena Klazl» Assistant Professor of Persian Ii l terature, 
Faculty of Literature, Kabul University, and presently a 
research scholar In Jawaharlal Hehru University, New DGlhl^ 
for her encouragement, I owe ny thanks to Dr. Chalbal 
Kostamandi, renovmed archaeologist of Afghanistan and 
J'ii['3» Merla JtostaEandl, both now l a the United States 
for t he i r affection and encouragement, 1^ sincere thanks 
also go to Mohammad Hassan Wolasmal, editor of former 
^Rlim Htt.1aMfl now known as Mu.lahld Wolea^ whose i^rltings 
have been a source of constant Inspiration for me, I am 
also Indebted to Dr. Mlratta Mugalzal, former Assistant 
Professor, Faculty of Medicine, Naugarhar University, and 
now working with Afghan freedom fighters , for his kind 
cooperation, I am deeply Indebted to Professor Shlrlndal 
Oardlwal, Professor In Pushtu Department, School of Languages, 
JNU, New Delhi for his affection and cooperation, Ify sincere 
thariks also go to Dr, Arshad Mahmood, M,D,, an Indian friend 
who stooJby me through thick and thin, I am also Immensely 
obliged to ny senior Afghan colleagues - Dr, Qudus, M,D,, 
Taj Mohammad Akbar, and Said Mohammad Malnwand,for the i r 
affection and encouragement, 
I am also in te l lec tua l ly beholden to 
Professor M,L* Sondhl, Professor and Chairman of the Centre 
for International . Poli t ics . , and Diplomacy, School of 
International Studies, JNU, New Delhi for his valuable 
suggestions, I also feel obliged to Professor Ram Rahul Sheel, 
an «xptrt on Central Asia for his valua>)le coimrents when the 
present study was at the draft stage. My thanks also go to 
Dr^ Ram Avtar Shartna of Delhi University and Yogesh Kumar 
Pathak, research scholar from JNU, for their benign 
cooperation, 
I owe special gratitude to Dr, Joseph J, Brennlng, 
Deputy Director, American Centre, New Delhi for his constant 
encouragement and sustained Interest, 
Kjy sincere thanks go to the librarians and other 
roembers of the staff of Maulana Azad Library, AMU, Allgarh, 
National Archives of India, New Delhi, Sapru House Library, 
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Information Centime, all in New Delhi, who generously helped 
in making the adequate material available to me. 
Finally, a word about the spellings of Afghan names. 
The name of A,R, Pazhwak is spelled out as Abdur Rahman 
Pazhwak and as Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, Both spellings are 
conanonly used. Besides the name "Mahmood" is generally written 
as Mahmood or Mahmud but for the purpose of the present study» 
the spellings retained are as "Mahmud", Similarly, the word 
Mohammad is also spelled as Mohammed, but the former spellings 
have been retained for the purpose of the present study, 
"(MOHAMMAD KHAUD) 
Chapter I 
HISTORICAL BACKGRO^D 
This chapter endeavours to analyse the evolution of 
Afghan foreign policy since the emergence of modem Afghanistan 
In 1747 t i l l the conclusion of the Second World War, with spec ia l 
reference to Afghanistan's r e l a t ions with the contemporary great 
powers — Russia and Br i ta in and Afghan response to them. In 
other words, I t w i l l be an analysis of the challenges posed by 
Anglo-Russian r i va l ry and I t s Impact on Afghan foreign pol icy . 
The word "Afghan" Is the na t iona l name of a l l the 
peoples of Afghanistan which symbolizes an Ind iv i s ib le un i t 
under a l l h i s t o r i c a l , economic and sobla l conditions In the 
1 
hear t of Asia, According to Hasan Kawun Kakar, a noted Afghan 
scholar , Afghanistan has had three p r inc ipa l names — Arvan^ 
in an t iqu i ty , Khuyasy^ In the medieval era and Afghanistan In 
2 
modem t imes. Modem Afghanistan i s almost co-extensive with 
the land mentioned in the old Greek as Arlana, in the old Persian 
as Airya or Alryana, in Sanskri t as Arya-Vartta or Arya-Varsha 
and in Zeud as Brlene-Veejo, Si tuated between India and Pers ia , 
Aryana was a geographical and cu l t u r a l r a the r than p o l i t i c a l 
3 
name. The name Aryana l a s t ed for about 1,500 years from 
1 A,H, Habibl, "Afghans and Afghanistan", Afghanistan 
(Kabul), v o l , XXII, no, 2 , Summer W6P, p . ! • 
2 Hasan Kawun Kakar, < 9^y^ rSffl^ I?tr and SggtstT U AfRtolf^ffl \ 
T h ^ . , % t o . t f •Alir.,AMsRateaflJ^haa (Austin? un ivers i ty 
of Texas Press , 1979), p , xv, 
3 I b i d , , p , x v l . 
1000 B.C. to the fifth century of the Christian Era, The word 
OJUCaaaCi denoting the "land of the rising sun" gained currency 
during the second century of the Christian Bra, According to 
Mir Ohulam Muhairisad Qhobar, an eminent Afghan historian, "for 
fourteen centuries Khurasan was aoplied initially to parts of 
Afghanistan and later to the whole country and is still in use 
4 
for a small region to the northwest of it". Even upto the 
nineteenth century the name Khuras^^ signifying Afghanistan 
5 
was in vogue along with the words Pashtunkhwa and Sarhad. 
Thus it was only toward the end of the nineteenth century that 
"the appellation Afghanistan replaced the word Khurasan 
6 
completely". According to Hasan K, Kakar, Afghanistan is not 
a new name and "it is generally believed to have appeared with 
7 
the accession of Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747", This view has 
also been supported by A,R, Pazhwak, a seasoned Afghan states-
man. He writesj "Afghanistan is not the original name of this 
country but a term which gained currency in usage when Ahmad 
Shah Durrani united the various principalities under one 
8 
political entity in 1747." According to available evidence 
the word "Afghanistan" was applied in a political sense to 
4 For details see, Ghulam Muhammad Ghobar, Khurasan 
(Kabul! History Association, 1946), 
5 Mountstuart ELphinstone, An AcGount of the Kingdom of 
Cfl^ l^ ul (London! Richard Bentley, 1839), p, 200, 
6 Kakar, n, 2, p, xvi, 
7 Ibid. 
8 A,R. Pazhwak, AlTaPa ! •.Angt??^ ^ Af gnaHtsi^aB (London* 
Royal Embassy of Afghanistan, 1957), pp, 5-6, 
a land for the f i r s t time In the t h i rd decade of the 
9 
fourteenth century by Sa l f l Herawl, A deta i led analysis of 
t h i s etymological controversy Is beyond the scope of the 
present study and I t deems suffice to say tha t Afghoilstan 
Is an ancient country whose his tory dates back to over f ive 
thousand years . 
The anthropological excavations undertaken In the early 
decades of the present century In Afghanistan revealed tha t 
Pa l aeo l i t h i c man probably l ived In the caves of northern 
Afghanistan as long as 50,000 years ago. According to Louis 
Dupree, "Post-V/orld War I I excavations In south-cent ra l 
Afghanistan point to Intimate re la t ionsh ips with the Indus 
10 
Valley Civ i l i za t ion fourth-second mil lennia B.C." 
References to Afghanistan recur In the ancient Vedic 
l i t e r a t u r e and subsequent travelogues of foreign t r a v e l l e r s . 
The reference to Afghanistan as Avagana occurs in Varaha 
Mlshra's Bhrl ta Sanhl ta . This view has been supported by 
11 
A, Foucher, a noted French scholar . The works of Al Belrunl 
and Hsuen Tsang a lso mention about Afghanistan, 
The advent of Islam during the seventh century In 
Afghanistan proved Instrumental In overhauling the en t i r e 
Sa l f l Heravl. I^lsal»-j-Tar^qir 1-QJLspa,VH-Ak-j-Q^U (The I r r i g a t i o n of Hera t ) , edi ted by Mag11 T, Herawi 9 
(Tehran, 1968), p, 77, 
10 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (New Jerseyt Princeton 
University Press, 1973), p, xvlli, 
11 A, Foucher, Th^ ,An<?tg9t.^aY Qf %r\iU afftil Bflgtr? XQ T « U a 
( P a r i s , 1947), pp. 235-52. 
12 
culture and civilization of Afghanistan. Islam which brought 
about an overaiLl change in the social, cultural and historical 
developiaent of Afghanistan also forged a new religious and 
cultural bonds - bonds that to a certain extent overrode the 
13 
prevalent ethnic diversities. 
The advent of Islam in Afghanistan was followed by the 
conquast by Arabs who reached Kabul and Kandhar during the 
seventh century. The Muslim conquest brought Afghanistan 
Within a greater political entity, stimulated trade in the 
region and preserved the countr/*s geosrapbic importance as a 
crossroad between India, Central Asia and the Mediterranean 
14 
world. 
For about two centur ies the l oca l dynast ies ruji.ed over 
Afghanistan — Tahir ids (820-70), and the Samanlds (874-999)* 
The closing years of the tenth century witnessed the advent 
of rasirae of Babult-tagin in Afghanistan who was succeeded by 
h i s son Mahmud Ghaznavl who ruled over Afghanistan t i l l 
1157 A»D, The Ghaznavl* s en t i r e extended over Kabul, Ballch, 
15 
Badakhshan, Persian Khorasan and sotae pa r t s of Ind ia , 
Following *hQ collapse of Ghaar.avi r u l e , the cen t r a l author i ty 
in Afghanistan passed on to the l oca l fo rces . The 
12 For d e t a i l s see, Pazhwak, n, 8, pp . 77-91, 
(Oxford, 193«), p . 79, 
(Stanford, G t l i f . i Stanford Universi ty Press , 1969), p . 14. 
15 G,N. Molesworth, MKJaaliglian.l^lt? (Soirbayt A91a 
Publishl»g H®ttse, 1962), p . 3 . 
16 Gregorian, n« 14) p . 15 . 
Mongol Invasion brought econointc disaster for Afghanistan 
during the thirteenth century. During the fourteenth century 
Afghanistan was invaded t>y Talmurlane and the early decades 
of the sixteenth century witnessed the establishment of Maghal 
rule in Kabul by Babur, a descendant of Tlmur, in 1504, 
Following the death of Babur which led to the collapse of 
Mughal rule in Afghanistan, the local tribes again vied for 
establishing their paramountcy in Afghanistan. During this 
period, Afghanistan was divided "between the empires of Persia 
17 
and Mughal India, the northern tribes being under Mughsil i-ule". 
The Afghan nationalism found Its early seedlings during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries under the inspiration of 
Roshanla movement and Khushal Khan Khattak (1613-89) who inspired 
the Afghan tribes to "defend their independence and strive for 
18 
political unity". 
The geo-political situation in the region underwent a 
substantial change and the early period of eighteenth century 
witnessed the southern Afghan tribes led by Ghilzals rise in 
revolt against Persia which in later years spread to Herat and 
Southeast of Persia, However the revolt was quelled by the then 
Persian King, Nadir Shah, whose assassination in 1747 provided 
an opportunity to the Abdalls under the leadership of Ahmad Khan 
Abdall to declare the Independence of Afghanistan, During the 
Same year, Ahmad Shah Abdall was made the King of Afghanistan, 
The succeeding pages present an analysis of Afghan foreign 
17 Molesworth, n, 15, p» 4« 
18 Gregorian, n, 14, p, 43, 
6 
policy since I t s emergence as an Independent modern Sta te in 
1747 t i l l the conclusion of the Second World War with spec ia l 
reference to contemporary great powers. Adamec has divided 
the period between 1747 t i l l the end of Second World War in to 
the following four phasesj 
(Ai^  The Period of Consolidation (1747 to 1800) 
(B) The Period of Foreign Conflict (1800 to 1880) 
(C) The Period of Defensive Isolat ionism (1880 to IPIP) 
(D) The Period of Defensive Neutralism (1919 t i l l the 
end of Second World War). 19 
The above c l a s s i f i c a t i on envisaged by Adamec i s retained for 
the purpose of present study, 
(A) Tfte PQTXQ^ Qf CQngQll<^at^9fi ? 1747 V? If^ QQ 
Ahmad Shah Abdali a f t e r assuming the re ins of power, 
consolidated his posi t ion and took measures to strengthen his 
empire. In t h i s d i rec t ion , he led e ight expeditions in to India , 
In t h e i r f i r s t expedition launched in 1748, however, the Afghan 
20 
forces coxild not go beyond the Indus, In his subsequent 
expedi t ions, the Afghan King was able to incorporate Punjab, 
Kashmir and Multan into his empire. At the time of his death 
in 1773, the Afghan empire of Ahmad Shah Abdali extended from 
21 
Atrek r i v e r to the Indus and from Tibet to the Arabian Sea, 
19 Ludwlg W. Adamec, AfKto i s t an ' s fgr^Xm Ift^X^ %Q X^^ 
H^-V^^ntX^Vn C?t^ ^UrY (Tucsom Arlzonat The Universi ty of 
Arizsona Press , 1974), p , 2 , 
20 G.P, Tate, Tti? C^toK^ QiB gf AfK^^ffl^stan (Bombay* Times of 
India Press , 1911), p , 7 1 , 
21 Sultan Mohammad Khan, Tarlkh»l»Afghanistan ( n , d , ) , p , 27. 
TlniTiT Shah succeeded af te r the death of h i s fa ther in 1773 as 
the new ru le r of Afghanistan. Two decades of Timur Shah's ru l e 
over Afghanistan witnessed no major change In Afghan domestte 
and external po l i c i e s but continuation of the legacy. 
The closing years of the eighteenth century witnessed 
the r i s e of a powerful France evincing I n t e r e s t in the countries 
of South-West and Central Asia. The B r i t i s h , whose power in India 
had been In ascendency since the establishment of the East India 
Company in the beginning of the seventeenth century, were a lso 
planning to augment t h e i r p o l i t i c a l power and expand t h e i r trade 
and commerce in and beyond Afghanistan, This period also 
"witnessed the beginning of t ha t in te res t ing epoch when the 
diplomatic r i v a l r i e s of the European powers became c lea r cut on 
22 
the chess-board of Central Asia", 
Zaman Shah (17?»3-c»9) who succeeded Timur Shah as the King 
of Afghanistan continued the policy of his fa ther and grandfather. 
The external th rea t s to Afghanistan during t h i s period had 
increased. The growing power and expansion of the B r i t i s h in 
India and Persian plans to r ea s se r t i t s sovereivnty over Herat 
portended th rea t to Afghanistan, According to Vartan Gregorian, 
"Afghanistan thus entered the nineteenth century a p o l i t i c a l l y 
23 
disuni ted , , . s t a t e " . 
22 Asghar H, Biigraroi. AfKbanlstao Mid British Xnaia 
17Q3-1Q07 (New Delhi » Ster l ing Publ i shers , 1P72), 
p . 13 . 
23 Gregorian, n , 14, p . 5 1 , 
8 
The onset of the nineteenth century envisaged an era of 
foreign conf l ic t s for Afghanistan. During the f i r s t decade of 
the nineteenth century, the B r i t i s h signed a t r ea ty with th© 
Sikh ru l e r of Pun:;ab, Maharaja Ran j i t Singh on 25 April 1809 
under which the B r i t i s h acquired a r igh t of passage for the i r 
army through the Sikh t e r r i t o r i e s in case of foreign aggression 
and the Sikhs undertook to help the B r i t i s h In t h e i r task of 
24 
defence. This t r e a ty was motivated by two f a c t o r s . In the 
f i r s t place, by the growing p o s s i b i l i t y of a French invasion 
of India in 3B08 and, secondly, to check the growing Sikh nower 
to secure the B r i t i s h power in India, 
During t h i s period, the B r i t i s h were facing t h r e a t to 
t h e i r power loca l ly from Karathas and the Sikhs, In the scheme 
of t h e i r defence s t r a t egy , the B r i t i s h made f r iendly gestures to 
the then Afghan r u l e r . Shah Shuja, and a B r i t i s h mission under 
25 
Kountstuart Elphinstone l e f t for Kabul on 13 October 1808, 
The Elphinstone Mission t r i ed to r a i s e the issue of French and 
Russian t h r ea t to Afghanistan as well as India and wanted Shah 
ShuJa to contract an a l l i ance but were re luc tan t to help the 
26 
Afghan King in his in t e rna l challenge which threatened the throne. 
However the Afghans were shrewd enough to discover the Br i t i sh 
24 For fu l l t e x t of the t r ea ty see, C.U, Altchlson, 
A CgUfff^^QP .Qf Trea^i^s, gPRa^efpeT t^s.„§n .^Sania<38 Relating 
to India and the Neighbouring Goun^yi^s CCalcutta t 
Government Pr in t ing Press , 1P09), vo l , V I H , p , 44, 
25 Bilgraml, n , 22, p , 35 . 
26 Altchlson, n , 24, vo l , XI, p . 309» 
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designs and regarded "an alliance for the purpose of repelling 
one enemy was imperfect and that true friendship between th« two 
states could only be maintained by Identifying their interests 
27 
in all cases". 
Despite the differing approaches, the British India and 
Afghanistan signed a treaty in June 1809 in terms of which 
Afghanistan undertook to prevent the passage through Afghanistan 
of French and Persian troops on their way to India and the British 
Government pledged to pay the Afghans for their services against 
the confederacy. Besides Afghanistan was to exclude all French-
28 
men from its territory. However, following tins defeat of Shah 
Shuja by Shah Mahmud, the treaty became almost a dead letter, 
Afghanistan, because of its borders with Russia and 
29 
Persia, had assumed immense strategic Importance in British 
defence strategy with regard to consolidation and protection 
of British rule in India, The Russians had started showing 
Interest in Persia during this period. Besides, the growing 
French power was also deemed as a threat by the British. 
Consequently the British signed two treaties in 1809 and 
1814 with Persia, Under the terms of the Anglo-Persian Treaty 
of 3B09, Persia agreed "not to permit any European force what-
ever to pass through Persia either towards India or towards the 
27 Ibid, 
28 For text of the Treaty, see ibid., vol, XIII, pp, 53-55, 
29 The name Persia is used for Iran here because the official 
use of name "Iran" was started only in 1937, Hence prior 
to that reference is made to Persia in the present study. 
10 
30 
ports of that country", Persia also promised to afford a 
force for the protection of British dominions in case of 
attack from Afghanistan or any other country. The British 
Government in return agreed to "afford to the &hah /"Perslsai 
KlngJ^ a force, or in lieu of it, a subsidy, with warlike 
31 
ammunition such as gims, muskets etc,,," Similarly the Anglo-
Persian treaty of 1814 envisaged for a Persian attack against 
32 
Afghanistan in the event Afghans invaded India, 
On the other hand, Russia had gained considerable 
diplomatic, political and economic gains in the region by virtue 
of two treaties «- the Treaty of Turkmanchai signed with Persia 
in 1828 and the Treaty of Adrianople signed with the Ottoman 
Empire in 182P, Under the terms of the Treaty of Turkmanchai, 
Persia aurrendej-ed its all territories west of the Caspian Sea 
to Russia, These developments proved instrumental in changing 
British strategy towards Iran as well as Afghanistan, It 
regarded any Persian encroachment or gain at the expense of 
Afghanistan as tantamount to an extension of Russia's political 
33 
and economic gains on the doorstep of India, 
30 For text of the treaty of 1S09, see Aitchison, n, 24, 
vol, XIII (Calcutta t Government of India Publication 
Branch, 1933), pp, 53-55, 
31 Ibid, 
32 For t ex t of Anglo-Persian t r ea ty of 1814, see . i b i d , , 
p , 54, Also see J ,C, Hurewitz, D|.plomacv in the Neay 
and the Middle Sast» A Documentary Survey 1535-1914 
(New York, 1956), vo l . I , pp, 86-88, 
33 Ph i l i p E. Mosiey, Russian PtPlQgaQY an<^  t^% 9P?"toK 
of ^h^ Eastern Question 1838-9 (Cambridge. Mass.. 
1934), pp, 3 -4 , 
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Lord Sllenborough, a then top ranking British official, 
had opined that Russia could anter India via Afghanistan. H« 
further added* "Russian commerce would he utilised to prepare 
34 
the way for Russian armies In Afghanistan**, Thus, the Russian 
factor was the rnajor determinant of British policies towards 
Afghanistan and Persia, Lord Palmerston, the then British 
Foreign Secretary was of the view that "a pro-British power in 
Afghanistan could influence officers in Persia in which Russia 
35 
was deeply interested". 
The British Governor-General in India, Lord Auckland, was 
advised by London to conclude political or commercial agreements 
with Afghanistan: 
The time has arrived when it will be right for 
you to interfere, decidedly in the affairs of 
Afghanistan. Such an Interference would doubt-
less be requisite either to prevent the extension 
of Persian dominion in that quarter or to raise a 
timely barrier against impending encroachments of 
Russian influence, 36 
Consequently Lord Auckland sent his emissary Alexander Burnes to 
Kabul in Noverber 1836 with the objective of securing political 
and commercial advantages without conceding any strategic 
concessions to Afghanistan, 
Realizing that the British were not going to get the 
desired concessions from the then Afghan ruler, Amir Dost 
34 H,W.C. Davis, "The Great Game in Asia J 1800-1844", 
Proceedings of the Britisl^ Acadamv (Oxford, ic>26), p, 230. 
35 Vincent A, Smith, ed,, Oxford History of India (Third edn.) 
(Oxford, 1958), p. 5P1. 
36 Ibid., p. 603, 
12 
MohaBmad, they tried to cultivate Shah ShuJa who was then 
living in exile In India with the promise to restore him his 
throne. Efforts were also made to enlist the support of Maharaja 
Ranjlt Singh of Pun;)ab, During that period, Persia was planning 
to invade Herat, However In November 1S3S, the British foiled 
Persian attempts to invade Herat and forced the latter to accept 
37 
a hands-off policy in regard to Herat. Subsequently the British 
also concluded a treaty with Shah Kamran, the ruler of Herat in 
38 
August 1839, thus making Herat an exclusive British sphere of 
influence. This move seemed to be the part of overall British 
policy of bringing Afghanistan under British sphere of influence 
in the wake of growing Russian influence in the neighbouring 
countries of Central Asia, The Russians, who had gained 
considerable economic stakes in Central Asia between 1758 and 
1858, considered a pro-British or English dominated Afghanistan 
39 
a serious threat to their interests in the region. Thus both 
British and Russians were appreh®isive of each other over 
Afghanistan, 
In the meanwhile, in October 1838, the then Governor-
General of India, Lord Auckland, issued a "Manifesto" accusing 
the Afghan ruler. Dost Mohammad of taking measures prejudicial 
37 John William Kaye, HAstgyy Qf tU9 V^V iT\ ATSto)3.fftiB 
(London, 1851), vol. I, p, 273, 
38 Text of the Trealgr given in Sir Edward Hertslet, ed.j, 
<^ OBiagrgial Tr^ atLfg,i, 3.ag7-:,1^2rS (London, 1936), vol. Till, 
p. 719, cited in Gregorian, n, 14, p# 100. 
39 Smith, n. 35, p« 591. 
13 
40 
to the secur i ty and peace of Indian f r o n t i e r s . I t was a lso 
planned to In s t a l Shah Shuja as the ru l e r of Afghanistan with 
the help of B r i t i s h army. In November 1838, the B r i t i s h arny 
launched Expedition against Amir Dost Mohaa^ad and in August 
1839 Shah Shuja entered Kabul following the surrender of Dost 
Fohammtad* 
However the people of Afghanistan, despite their internal 
differences, could not tolerate the alien presence on their land. 
Consequently a countrywide revolt by the Afghans resulted in the 
annihilation of a British force of 4,500 men and supporting army 
41 
of 12,000 and the murder of Shah ShuJa, 
Despite t h i s blowing defeat , the B r i t i s h forces again 
entered Afghanistan in the autumn of 1842 but were defeated 
42 
again. As a consequence of the B r i t i s h f a i l u r e , Amir Dost 
Mohamffi<a4 regained his throne in 1842, Prof, Bllgraml has opined 
tha t the f i r s t B r i t i s h defeat in the f i r s t Anglo-Afghan war 
"served as a good lesson to the B r i t i s h empire bui lders not to 
meddle in the a f fa i r s of the far-off lands and taught them to 
43 
follow a policy of non-entanglement and non-Interference", 
However the B r i t i s h never l e a r n t the lesson but repeated the 
same mistake by launching second and th i rd war against 
Afghanistan as analysed In the succeeding pages. 
40 For d e t a i l s see, Kaye, n , 37, pp. 355-59, Also see . 
S i r Percy Sykes. A History pf AfKl^ anlst^ l^P (London » 
Macmlllan, 1940), vo l , I I , pp, 3 -6 , 
41 For de t a i l s see , Kaye, n , 37, v o l , I I , pp, 218-46, 
42 For d e t a i l s see Munawar Khan, Anglo-Afghan Relat ions! 
17P8*I878 (Peshawar, 1963), 
43 Bllgraml, n , 22, p , 109. 
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y*4^gh^ Way 
Unt i l the death of Amir Dost Mohammad In 1863, the B r i t i s h 
followed a policy of non-intervention in the in te rna l a f fa i r s of 
Afghanistan, There followed a period of in te rna l dissensions in 
Afghanistan af te r the death of Amir Dost Mohammed, However, 
between 1869 and 1872, the B r i t i s h and the Afghans forged c loser 
r e l a t i o n s . Following the second Anglo-Slkh War of 1847, India 
and Afghanistan had become close to each o ther . In 1869, the 
then Afghan Amir, Sher All Khan paid a v i s i t to India which 
resul ted in the signing of Anglo-Afghan agreement under which 
the B r i t i s h declared t h e i r in tent ion not to in t e r fe re in Afghan 
in te rna l a f fa i r s and also undertook to support Afghanistan's 
44 
independence. 
However the Br i t i sh GovemmCTit was alarmed over the 
growing Russian advances in the Central Asian countr ies bordering 
Afghanistan, In 1864, Russians gained control of Khiva and 
Kookand, captured Tashkent in 1865 and annexed Samarkand in 
1869 and then got Bukhara, These Russian advances were deemed 
a ser ious t h r ea t to B r i t i s h power in India , A sect ion of the 
B r i t i s h policy makers argued in favour of es tab l i sh ing a permanent 
B r i t i s h mission in Kabul and make c lea r to a l l t ha t a p ro -Br i t i sh 
and peaceful Afghanistan was of Immense signif icance to B r i t i s h 
45 
i n t e r e s t s in India and the East , 
44 
Afghanistan. China and Central Asia (London. 18RSK n. 
in 
the Northwest Front ie r of India, 1874-1877", The Reaearch 
^ttll9li,in Qf. .W fm]^^ ^UYMHh (Lahore), no. 1, 1951, 
pp, 4-6 , 
46 H.C, Rawlinson, ^ g j a n ^ m4 H^H^ tn %h^ % s t (London, 1875), p , 14, 
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Unti l the beginning of 1874, London favoured a policy of 
non-intervention in Afghanistan, In February 1874, Benjamin 
D i s r a e l i ' s Govemment came to power in London and Lord Salisbury 
was appointed as the new Secretary of Sta te for India , The new 
46 
government followed a "Forward Policy" which meant tha t 
Br i ta in could not preserve i t s i n t e r e s t s in India while pursuing 
a non- in te rvent ion is t policy in Afghanistan and demanded tlm 
establishment of a permanent B r i t i s h mission in Kabul, However, 
the then Afghan r u l e r , Sher Ali Khan was opposed to the appoint-
ment of a B r i t i s h mission in Kabul and argued tha t the re l ig ious 
sentiments of h is "people a t the time would impose too grea t a 
r e spons ib i l i t y upon him in protect ing a B r i t i s h agent in 
47 
Afghanistan", This provided an excuse for the B r i t i s h to 
invade Afghanistan which resul ted in the outbreak of Second 
Anglo-Afghan War, Afghan forces withdrew back ^^^ Amir Sher 
Al i Khan who had to take refuge in Mazari-Sharief, died on 
48 
21 February 1879, 
Consequently the B r i t i s h imposed the Treaty of Gandamak 
49 
signed in May 1879 on Afghanistan. Amir Yakub Khan, son of 
Amir Sher Al i , became the new ru le r of Afghanistan, Under the 
Treaty of Oandamak, Afghan ru le r agreed to the appointment of a 
46 For de t a i l s regarding "Forward Policy", see , 
W,K, Fraser -Tyt ler , Afghanistan (Londoni Oxford 
Universi ty Press , 1950), pp. 137-47, 
47 Si rdar Ikbal Ali Shah, Modem Afghanistan 
(London: Sampson Low, 1938;, p» 2 1 , 
48 I b i d , , p , 22 . 
49 For text of the Treaty of Gandamak, see Aitchison, 
no. 24, Vol. XI (Calcutta, 1909), pp. 344-47. 
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B r i t i s h agent In Kabul and follow the advice of the B r i t i s h 
In the conduct of Afghan foreign r e l a t i o n s . S i r Louis Cavagnarl 
who took oyer as B r i t i s h envoy In Kabul was murdered In Septeirber 
1879 which led to the B r i t i s h r e p r i s a l s . These events led to 
the abdication of Amir Yakub Khan and In 1880, Amir Abdur 
Rahman, the nephew of Amir Sher All Khan took over as the 
new ru l e r of Afghanistan, 
(C) The Period of Defensive Isolat ionism (IRffQ - m?I 
When Amir Abdur Rahman took over as the new ru l e r of 
Afghanistan In 1880, "Anglo-Afghan r e l a t ions were burdened with 
the legacy of two wars, the loss of l i f e and property and the 
50 
l l l w l l l and d i s t r u s t t ha t r e su l t ed" . In his f i r s t foreign 
policy pronouncement, Amir Abdur Rahman Informed the then chief 
B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l of f icer In Afghanistan! 
•*, AS long as your Empire and tha t Russia 
e x i s t , my countrymen, the t r i be s of Afghanistan 
should l i v e quiet ly In ease and peace; and tha t 
these two States should find us true and f a i t h -
ful , , , and we hope of your fr iendship t h a t , 
Sympathizing with and a s s i s t i n g the people of 
Afghanistan, you wi l l place them under the 
honourable protect ion of the two Powers , . , , 51 
In the wake of acute Anglo-Russian r i v a l r y , the Afghan Amir 
wanted Afghanistan to pursue an Independent foreign policy by 
maintaining fr iendly r e l a t ions with B r i t i s h India as well as 
50 Ludwlg W. Adamec, ACKnfnJ^st^n, l^QQ-log? t, A PlPlQfflatlfi 
History (Berkeley, Calif , t University of Cal i fornia 
Press , 1967), p . 14, 
51 National Archives of India (NAI, New Delhi ) , Foreign and 
P o l i t i c a l Department, Secret F, Nos, 243-250, June 1880, 
No. 244A. 
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Rustia, However the British were reluctant to concede tlje Afghan 
demand, Lepel Griffin, while assuring the Afghan Amir about the 
British Intention not to Interfere In the Internal affairs of 
Afghanistan, wrote: "... Your Highness can have no political 
relations with any foreign power except with the British Govem-
52 
ment,,," This analysis makes It discernible that the British 
Government accepted the Internal Independence of Afghanistan 
while continuing its control over the foreign affairs of 
Afghanistan. However, Amir Abdur Rahman wanted to pursue an 
Independent policy, both domestically and externally, 
Ludwlg W, Adamec has divided the foreign policy of 
Abdur Rahman into three categories* 
(1) Assertion of National Independence^ 
(11) Insistence on Isolationism; and 
53 (ill) Promotion of a Balance of Power. 
The succeeding pages analyse these aspects, 
(1) Assertion of National Independence t 
Amir Abdur Rahman always regarded himself as an independent 
ruler of an Independent Afghanistan, In the lifht of the fact 
that British exerted control over Afghanistan's foreign relations, 
the Amir insisted that, after seeking the advice of the British 
Indian Government, he could take an Independent decision on any 
54 
issue at hand. The Amir wrote to the then chief British agent 
in Kabul, Lepel Griffin in 1880, "I desire nothing in lieu of 
62 Ibid,, Nos. 143-144, August 1905, Ho, 143. 
53 Adamec, n. 50, p. 17, 
54 NAI, n , 51 , Nos, 34-40, August 188?>, No, 34, 
18 
services rendered nor do I demand favours in exchange for duties 
performed. But I have my claims on the desire of the Afghan 
55 
nation," 
In a royal proclapatlon issued in 18B7, he appealed to 
the Afghan's sense of honour, na t iona l dignity and pa t r io t i sm, 
drawing t h e i r a t t en t ion to the Anglo-Russian th rea t ! "The 
country of Afghanistan i s a mere spot under the compass of two 
i n f i d e l s . , , i t i s c losely besieged; ye t although imprisoned, 
men are always thinking of t h e i r r e l ease , you are indi f ferent to 
56 
your bonds". Amir Abdur Rahman united Afghanistan and reta ined 
powers and authori ty to himself. He a lso equipped the army with 
modem weapons, 
(11) i"s4st^n<??„9q i8gXa1 i^Lgn1.3iff i 
Afghanistan followed a consistent policy of isolationism 
during the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman, Because of the British 
control over Afghan foreign policy, Afghanistan was Isolated 
from Persia and Russia and left the door for political relations 
open only to Britain. Even while dealing with the British, the 
Afghan Amir exercised and asserted his Independence to decide 
the in5>ortant Issues, In place of a British envoy, the Afghan 
Amir insisted on the appointment of a Muslim as British envoy to 
Kabul, In October 1881, the British Viceroy suggested the name 
of Mir Hashim Khan as the British envoy, but the Amir insisted 
on the appointment of Afzal Khan, which was to be approved l^ 
55 Ibid,, Nos. 256-280, July 1880, No, 261, p, 8. 
56 For the f u l l t ex t of t h i s Proclamation, see 
Stephen Wheeler, Tl^ e Aipeep A <^aur RafeiaB 
(London, 1895), pp. 248-50, 
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57 
the B r i t i s h . 
AS a par t of the policy of isola t ionism, the Afghan Amir 
also refused to allow the B r i t i s h troops and off icers to v i s i t 
the s t r a t eg i c areas in Afghanistan, In 1884) when the Russians 
had reached Merv, the B r i t i s h t r i e d to influence the Amir for 
the construction of r a i l l inks for the defence of Afghanistan 
but the Amir while appreciating the B r i t i s h suggestions refused 
to ob l ige . He protested the planned extension of the B r i t i s h 
58 
r a i l roads to Chaman as "leading to no good". 
The Amir was a l l in favour of the induction of modem 
technology in to Afghanistan but a t the same time he feared tha t 
59 
i t would lead to the penetrat ion of foreign influence. He was 
also opposed to the s ta t ion ing of B r i t i s h troops or advisers in 
Afghanistan, During 1887-88 when the Amir was faced with 
Ghilzal rebel l ion and revo l t of Ishaq Khan, he proclaimed tha t 
the B r i t i s h were waiting a t the border for his c a l l to coii« to 
his he lp . In f ac t , he did not inv i te the B r i t i s h arny. His 
purpose was only to warn his enemies and he was not incl ined 
60 
to inv i t e foreign troops on Afghan s o i l . 
The independent thinking of Amir Abdur Rahman was noticed 
by the B r i t i s h . Lord Dxifferin wrote to the Amir in 1886 t " , , , 
your mind i s constantly occupied by the idea of asser t ing your 
independence of a l l control In In terna l a f f a i r s , t ha t you see 
57 NAI, n , 51 , Nos, 213-239, August 1882, K,W, I , p , 4 , 
68 I b i d , , Nos, 475-488, June 1892, No. 475. 
59 Adamec, n , 50, p# 23 . 
60 NAI, n , 51 , Nos, 76-83, August 189P, No, 81A, pp. 6-7. 
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61 
interference In every B r i t i s h ac t ion , " 
( l i t ) PxfflwUQQ ...gf Balfflce Jit Poye?; t 
During the reign of Amir Abdur Rahraan, the geopol i t i ca l 
s i tua t ion In the neighbourhood of Afghanistan had assumed 
s ign i f i can t dimensions, Anglo-Russian r iva l ry was a t I t s 
zeni th . Both great powers were increasing and expanding the 
Sphere of influence in Islamic countr ies — Afghanistan, Pers ia 
and Ottoman Empire, 
Under these circumstances, Arrlr wanted Afghanistan to 
pursue a "middle course** policy of forging closer r e l a t ions 
with neighbouring Islamic countries without annoying the e i t he r 
great power In the neighbourhood. According to Adamec: "Abdur 
Rahman's r e l a t ions with the more or l e s s Independent Muslim 
populations of the East were influenced by Pan-Islamic 
62 
considerations**. 
According to Amir Abdur Rahman, the Russian volley was 
essentlal . ly t ha t ' ' r igh t ly or wrongly, f r iendly or \infrlendly, 
with peace or war, the I s i an l c kingdoms Phou3.d be washed away 
63 
from the face of the Asiat ic continent**. 
Arlr Abdur Rahman vms perhaps also convinced t h a t the 
Russians were determined to annex Pers ia , Turkey and Afghanistan, 
by hook or crook. There were two possible ways of doing so . In 
61 I b i d . , Nos. 573-77, August 18?>2, No, 575, p . 5 . 
68 Adamec, n , 50, p , 24, 
63 Mir Munshl Sultan Mahomed Khan, ed . , 
1?§S„UC?-Ql' Alaaw Ratoaa (London, 1900), v o l . I I , 
. 260, 
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the first place, Russians could directly befriend these 
countries and thus draw them to their orbit or on the other 
hand provoke these countries against Britain and eventually 
reach mi understanding with the British in crushing them and 
64 
thus dividing the booty. 
The Afghan Amir also recounted in his memoirs that the 
Russians were planning to attack India t "Russia expected that 
an attack on India would be accompanied by a general uprising 
In that country, followed by a quick Russian victory, since 
65 
Britain, as a seapower, was no match for Russia on land". 
In the wake of such geo-political compulsions, Amir Abdur 
Rahman proposed the establishment of an Islamic alliance among 
Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, which could separate the two 
great empires neither allowing Russia nor England to take any 
66 
part of o\ir dominions". The Amir was convinced about the 
nefarious designs of both great powers and added that no single 
power could usurp Afghanistan without invoking the hostility of 
the other. He felt that although "these neighbours are a cause 
of much anxiety to Afghanistan, yet, as they are pulling against 
each other, they are no less an advantage and protection for 
Afghanistan than a danger ^ and indeedJ7 a great deal of safety 
of the Afghan Government depends upon the fact that neither of 
these two neighbours can bear to allow the other to annex an 
67 
inch of Afghan territory," 
64 Ibid, 
65 Ibid., p, 272, 
66 Ibid., p, 266, 
67 Ibid,, p. 171. 
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Thus, Amtr Abdur Rahman kept Afghanistan politically 
Intact by pursuing a policy of strict neutrality by warding 
off th© Internal or external Interference by either great 
power. He also maintained th© balance of power to the 
advantage of Afghanistan, 
The Durand Line agreement signed between Amir Abdur 
Rahman and the British India In 1S93 Is analysed In the 
succeeding pages because of Its recurring references In 
subsequent years. 
Following the death of Amir Abdur Rahman In October 1901, 
his son, Hablbullah succeeded as new Amtr of Afghanistan during 
the same month. Amir Hablbullah was faced with a critical 
foreign political challenge because both Russia and Britain 
68 
desired a change in the political status quo of Afghanistan, 
The Russians wanted to have direct relations with the new 
Afghan Amir but the British were opposed to such a move and 
wanted to retain their hold over the conduct of Afghan foreign 
affairs. 
The B r i t i s h Indian Oovemn^nt, while sending the 
condolence message to the new Amir over th© demise of l a t e 
Amir Abdur Rahman, hinted tha t a mission would be required to 
meet the new Amir to confirm the previous Anglo-Afghan 
69 
agreements, Br i t a in also Informed Russia tha t there prevai led 
70 
a s t a tus QUO even a f te r the death of Amir Abdur Rahman, 
68 Adamec, n , 19, p , 9 , 
69 KAI, n , 51, Nos. 1-129, November 1901, Nos, 9, 22, 36 . 
70 I b i d . , Nos, 8»48, December 1901, No, 37, 
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However Aalr Hablbullab in his reply on 3 i October IPOl, while 
ignoring the British hint, promised that he would honour the 
agreements made by his late father with the British Indian 
Government "so long a* the illustrious British Government 
71 
firmly adhere to them," 
However, the Russians wanted a change In the status quo. 
Even prior to the death of Abdur Rahman, the Russians had 
expressed such a desire on 1 February 1S99, a Russian 
publication Novoe Vremva contained a hint In this regardt 
Russia, whose frontiers run more than 2000 
versts with that of Afghanistan, cannot 
settle the most simple, but unavoidable, 
frontier question through her relations with 
the powers of this neighbouring state. For 
this purpose, we have to communicate with 
London, and London with Simla, and from Simla 
attempts begin to enter into negotiations 
with Kabul, which can easily lead to no 
result, as the Amir already for some tlmej 
and on every possible occasion, shows that 
he Is not a vassal of England... 72 
It further suggested the stationing of representatives of both 
Russia and Britain in Kabul — a move which could help in 
removing the British distrust of a Russian invasion of India. 
In this regard, M, Lesar, Secretary at the Russian Embassy in 
London, informed the British Government on 6 February 1900t 
Russo-Afghan relations have been defined by 
the Arrangement of 1872 and 1873, which 
Russia regards as still being in effect and 
as placing Afghanistan entirely outside her 
sphere of action. Although Russia's obliga-
tions only bind her to refrain from political 
action, she has, except in the case of transient 
deviation from the correct standard of diplomatic 
71 Ib id . 
72 I b i d . , No. 106-108, May 189P, No. 108. 
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action, consented In the past, from a feeling of 
friendly interest toward Great Britain, to 
forego even non-political relations ,,, the 
moment would accordingly appear to have come 
when a definite step sl^uld be taken In the 
regularization of these relations,,,, 73 
Thus It Is evident from these pronouncements that Russia had 
predetermined to have direct relations with Kabul even prior to 
the taking over by Hablbullah as the new Amir of Afghanistan, 
There ensued a series of diplomatic negotiations between 
Russia and England in which London wanted to know Russian 
intentions of having direct relations with Kabul with a view to 
ascertain if a mutually satisfactory solution could be found. 
On 29 January 1902, the British envoy in St, Ptersburg conveyed 
a verbal declaration of his Government to the Russians that 
Britain did not wish to contend that "there was no force In the 
Russian arguments for direct comirunicatlons on matters of local 
detail, but that as having charge of Afghan foreign relations, 
th^ held that arrangements for the purpose could only be made 
74 
with their consent", Ludwlg W, Adamec feels that now it was 
left to Russia to formulate proposals as to the change of the 
s^^tus QUO and to give guarantees that any relations would 
75 
remain of a nonpolitical character. However on 19 December 
1902, the Novoe Vremva. a Soviet publication, carried a 
statement of the Russian Foreign Office which statedj 
73 Ibid,, Nos, 145-147, May 1900, Note No, 147, Bncl, 1, 
p. 55, 
74 Quoted in Adamec, n, 50, p» 33, 
75 Ibid. 
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In regard to our relations to Afghanistan, It must 
be remarked that In this matter we made no request 
to the London Cabinet, but that we merely Intimated 
our decision to enter Into direct relations with 
Afghanistan In consequence of altered circumstances. 
No further explanations have taken place on this 
subject, 76 
Both Britain and Russia stuck to their respective positions 
which created an Impasse, In the meanwhile, Russians Initiated 
diplomatic offences resulting In a series of Incidents, In 
September IPOS, the Afghan officials noticed removal of boundary-
pillars at Meshed by the Russians, The Russian Government, 
however, expressed Its willingness to reinstate the boundary 
pillars by a joint Russo-Afghan commission but Amir Hablbullah 
77 
declined the Russian suggestion. The Afghan Amir, at that 
Juncture, asked for the British advice and the latter offered to 
send a representative. However, the Russians rejected the Idea 
of dealing with the British representative and went ahead with 
the task of restoring some of the pillars themselves. In the 
meantime Meshed area was hit by a famine and some Russians were 
reportedly selling wheat at cheap rates to the Afghans in the 
famine hit areas. Thus on the one pretext or the other, the 
Russians got an opportunity to deal and negotiate with local 
Afghan officials In Meshed and Herat, 
In the wake of these developments the British Indian 
Government got alarmed and thought that a permanent British 
representative should be stationed at Herat, However this 
76 NAI, n, 51, Wos. 145-147, May 1900, No. 147, 
Sncl, 1, p, 59, 
77 Ibid,, Nos, 40-183, February 1904, Bncl, 1, 
No. 147. 
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Idea was shelved for the time being because the then Viceroy^ 
Lord Curzon, cautioned the British against such a move since 
It would frighten the Amir who might resent Russian pressure 
78 
Just as much as he did British. 
AS a follow up of these developments, the British inpressed 
upon the Afghan Amir the need for the revision of Anglo-Afghan 
agreements signed earlier on the plea that those agreements were 
concluded with the late Amir Abdur Rahman as person, subject to 
79 
renegotiations with every successor. However, Amir Habibullah 
asserted that there was no need to renegotiate those agreements. 
Following prolonged discussions, the Amir finally agreed to accept 
a British mission In this regard at Kabul. 
Consequently, a British mission headed by Louis W, Dane 
reached Kabul on 12 December 1Q04 to renegotiate the Anglo-
Afghan agreements in force during the reign of late Amir 
Abdur Rahman, It came to be known as Dane Mission, The 
negotiations between the British officials and Afghan officials 
lasted until the end of March 1?>05, The main issue around 
which the discussions veered was the nature of Anglo-Afghan 
agreement of 1880 and Its revision. The major British objective 
was both to get the Agreement of 1880 renewed with favourable 
modifications and resolve the vexing question of Russo-Afghan 
relations. However, Amir Habibullah*s main objective was to 
remain independent and not to serve as a "mere pawn on the 
78 Ibid,, Nos, 83-162, August 1P03, No. 155, Notes, 
79 Adamec, n, 19, p, 10. 
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80 
chessboard of Indian mi l i t a ry defence". Consequently, both 
the sides exchanged draf ts of the proposed t r e a t y . The copy of 
the B r i t i s h draf t t r ea ty was given by Dane to the Afghan AmLr who 
objected to the word "Slvasi" as a t r ans l a t ion for "Poli t ical* ' 
for his foreign r e l a t i o n s . This shows tha t the Amir was 
conscious of not accepting any provision in the proposed t r ea ty 
which could imdermine the Afghan na t iona l i n t e r e s t s . 
The prolonged se r i e s of negot ia t ions resu l ted in the 
conclusion of what became to be known as Habibullah-Dane Treaty 
81 
on 21 March 1Q05, The Amir. Habibullah was recognized by the 
B r i t i s h as the "Independent King of the S ta te of Afghanistan 
and i t s Dependencies" and he was to be addressed as "His 
82 
Majesty", The t r ea ty reaffirmed the annual subsidy granted 
in 1893, allowing the Amir to co l l ec t £ 400,000 in undrawn 
subsidy payments and Afghanistan's r i g h t to import arms without 
83 
r e s t r i c t i o n s . 
The Amir was very cautious about B r i t i s h s t r a t e g i c 
manoeuvres. He declined to accord trade concessions to the 
B r i t i s h in Afghanistan as well as introduction of railways in 
84 
his country. Under the new t r ea ty though the B r i t i s h f a i l ed 
80 NAI, Foreign Section F , No, 34*136, January 1905, 
No, 185, Notes, 
81 For t ex t of the Treaty see Altchlson, n , 24, v o l , XI I I , 
pp. 282-83, 
82 Ib id , 
83 Augus Hamilton, PrffU .^gjS Qf 1^ ?^ ^1<3^1? ^ s ^ (London, 1909), p , 268, 
84 Ib id , Also see . Mohammed All , Afghanistan t The 
!!JQnaBaW<3iaat P?r io^ (Kabul, 1959), p , 148. 
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to obtain the right to set up a diplomatic mission In Kabul yet 
they retained control of Afghanistan's foreign relations and 
85 
considered the treaty as a renewal of the Durand Agreement, 
The Russians expressed apprehensions about the Anglo-
Afghan agreement lest the British seek to alter the then 
existing pattern of Indo-Afghan relations by annexing or 
occupying Afghan territory. In this regard, the British 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdovme, with a view to allay Russian 
misgivings, assured the Russian Ambassador in London, Coimt 
Benckendorff, that Britain would not interfere in the internal 
86 
affairs of Afghanistan and maintain status QUO. 
The British on their part sought a similar assurance 
from the Russian Government for maintaining status quo in their 
policy towards Afghanistan and regarding the latter "as wholly 
87 
outside the sphere of their influence**. After having secured 
such an assurance from St, Petersburg, the British were willing 
to allow the Russians to have interchange of communications 
betwew the Russian and Afghan frontier officials on non-
85 
political matters of a local nature. However the Russians 
89 
refused to give a formal assurance in this regard. However 
Russians expressed satisfaction over it. 
85 C. Colin Davles, T^Q ?rgl?;e|p of t^^ ^ Ngrt^^-Wga^ FrQ^t^gg (Cambridge, U.K., 1932), p , 167, 
86 Lansdowne to Benckendorff, 17 February 1907, 
B r i t i s h Documents on the Origin of Wary ===-(London, 1929), v o l , IV, pp, 520-21, 
87 Ibid, 
88 Lansdowne to Hardinge, 8 March 1905, ibid,, p, 521, 
89 Ibid, 
29 
Towards ^^i^ Anglo^Rusj 
The Hablbullah-Dane agreement was concluded a t a time 
when Russia was entangled In h o s t i l i t i e s with Japan, Russia 
was defeated a t the hand? of Japan, The renewal of Ango-
Japanese t r ea ty of 1?»02 in 1P05 made the Russians hes i t an t 
towards the B r i t i s h with regard to Afghanistan, For Russia, 
the t r ea ty envisaged implications for the Afghan policy of the 
B r i t i s h Indian Government, and was,, therefore , directed against 
90 
i t . The Russians feared tha t the B r i t i s h Government had 
enter ta ined some designs on the Russian possessions of Central 
91 Asia and "Special Russian In t e r e s t s " in Pers ia , In October 
1905, the Russian Foreign Minister , Count Lansdorff apprised 
the B r i t i s h Ambassador of the adverse ef fec t caused in Russia 
9S 
about the Anglo-Japanese t r e a t y . 
The year 1905 had brought changes in domestic p o l i t i c a l 
scenario both in Br i ta in and Russia, The new s e t up of govern-
ment in Russia with Alexander I sva l sk l as new Foreign Minister , 
sought f r iendly ra ther than competitive re la t ionsh ip with B r i t a i n , 
During the same year the Liberals came to power in London, The 
increasing influence of Germany had brought Br i ta in and France 
93 
close to each other under the Immutable law of balance of power. 
In the wake of Russia ' s close r e l a t ions with France and French-
90 I b i d , , pp. 203-7, 
91 Ib id . 
92 I b i d , , pp. 203-4, Enclosure in No, 193, 
93 For d e t a i l s about B r i t i s h policy towards France and 
Germany see , i b i d , , v o l . I I I , pp. 379-440. 
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British Qptente^ Russia also made efforts to forge close ties 
with London, Consequently, In May 1906 both countries started 
negotiations which lasted until August 1P07, with the main purpose 
of resolving differences and forge cooperation on mutually agreed 
terms. Consequently on 31 August 1907, Britain and Russia signed 
an agreement which came to he known as Anglo-Russian Convention 
of 1907, It comprised three agreements on each on Persia, 
94 
Afghanistan and Tibet, The part pertaining to Afghanistan 
was on the whole more favourable to Britain, 
The Russians conceded that Afghanistan was out of their 
sphere of Influence and agreed to conduct their political 
relations with Afghanistan through the intermediary of the 
95 
British Government, The Russians gained only in terms of 
local question of a non-political nature which could be settled 
directly by the Afghan and Russian officials. 
The British Government on its part declared its adherence 
to the provisions of the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1905 and also 
declared not to Interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. 
In other words, British control over the conduct of Afghan 
foreign policy was conceded in the Convention, 
However the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 came as a 
shock for Amir Habibullah and the people of Afghanistan, 
According to Vartan Gregorian, perhaps "no single event gave as 
much Impetus to the growth of Afghan nationalism as the Anglo-
94 For the text of the Convention dealing with Afghanistan 
see C,H, Phillips, yt?e gv9t^ 1^ t9y^  Qt 1^44^ m<3 P^ Ktst^ aR 
:^5a-l947 (London, 1962), pp, 485-6, 
95 British Documents, n, 86, vol, IV, p, 535, 
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Russian Convention of IPO?**. The fifth article of the 
Convention provided that It would come Into force only after the 
British Government had obtained the consent of the Amir of 
Afghanistan and notified the same to the Government of Russia* 
Though the Convention required the approval of the Afghan AmLr 
but he was not consulted by the British In this regard. The 
Afghan Government feared that the Convention posed a threat to 
97 
Afghan Independence, AmLr Hablbutlah was determined to keep 
Afghanistan completely Independent and to that end he wanted to 
refrain from having any closer relations with either of the two 
great powers. Thus the Amir of Afghanistan expressed his 
reluctance to adhere to the Anglo-Russlan Convention. 
The British Indian Government offered several explanations 
that the Convention was In no way a slight on Afghan Independence 
but all this failed to appease or allay the misgivings of Afghan 
98 
Government, 
During Amir Hablbullah 's v i s i t to India In 1908, the then 
Viceroy Lord Mlnto t r i e d to convince the Amir % "I cannot but 
think tha t your Majesty w i l l regard the conclusion of the 
99 
Convention with l i v e l y s a t i s f a c t i o n " . The Afghan Amir while 
acknowledging the r ece ip t of Mlnto's message promised t h a t he 
would send his rep ly . After keeping the B r i t i s h Government In 
suspense for about a year, Amir Hablbullah In his f i f ty - four 
96 Gregorian, n , 14, p , 211, 
97 Percy Sykes, History of Afghanistan (London, 1940), 
v o l , I I , p» 47. 
98 NAI, Foreign Section F, No. I l l , 14 August 1908, 
99 I b i d , , No, 94-128, October 1908, No, 98 . 
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page reply stated that the Convention destroyed the independence 
of Afghanistan. It further added that "if they /"the BritishJ^ 
act in contravention of the principle laid down by them in the 
past, they will have to show a better principle to their own 
100 
Government and to ours". However, Afghanistan never signed 
the Convention, 
Seeing that there was no change in Afghan attitude on 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, the British Foreign Secretary, 
Sir Bdward Grey and his Soviet counterpart, A.P, Isvolsky, agreed 
In late 1908 that consent of the Afghan Amir was not necessary. 
Consequently, the British Government declared that "as the Amir 
had raised no ob;)Gction to Article 3, and was not prohibiting 
communication between his frontier officials and those of Russia, 
we saw no reason why the Convention should not continue to work 
101 
well, for the Amir was in practice, acting upon it," 
Despite these differences, Anglo-Afghan relations remained 
normal in the years preceding the outbreak of First World War, 
The cautious and independent nature of foreign policy pursued 
by Amir Habibullah deterred both Britain and Russia from exerting 
any sort of pressure on Afghanistan, 
On the home front, Amir further consolidated his position 
by initiating reforms and projects of modernization. The 
international developments occurring during that period had 
considerable impact in Kabul, Turkey's war with Italy and Balkan 
100 Ibid,, No, 99, 
101 Ibid, B, Grey to A, Nicolson, 13 October 1908t 
Nos, 51*65, December 1908, No, 61, 
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were "polllAclzed Afghans and taught them the lesson of unity 
102 
and Islamic solidarity". Nationalists like Mahaaid Tarzl 
played notable role in this regard. Taral's SlraLal^Akhbitr. 
a prominent newspaper, Sjaterpreted world affairs from the Pan-
103 
IslaMc and Afghan perspective. 
Afghanistan and First World Wg^ r 
The outbreak of the First World War In the sumpier of 1914 
forced both Britain and Russia not to force the Convention of 
1907 on Afghanistan, On 7 August 1914, Lord Hardinge informed 
Amir Hablbullah about the outbreak of war in Europe between 
Russia, Franca and Britain on one side and GermaiTy and Austria 
104 
on the other and the Amir was urged to remain neutral. The 
Afghan Amir promptly replied pledging hie continued adherence to 
the Anglo-Afghan treaty obligations and declared his determination 
105 
to maintain neutrality In the war. 
Following Turkey Joining the war, the British became 
apprehensive about the possibilities of misgivings between Britain 
and Afghanistan in the wake of Britain's war with the Ottoman 
Empire. Consequently on 5 November 1915 Lord Hardinge Informed 
Amir Hablbullah that "owing to the ill-advised, unprovoked and 
deliberate action of the Ottoman Government, war has broken out 
103 Ibid. 
104 Hardinge to Hablbullah, 7 August 1914, 
^rtttfffti PQgttttfntgi n* S6, vol . 4, pp. 528-&9. 
105 Hablbullah to Hardinge, 18 August 1914, ib id , , 
pp. 540*42* 
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between Great Br i t a in and Turkey**, The B r i t i s h Viceroy 
fur ther added t h a t B r i t a i n ' s war against Turkey was in no sense 
a r e l ig ious war and Br i ta in Jiad the support of Muslim community 
In India and Pe r s i a , He f i n a l l y urged the Anlr t " I f ee l sure 
tha t Your Majesty w i l l not waver from the a t t i t u d e of 
107 
n e u t r a l i t y , . , you hare already guaranteed**. The Afghan Amir, 
Hablbullah r e i t e r a t ed his country 's continued commitment to the 
policy of n e u t r a l i t y . The B r i t i s h Government was s a t i s f i e d with 
Amir's assurancep. 
However the B r i t i s h rea l ized t h a t the Afghan mood was 
syn^athet lc to the Turkey and not to Germany, An Englishman 
wrote to his r e l a t i \ ' e s In Bombay from Kabuli "Almost everyone In 
Kabul was strongly a n t l - B r l t l s h and pro-Turkish, except the Amir, 
who Speaks seldom In publ ic ••• £'h\ktj occasionally remarks t h a t 
108 
the B r i t i s h were very powerful,** The Afghan public opinion was 
ref lec ted by the popular newspaper Slra.1»a^-Akhbar- Mahmud Khan 
Tarzl wri t ing In the Issue of 16 April 1915 of Slra.1-al-j^^hbar 
expressed his surpr ise tha t Al l ies and Axis powers were put t ing 
blame for the war on the shoulders of the o the r . While ••the chief 
and the only cause of t h i s general bloodshed Is the commercial 
r i va l ry between England and Germany and t h e i r respect ive claims 
to supremacy based on t h e i r achievements in science, expansion of 
106 India Office (London), PS Papers 4741 (1914), 
Memo Ho, 173, 
107 Ib id , 
108 NAl, FPS'War, Nos. 1-202, December 1915, No, 12. 
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t e r r i t o r y and naval s t r eng th" . 
WhU© pursuing the policy of s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y , A d r 
Hablbullah did not respond to German over tures . The B r i t i s h 
King George V sent a personal l e t t e r to Amir Hahlhullah comrnendlng 
110 
the Afghan ru l e r for maintaining s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y . The 
B r i t i s h could not afford to disbel ieve Amir Hablbullah*s 
commitment to the policy of s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y during tfcrti^  war 
per iod. On 5 November 1<>15, the" Viceroy of India In his repor t 
sent to London observedi "The a t t i t u d e of the Amir continues to 
be most s a t i s f a c t o r y . He i s one of the few statesmen in the 
111 
East, and his conduct has r e a l l y of a l l p r a i s e " . During 1915 
and ear ly 1916, the Germans t r i ed to woo Amir Hablbullah to sign 
112 
a t r ea ty with Germany, But the Amir refused to respond to 
German overtures and r e i t e r a t e d his adherence to the p r inc ip le 
of s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y . 
The col lapse of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of Turkey's 
defeat in the F i r s t World War, the advent of the Bolshevik 
revolut ion In Russia In 1917 and the defeat of Axis Powers in the 
war had changed the in te rna t iona l p o l i t i c a l scenar io . The 
maintenance of s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y by Afghanistan during the war 
period and re jec t ion of German overtures by Amir Hablbullah had 
made the B r i t i s h Governments in India and London think how to 
reward Amir's l oya l ty . Amir Hablbullah wanted his country 's 
109 I b i d . , March 1916, No, l 6 , p , 7 , 
110 I b i d . , F ron t ie r B, May 1916, Nos. 1-288, No, 280. 
111 India Office, n , 106, Memo A-173a, 
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Independence recognised by Britain including Afghanistan's 
freedom of maintaining political relations with other countries. 
Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy of India, wrote to London, asserting 
that "the services of the Amir have been immense, and when the 
113 
time comes to reward them, we must be generous". According 
to Lord Chelmsford, the Afghan Amir could ask for the following 
concessions from Britain (t) complete political freedom, 
(11) territorial aggrandizement, (ill) money, and 
114 
(Iv) representation in England. On 2 February 1919, Amir 
Habibullah wrote to the Indian Viceroy that his country be 
represented at the Peace Conference because Afghanistan was an 
Independent country and had remained neutral during the war. 
The Amir further stipulated that if the Viceroy could bring a 
signed certificate of Afghan independence from the Conference 
he would be satisfied; otherwise an Afghan representative must 
115 
be allowed to attend the conference to obtain one,,. The 
Viceroy's Council was willing to provide some concessions to 
Afghanistan, However Denys Brag, a member of Viceroy's Council, 
remarked! 
, , , Our control of Afghanistan's foreign r e l a t i ons 
have been so long a fundamental p r inc ip le of our 
Afghan policy tha t I t requires an e f for t of mind 
to conceive of our wi l l ing ly consenting to any 
diminution of i t . Possibly i t m^ prove e s s e n t i a l 
t ha t i t should continue to dominate our po l icy . 
But the present i s so d i f ferent from the pas t , and 
113 NAI, Foreign Secret F, Nos, 705-806, 
October 1920, No, 705, Notes, 
114 Ib id , 
115 Ib id , 
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the future seems l i k e l y to be so much more 
d i f ferent s t i l l , t ha t the time has come for 
us to scrutinlzse our t r a d i t i o n a l policy anew, 116 
Thus Brag opined tha t Br i t a in should not a l l e v i a t e i t s control 
over Afghan foreign relat lcais and recommended the conclusion of 
a def in i te t rea ty between Afghanistan and the B r i t i s h India , 
However, Viceroy's nwod of "being generous" to Amir 
Habibullah was not shared by London which advised the Viceroy to 
stave off the Amir t e l l i n g how tha t pa r t i c ipa t ion a t the Peace 
Conference was open only to b e l l i g e r e n t s , and t h a t In te rna t iona l 
guarantee would be no good^ to Afghanistan, even if they could be 
secured, since they might lead to Interference by other 
117 
n a t i o n s , , . 
(I>) P Q Pe;cW Qf pelernslYQ He^tyftltsn 
Following the assass inat ion of Amir Habibullah on 
29 February 1919, Amanullah succeeded the throne of Afghanistan 
on 21 February 1919, After assuming the power, the f i r s t thing 
Amir Amanullah did was tha t he wrote a l e t t e r on 3 March 1919 to 
the B r i t i s h Viceroy in India , informing the l a t t e r of his 
f a t h e r ' s death, r e i t e r a t e d his Government's pollcyt 
, , , our independent and free Government of 
Afghanistan considers i t s e l f ready and prepared 
a t every time and season to conclude, with due 
regards to every consideration of the r enu i re -
ments of fr iendship and the l i k e , such arrange-
ments and t r e a t i e s with the mighty Government of 
England as may be useful and serviceable in the 
way of commercial gains and advantages to our 
Government and yours , 118 
116 I b i d . , No, 706, Notes, 
117 I b i d , , No, 705, Notes, 
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Again on 13 April lf>l?*, Amir Amanullah announced in a durbart 
• . , I have declared myself and my country e n t i r e l y 
f r ee , autonomous and Independent, both in t e rna l ly 
and ex te rna l ly . W country wi l l hereaf ter be as 
independent a s t a t e as the other s t a t e s and powers 
of the world a r e . No foreign power wi l l be allowed 
to have a halves breadth of hlght to in te r fe re 
in t e rna l ly or ex te rna l ly . With the a f fa i r s of 
AfghaiAlstan, and If any ever does I am ready to cut 
I t s throat with t h i s sword, 119 
The Viceroy of India in his reply to the Afghan Antr 
remained non-committal and only thanked the l a t t e r for Informing 
tha t he had become the Amir of Afghanistan, Amir Amanullah was 
proclaimed as King of Afghanistan In March 1919, However the 
B r i t i s h Government maintained complete s i lence to Amanullah*s 
demand for recognition of his accession to the throne. The 
B r i t i s h s i lence conveyed an impression tha t Amanullah's r i s e to 
120 
pov/er was not favourably viewed by London,,, 
II^IN ^Rl<S'M{<Wh wag. 
The proclamation of Amir Amanullah as the King of 
Afghanistan was f a c i l i t a t e d through a firmai^ envisaging tha t he 
was proclaimed King by the people and t h a t he accepted on 
condition tha t 
(1) Afghanistan should be In te rna l ly and external ly 
f r ee ; 
(11) the people should uni te with him to avenge the 
assass inat ion of Hablbullah, and 
( i l l ) the people should be f ree and no one be oppressed 
and government should be by law , , , " 121 
119 I b i d , , Foreign Secret F , Nos, 705-806, October 1920, No, 720, 
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The dawn of the May month In 1Q1«> marked the crossing of 
Indo-Afghan boundary by the regiiLar Afglian force . On 1 May 1919, 
Saleh MoiianHnad Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, moved to the Indian 
border, and reached a t Dakka on 3 May 1919 along with two 
companies of infantry "for the os tens ib le purpose of inspecting 
122 
the b o r d e r . . . " In a couple of days, Mcyoammad Nadir Khan 
arrived in Khost with regular Afghan troops and AhdvCL Kuddus Khan 
123 
proceeded to Kandhar , , , 
^he firman issued by King Amanullah, which had begun to 
c i r cu l a t e among the tribesmen l iv ing on the Afghan side of the 
Indo-Afghan border, H,nter &X%^ s ta ted In pa r t t 
I send t h i s order to a l l subjects of the Eastern 
c i r c l e s who are sayylds, Shaikhs, Mullahs, Khans and 
Motabars and t e l l you t h a t there i s a grea t unres t 
in India , Hindus and Muliammedans have almost a l l 
remained f a i t h f u l , , , but i t i s a p i t y tha t they have 
been rewarded by crue l ty and a l l kinds of in jus t i ces 
in connaction with t h e i r r e l i g ion , t h e i r honour and 
t h e i r ffiodesl^. 124 
125 
The firman fur ther s ta ted tha t the uprising occurring in India 
a lso affected Afghanistan, therefore Saleh Mohammad was deputed 
126 
with f u l l power for the protect ion of Afghanistan's boundaries. 
On 4 May 1919, the Afghan troops cut the water supply to Landl 
Kotal once the B r i t i s h forces r e t a l i a t e d by closing the Kl^ber 
122 Adaiaec, n , 50, p . 111, 
123 NAI, Foreign Secret F, Nos, 1-235, July 1919, No, 1. 
124 I b i d , , Nos, 1-200B, August 1919, Appendix to Notes, 
126 During tha t period, the Khalifat movement was launched in 
India which cal led upon the B r i t i s h Government t ha t Indian 
%isllms could cooperate with the B r i t i s h during th^ar of 
the l a t t e r did not launch was against Turkey, the sea t of 
Khi la fa t , 
126 NAI, Foreign Secret F, Nos, 1-200B, August 1919, 
Appendix to Notes, 
40 
Pass, Two days l a t e r the Afghanistan forces In the region were 
127 
increased and tViey occupied Tor Trappar and Spinatsuka, The 
Afghans then moved three regiments firom Jalalabad to Mohamand 
country, and Kadir Khan arr ived a t Khost with troops and several 
128 
thousand tribesmen, irost of therc Ohi l za i s . 
The B r i t i s h r e t a l i a t e d on 7 Kay l^lP by dispatching a 
column to Landi Kotal and another to Parachinar , A Cavalry 
129 
brigade was sent on 7 May to Shahgai on the Kalagori Road, 
In the beginning the h o s t i l i t i e s were confined to the eastern 
f ront and the B r i t i s h regis tered some success. The t r i b a l 
armies and the forces of Nadir Khan then opened up a new front 
and the B r i t i s h offensive moves were stopped. The B r i t i s h sent 
f ee le r s to the Afghan King for ending the h o s t i l i t i e s . On 
24 May 1<^19, King Ajjianullah responded to the B r i t i s h peace 
overtures end the B r i t i s h Government gladly accepted the end of 
h o s t i l i t i e s in the wake of rapidly de te r io ra t ing s i tua t ion in the 
North-West F ron t i e r , Series of negot ia t ions between the two 
countr ies led to the conclusion of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty on 
8 August 1919 a t Rawalpindi under which Afghanistan was 
130 
recognized as a fu l ly sovereign country, Amanullah paid 
a pr ice for Afghan Independence, "However, he was forced to 
131 
recognize the Durand Line,,,** 
127 m d l a Office Library (London), Memoranda Nos, A 177, A 183, 
128 Ib id , 
129 Ib id , 
130 For t ex t of the Treaty see, Aitchlson, n , 24, v o l , XI I I , 
pp, 286-88. 
131 Gregorian, n , 14, p , 231, 
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When King Ananullah had assumed the reins of power tn 
Afghanistan, the latter*s confrontation with Britain was under 
way. Consequently, Amanullah's foreign policy followed three 
distinct paths -- establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Russia, normalization of relations with Britain and forging 
solidarity with the Muslim world. 
On 7 April IP19, King Amanullah despatched two letters 
to Moscow, One letter sent in the nan» of Mahmud Tarzl, then 
named as Foreign Minister of Afghanistan informed the "Great 
President of the Hussian Republic (Lenin)" of the enthronement 
132 
of the benevolent Amir Amanullah Khan, The second letter, a 
personal note from Amanullah to Lenin stressed the fact that 
Afghanistan was free and independent, and pointed out that the 
Afghan "psychology had always contained in it ideas of equality, 
X33 
humanity and liberty", Lenin in his reply sent on 27 May 
1919, congratulated the Amir and the people of Afghanistan for 
their heroic defence of liberty and accepting the proposal to 
134 
establish relations with Russia, 
In April 1919, an "Afghan Mission" headed by Maulvi 
Barakatullah arrived in Moscow, However, Maulvi Barakatullah, 
disowing any official status or relationship with Afghan 
Government, declared that he was neither a comirunist or 
socialist but an Asian nationalist interested in ousting the 
132 For full text of the letter, see Ministerctvo 
Innostranlkh del SSSR, vol, H , p, 175 as cited in 
Kapur, n, 120, p, 217, 
133 Ib id . 
134 The Times (London), 13 June 1919, 
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135 
British from India, In early June i91o, an Afghan mission 
led by Mohammad Wall Khan was cordially received in Tashkent and 
Russia granted permission to Afghanistan to open an Afghan 
consulate there. While opening the consulate, the Afghan envoy, 
Mohammad Aslam Khan, saidi "We who have risen against the 
tyrannical British, and made friends with the Russian Soviet, 
have not done so merely to liberate ourselves or the oppressed 
Muhammadans of India alone. We strive for the salvation of 
136 
Muhammadans all over the world**. The Afghan objective of 
establishing diplomatic relations with Russia was to make its 
northern borders secure and "to be able to conclude an alliance 
with the Soviets in case of a renewed outbreak of the Anglo* 
137 
Afghan war**. 
The Afghan Mission headed by Mohammad Wall Khan reached 
Moscow on 10 October 1«>19 and welcomed by Narimanov, the 
representative of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and 
Sxatan Galiev, the representative of the Revolutionary Council 
of the Soviet Republics, In his welcome address Narimanov, while 
referring to the visit of the mission as "first Ambassador" of 
Afghanistan further added that the "historic event proves that 
imperialism which aims at the enslavement and humiliation of 
138 
la rge and small na t ions , has h'^en given a death blow**. Sultan 
135 Xenia J , Budin and Robert C, North, e d s , , Soviet Russ: 
and the Bast 1Q2Q-1927 (Stanford: Stanford un ivers i ty 
P ress , 1P57), p , 83 , 
136 Adamec, n» 19, p . 53 , 
137 The T ^ e s (London), 28 October l ^ ig . 
138 Ib id , 
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Gallev went further and frankly stated that Soviet Russia would 
139 
render assistance to Afghanistan, On 14 October loi9, the 
Afghan envoy was received personally by Lenin who expressed the 
pleasure of his government at the presence of the Afghan 
140 
Ambassador in the capital of Soviet Hussia. On this occasion 
the Afghan Ambassador handed over to Lenin, a letter from the 
Amir of Afghanistan and personally stressed the importance of 
141 
military assistance to Afghanistan, Lenin in his reply to 
AraLr*s letter on 27 November 19IP wrote that Afghanistan was 
"the only independent Muslim state in the world, and the fate 
sends the Afghan people the great historic task of uniting about 
itself enslaved Mohammedan peoples and leading them on the road 
142 
to freedom and independence. The desire of both Kabul and 
Moscow to normalize relations led to negotiations in Moscow In 
143 
this regard, 
Afghan-Soviet Differences Over Bukhara 
The negotiations regarding the normalization of relations 
between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union suffered a setback in 
the autumn of 1920 because of the rleing differences between the 
two countries over the future of Bukhara, Prior to 1917, Bukhara 
was a protectorate of Russian Empire, In 1868, the Amir of 
139 Ib id , 
140 I b i d . , 15 October 1919, 
141 Louis F i sche r , j n? . ?9Yl?^s IP Worl<3 m^U^ t 1?17-1?SP (Londont Jonathan Cape, 1930), v o l , I , p , 286, 
142 Kapur, n , 120, p . 221, 
143 Ibid. 
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Bukhara ta&d acknowledged the sovereignty of the Russian Tsar 
and ceded to him the r i gh t to represent Bukhara with other 
144 
powers, 
Following the adrent of Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, 
the Russian leader? had made various declara t ions recognizing 
the secession of a l l s t a t e s which had declared themselves 
Independent from the Central Government In Moscow, However, 
the new Bolshevik Government a t the same time was awaiting a 
su i t ab le opportunity to incorporate these s t a t e s in to Soviet 
Russia, The s t a t e of Bulthara was given tremendous revolutionary 
Importance. The Soviet journal Zhlzn Natsionaenostei wrotej 
"Bukhara represents a very Important place for the development 
of revolution in cen t ra l Asia, Either i t w i l l serve a bulwark 
of react ion led by B r i t a i n , , , or i t w i l l become the vanguard 
145 
for a number of cen t ra l Asian and Indian revolutionary movements", 
Afghanistan also showed i n t e r e s t in Bukhara. King Amanullah in 
his pursu i t of pan-Islamic pol icy , f e l t tha t he had a specia l 
r e spons ib i l i t y to p ro tec t the i n t e r e s t s of Islamic world, A 
Russian scholar , I ,R, Reysner wrotes "The inoler of Afghanistan 
appeared in the ro le of supreme pro tec tor of a l l Moslems, and 
was equally in te res ted In the r e s u l t of Greco-Turkish war, in 
146 
the r i s i ng of Egypt and in the f a t e of Bukhara", Bukhara, 
144 For background d e t a i l s , see, Joshua Kunltz, D^wn Over 
SaiffiarHa^}< t^„in? fiefruU 9t cen t ra l A^U (New York, 1P55). 
145 ^^ilzn Nats ionalnoste l (Moscow), no . 6 (14) , 23 February 
1919, ci ted in Kapur, n , 120, p , 223, 
I ,R. 
146 /Reysner, Afghan is ^gts (Moscow, 1946), p , 205, 
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besides betng a Fuslim country, was also of strategic tmportance 
for Afghanistan. Accorr-lng to Fraser-Tytler, Ainanullah had 
dreams of a Central Asian confederacy under his own leadership 
of which neighbouring Duichara would constitute an important 
147 
part"* Most of the trade of Bukhara was conducted through 
Afghanistan, This flow of trade entitled Kabul to charge transit 
duties which, according to Reysner, constituted an important 
148 
part of revenue of Afghanistan In 1P20, Thus in the wake of 
the conflicting nature of interests of Afghanistan and Russia, 
it was natural that any effort on the part of either of them to 
undermine the existing status of Bukhara would have been 
instrumental in straining their mutual relations. 
In March 1P18, when Kolesov, Chairman of the Turkestan 
Soviet Government, had moved with his troops to the capital of 
Bukhara, the Amir of Bukhara was openly assisted by AfglMun 
volunteers, who undoubtedly played an important role in defeating 
149 
the Soviet troops. It was also reported that Afghan regular 
troops had crossed the frontier and for a few weeks had effectively 
150 
occupied Merv and Eastern Bukhara, Thus encouraged by this 
development, Kabul made efforts to establish even closer relations 
with the Amir of Bukhara, and to assist him in every possible 
147 W,K. Fraser-Tytler, AfRhaPl^tan I A Study Qf P<?llttgal 
ggY?l9Pi?ntg tn,.c?nt;ral ana so^^nagxaj^aJA (Londom 
Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 203, 
148 Reysner, n, 146, pp, 205-7, 
149 Si r George MaCartney, "Bolshevism as I saw i t in Tashkent 
In 1918", Journal of Central Asian Society (London), 
v o l , VII , par ts 2 -3 , 1920, p . 44, 
150 Lt f s ie Francaise ( P a r i s ) , May 1923, p . 500, c i ted in 
Kapur, n , 120, p , 224. 
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way In order to make him strong enough to stop any further attack 
from Soviet territory. One of the first steps taken in this 
direction was the exchange of ambassadors by the two countries 
and making of public declarations of eternal friendship by the 
151 
King of Afghanistan and Amir of Bukhara, 
While Afghanistan was helping Bukhara to strengthen it, the 
Russians were iraklng attempts to launch another offensive against 
Bukhara, In August 1P20, the Russian troops moved into Bukhara, 
The troops of the Amir of Bukhara gave a tough fight which lasted 
for over a week but finally on 2 Septerber 1P20, the Red Arny 
managed to capture the capital of Bukhara, The Amir of Bukhara 
fled to Afghanistan and a Soviet Government was established in 
Bukharan capital. On 15 September 1920, the new Government of 
Bukhara, sent through the Russian envoy in Kabul, a cable to the 
Afghan Government requesting an exchange of diplomatic represen-
tatives between two countries and announcing firm intention to 
152 
develop close relations between Bukhara and Afghanistan, 
However, Afghanistan continued rendering support to the 
oppositional elements in Bukhara to undermine the interest of 
pro-Russian elements. The Afghan activities came to the notice 
of Russians and on 2i September 1920 Moscow instructed its 
Ambassador in Kabul to hand over to the Afghan Government a 
strong note containing a number of charges against Afghanistan 
and demanding an inquiry into the activities of the Afghan 
151 Kunltz, n, 144, p, 118, 
152 MUilsterctvo Innostranikh del SSR. vol. III, p, 183, 
cited in Kapur, n, 120, p, 224. 
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representative In Bukhara and the inroedtate withdrawal of the 
163 
Afghan troops. The future of Bukhara was an Important issue 
during the negotiations between Afghanistan and Soviet Russia 
for concluding a friendship treaty between the two countries. 
On 13 September 1920, Afghanistan and Soviet Russia signed 
a treaty at Kabul which was ratified by Moscow on 28 February 1921 
164 
and by Kabul In August 192i, Article I of the treaty secured 
Russian recognition for independence of Afghanistan. It also 
enjoined upon the either side to undertake to respect It and enter 
155 
into proper political relations <'/ith the other. Article H 
provided that both countries would refrain from entering Into 
any military or political agreement with a third party that 
might be against the Interests of the other". By obtaining 
the Inclusion of such a provision in the treaty, Moscow had 
been successfia In forestalling In the area any military or 
political alliance which could have adverse effects on the 
Central Asian borders of Soviet Russia. The Article IX envisaged 
that Russia agreed to return to Afghanistan all the lands 
situated in the frontier zone and which had belonged to 
156 
Afghanistan in the past century. However Russia did not 
return these territories to Afghanistan, Under 
Article VI, Afghanistan acquired free transit through Russian 
153 Ibid., p. 225. 
154 For full text of the treaty see L, Shapiro, Sovlet.»Troaty 
S^^fs (Washington, D,C. c The Georgetown university Press, 
1950), vol, I, pp. 96-97, 
155 IMd,, p. 96. 
X5P Ibid., p. 97. 
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t e r r i t o r y of a l l goods whether purchased in Russia or abroad. 
Under Ar t ic le V I H , "the actual independence and freedom of 
Bukhara and Khiva, whatever form of government may be in 
157 
existence there" was recognized. This provision was a 
concession to the Afghans and grea t ly enhanced Amanullah*s 
158 
posi t ion as a champion of Islamic s o l i d a r i t y , A supplementary 
a r t i c l e added to the t r ea ty provided tha t within a year of coming 
in to force of the t r e a t y , a subsidy would be given by Russia to 
the extent of one mil l ion rubles in gold or s i l v e r coin or 
bu l l ion . I t a lso provided for construct ion of a te legraph 
l i ne from Kushk through Herat and Kandhar to Kabul and place 
technical and other s p e c i a l i s t s a t the disposal of the Afghan 
159 
Government, According to a news item published in London 
based The Times,. Russia was also to e s t ab l i sh a powerful radio 
s t a t ion a t Kabul and, to supply engineers to improve Afghanistan's 
160 
communications, 
Viewed from Afghan perspective the t r ea ty marked a 
s ign i f i can t move towards Afghanistan's Independence in 
in te rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s , and was "calculated to strengthen the 
hands of the Afghan Government in future dealings with 6r«at 
161 
B r i t a i n " , For Moscow I t provided new oppor tuni t ies for 
offensive and defensive action against Great B r i t a i n , 
167 Ib id , 
158 Gregorian, n , 14, p . 232, 
159 Ib id , 
160 The Times (London), 21 September 1921, 
I6(t Kapur, n , 120, p , 229. 
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The Afghan-Soviet enten^fe aroused B r i t i s h suspicions 
because only a couple of years back Br i ta in had complete control 
over Afghan foreign r e l a t i o n s and now Kabul had proclaimed I t s 
Independence which perhaps I r r i t a t e d the B r i t i s h , Besides, the 
Increasing Soviet influence In Afghanistan also alarmed the 
B r i t i s h , The B r i t i s h Government had become fearful and i t voiced 
i t s concern In a note of March 1<521 to Moscow — tha t the major 
object ive of Soviet policy In the region was to overthrow B r i t i s h 
162 
ru le In India . King Amanullah, on his pa r t , was apprehensive 
of both Great Br i ta in and Russia. He did not t r u s t e i t h e r . Thus 
he forged c loser cooperation and fr iendship with Islamic 
coun t r i e s . In March 1921, Afghanistan concluded a t r ea ty of 
f r iendship with Turkey which affirmed Turkish Independence and 
recognized Afghanistan as "independent in the most r ea l and 
163 
complete sense of the word". In June 1921, Afghanistan 
164 
concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Neut ra l i ty with I ran , 
Thus by concluding a t r ea ty with Iran, King Amanullah not only 
grea t ly strengthened Afghanistan's diplomatic posi t ion in the 
Middle East but in the e n t i r e Islamic community. 
Though Afghanistan had concluded a fr iendship t r e a ty with 
Moscow, King Amanullah was equally apprehensive of Soviet designs. 
The B r i t i s h had tended to regard Amanullah as a Soviet "Trojan 
162 B r i t i s h Command Pflp^ys^ No. 1869 (London, 1921), p . 7 . 
163 For t ex t of the t r ea ty see, Arnold J , Toynbee, 
8^TT?Y Qt iRX^yr^nXXoml Affairs logs (London, 1927), 
pp, 385-S7. 
164 For t ex t of ^Je t r e a t y , see League of Nations. Treatv 
Se r i e s , vo l . XXXIH, pp^ 295-30lI 
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Horse" but according to M,N, Roy, the Afghans made t t c lear 
tha t they had no Intentlori of allowing any Soviet force to enter 
t he i r t e r r i t o r y and use i t as a base of operations against India , 
165 
nor did they des i re to p a r t i c i p a t e in such an operat ion. 
However, King Amanullah*s primary concern was to s t ee r 
Afghanistan by pursuing independent foreign policy without 
compromising the freedom and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of Afghanistan 
in the presence of powerful Soviet Union and B r i t i s h India on i t s 
borders . He a lso followed the t r a d i t i o n a l policy of seeking a 
balance of power in the region. He signed a t r ea ty with Br i ta in 
on 22 November 1P21. The t r ea ty provided for the establishnffint 
of legat ions in London and Kabul, and granted tax exemption on 
166 
mater ia ls destined to help modernize the country, A major 
feature of the t r ea ty was Afghanistan's agreement to keep the 
167 
Soviet consulates out of eastern Afghanistan, 
The year 1922 witnessed the recrudescence of complications 
between Koscow and Kabul over Bukhara where the n a t i o n a l i s t s had 
a^ain ra ised the banner of revo l t against Moscow, The Russians, 
with a view to u t i l i z e the Influence of Enver Pasha, a former 
Turkish leader who had escaped to Russia af ter F i r s t World War, 
sent him to Bukhara to f igh t the n a t i o n a l i s t s . On the contrary , 
Enver Pasha Joined hands with the Bukharan n a t i o n a l i s t s and 
managed to control Important port ions of Bulchara by May 1922, 
King Amanullah, being encouraged by these developments, took the 
165 M,N, Roy, M i^riQ j^s (New Delhi , 1964), pp. 492-93, 
166 See Altchison, n , 24, pp. 288-96, 
167 Ib id , 
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step of concentrating his armed forces on the northern borders 
and a t the same time entered Into correspondence with Enver 
168 
Pasha, However, the Soviet Government of Bukhara, having 
discovered Afghan complicity In the a f f a i r s , sent a formal note 
on 11 July 1922 to the Afghan Foreign Ministry demanding the 
Immediate withdrawal of Afghan aid to " rebe ls" In Bukhara, the 
ex t rad i t ion of a l l rebel leaders in Afghanistan to Soviet Russia 
and an assurance from the Afghan Government t ha t Enver Pasha and 
169 
his supporters would not be allowed to enter the Afghan t e r r i t o r y , 
Hoyever, the Afghan Government declared tha t disturbances 
in Bukhara were "a kind of in te rna l disorder , , , /"and 7 
170 
Afghanistan remains n e u t r a l " , Moscow also expressed i t s 
171 
displeasure to Kabul over these developments. Some Soviet 
leaders began to consider Amanullah as a puppet of the B r i t i s h 
and demanded the cancel la t ion of the annual subsidy tha t Soviet 
172 
Russia had been giving to Afghanistan under the t r ea ty of 1921, 
The death of 3nver Pasha in August 1922 and consolidation of power 
by Soviet Government in 3ul:hara made King Airanullah to forsake 
his desire of consolidat ing Afghan power in Central Asia, In 
the meantime, the developments in the southern f ron t i e r s had also 
been taking dramatic t u r n s . The Afghan King consequently 
focussed his a t t en t ion on the Indo-Afghan border. 
168 Fraser -Tyt le r , n , 147, p , 203, 
169 Kapur, n, 120, pp, 234-35, 
170 Adamec, n , 19, p , 7 1 . 
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In the North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP), the British 
followed the "forward policy" with a view to exert their 
administrative control In the region. King Amanullah saw 
British move as a slow advance towards Afghanistan, In early 
1?»23 he visited the NWPp areas on the Afghan side and came to 
the conclusion that British policy was dangerous for Afghanistan 
173 
as well as for the tribes living In the area. The British 
reluctance to abandon the forward policy led to the revolt by 
174 
the people in the NV?FP, Moscow tried to exploit the situation 
to Its own advantage. The Russian Ambassador In Kabul, 
Raskalnlkov, was alleged to have recommended to Soviet 
authorities in Tasbkent on 17 February 1P23 that the Afghan-
British crisis be aggravated by the distribution of arms and 
175 
money to the various tribal groups. The British Government 
In an ultimatum sent to Moscow demanded among other things, the 
recall of Comirunlst agents from India and the withdrawal of 
176 
Raskolnlkov from Kabul, Though Moscow recalled Its envoy 
from Kabul but the relations between Kabul and London remained 
estranged, m December 1923, the British Government sent an 
ultimatum to Kabul demanding the cessation of all Afghan support 
to the "rebels" In the NWFP area and severance of relations 
177 
between Kabul and Moscow, The Soviet Russia denounced the 
British move and at the same time warned Kabul that the expulsion 
173 Fraser-Tytler, n, 147, p 
174 For details see, Toynbee, n, 163, p, 563, 
175 Great Britain, Command Papers. No, 1869, p, 7, 
176 Ibid,, p, 13, 
177 Kapur, n, 120, p, 237, 
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of Soviet ambassador from Kabul would In fact mean the end of 
178 
an "Independent Afghan state*** 
King Amanullah, being a shreswd statesman, did not go "by 
either British threats or Scjrlet advice. For him the national 
Interest was supreme, Selng the gravity of the situation, he 
ordered for the arrest of "rebels" who had sought asylum In 
179 
Afghanistan, 
With a view to selsse new opportunity, Moscow started 
negotiations for the construction of a telegraph line, a radio 
station, roads between the two countries and the agreement In 
July 1924 to commence talks at an early date for the conclusion 
180 
of a commercial treaty. During 1925 both countries again held 
negotiations to conclude a commercial agreement. The quantum of 
trade grew rapidly between the two countries In 1925-26, The 
frontier dispute over the possession of Dorgid Island on the Amu 
River, which was claimed by Bukhara, annexed by Afghanistan, and 
again occupied by Soviet troops, was also settled by a diplomatic 
agreement on 28 February 1926, 
ana lfon*Aggrcg?toB 
On 31 August 1926, both Kabul and Moscow signed the treaty 
1S2 
of Neutrality and Non-Aggression, Under the treaty, the two 
178 Ibid,, p. 238, 
179 Toynbee, n, l63, p, 664, 
180 Mlnlsterctvo Innostranlkh del SSR. vol. VII, p, 395, 
cited in K.spur, n, 120, p, 239, 
181 Kapur, n, 120, p. 239, 
182 For f u l l t ex t see Shapiro, n , 154, pp,322-23. 
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countries agreed to niatntaln neutrality in case either of them 
183 
was Involved in a military conflict with a third country. It 
was also agreed not to take part in any alliance or agreement of 
a military or political character with another or several third 
powers which might be directed against the other contracting 
party. Both countries also agreed that they would abstain from 
184 
interfering in the internal affairs of each other. The treaty, 
on the whole, was more advantageous to the ^ Afghanistan than to 
Afghanistan 
soviet Union because the / being a small country could 
neither match the Soviet military might nor could interfere in 
its internal affairs. This shows that Afghanistan signed the 
treaty to safeguard its territorial integrity from Russian 
expansions. 
On 28 November lo27, another agreement was signed between 
the two countries providing for the establishment of an airline 
between Kabul and Tashkent thus linking the two countries by 
185 
air. From December 1927 to July 1«>28, King Amanullah paid 
state visit to India, various countries in Europe and the Middle 
Bast, While in India, King Amanullah spoke of Islairic solidarity 
186 
and in turn was hailed as the King of Islam, He then visited 
Egypt, Italy, France and Germany, During his visit to England, 
he was presented the Collar of the Royal Victorian Order by 
King George, The visit was marked by Amanullah's visit to 
183 I b i d , , p , 322, 
184 Ib id , 
185 For f u l l t e x t see i b i d , , pp, 356-57, 
186 Husljjp Outlook (Lahore), 24 July 1928, 
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187 
the various places In England. During his visit to the 
Soviet Union, Arnanullah delayed three days in Warsaw eaiQUia, 
judiciously avoiding the May Day Celebrations in order to spare 
188 
h is h o s t ' s embarrassment and in order to mollify the B r i t i s h , 
Before his return to Afghanistan, the King also v i s i t ed Turkey 
and I ran , 
King Arnanullah was great ly influenced by the progress made 
by Europe and he now recognized the enormity of the task of 
modernizing Afghanistan, His western ways and rad ica l reforms 
were opposed by the orthodox forces in Afghanistan, His 
opponents said tha t the King "had turned against Allah and 
189 
Islam", He reduced the autonomy of the t r i be s and the 
influence of the re l ig ious l eaders , opposed polygamy and the v e i l , 
es tabl ished schools for g i r l s and extended the mi l i t a ry draf t to 
the whole country. Though these were progressive roear5ures, but 
Arnanullah became very unpopular. The r e su l t an t impact was the 
outbreak of a revol t against King Arnanullah in January which 
forced him to f l ee from Kabul to Kandhar, The leader of the 
rebel l ion was an i l l i t e r a t e person ca l led Bacha~l-Saqao who 
190 
proclaimed himself as the King, 
This new development in Afghanistan divided the leadership 
In Moscow on the question of rendering support to Bacha-i-Saqao, 
187 Ib id . 
188 Dupree, n , 10, p , 450, 
189 Ib id , 
190 Nancy P. Newell and Richard S, Newell, The Struggle 
for Afghanistan (Ithaca, N,Y. i Cornell University 
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191 
Accordirig to Agabftko/, a former of^lc^r of OGPIJ, the OGPU 
was in favour of al'ilng B-„oha in Vne i'op>'> tha t hf» woul'^ carry 
out a rad ica l revolut ion In Afghanistan and tha t through him, 
192 
the country woold gradually be Sovlet lzed, Consequently, he 
received the hold of OGPU to con»« in to power, 
Sg^HQt Invasion .fff HF^X^mlHm 
Tn 7iew of the f luid s i tua t ion in Afghanistan a f te r 
Bacha-t-Saqao had proclalrred himself as the King of Afghanistan, 
Moscow decided to ava i l the s i t ua t ion to i t s own advantage. 
According to Agabekov " I t was decided to form an expeditionary 
force of red so ld ie r s disguised as Aft^hans who would secre t ly 
193 
cross the f ron t i e r and march against Kabul", The Soviets 
provided for ty a i rplanes as wall as horsemen especia l ly equipped 
194 
with nachlneguns. Thus Soviet arny entered Afghanistan and 
a f te r crossing the Ami River captured the town of Mazar-i-
Sharlf on 30 April 1PS9. There occurred a f i e rce b a t t l e between 
the Russian artr.y and the supporters of Bacha-l^Saqao near Khulm 
and a f te r defeating the l a t t e r they marched toward Kabul, In 
the meanwhile two Bas^iachi leaders also conducted ra ids inside 
Soviet Union from Afghanistan, though unsuccessful. The Soviet 
media claimed t h a t those a t tacks were ins t iga ted e i the r by 
195 
Bacha or the B r i t i s h , 
191 The Russian name for the then secre t senr ice , predecessor 
of the present K,Q,B, 
192 Georges Agabekov, OGPU t The Russian Secret Terror 
(New Yorkt Brentano»s 1931), p , 164. 
193 I b i d . , pp. 166-67. 
194 India Office Library (London), LPS/io/1203, p. 135/1927. 
195 Adamec, n. 
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While Ghulan ^^abl»s aray was marching toward Kabul, word 
came tha t .^lanuliah had abdicated and fled to Trdia, Thlf? 
created a panic in the Gbulam ITabi's arry of whom cany had 
196 
deser ted. The Hui-stans promptly withdrew t ^ e l r t roops, the 
197 
l a s t of thRTtt leaTlrtg in Jmtn 1€>29, Another reason for f?ovlet 
Union to abandon th-^ '\fghan invasion was tha t Moscow did not 
want to alarum tho T5ritlsh a t a time v/hen i t v;as hoping to 
r e s to re dlplonat ic r e l a t ions with the newly elected Labour 
198 
Government in London, Thus by launching a well concerted 
at tack on Afghanistan, Honcow had deciinstrated tha t " l ike i t s 
Tsa r i s t predecesror, i t h?,d ambitions regarding Afghanistan 
199 
and vjas wi l l ing to usa c i i l l ta ry force to bacV- them up". 
r a g i r Kn^Tlo2o : i933) 
Following the defeat of 3acha-i-3aqao In October 1929, 
JTadlr Shah becama the King of Afghanistan. The new Afglian King 
pursuJd a cautious moi'srnination programir.o a t home and followed 
the t r a d i t i o n a l polic/- of n a u t r a i t t y , '.Jhilo giving the opening 
speech in the Afghan National Consultative \ssombly, Nadir Shah 
said: 
In ny opinion the best and nore useful policy 
tha t one can imagine for Afghanistan i s a policy 
of n e u t r a l i t y , Afghanistan must always en te r t a in 
good re l a t ions with i t s neighbours as well as a l l 
the fr iendly powers who are not opposed to the 
196 Leon B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in•Afghanistan. 
;^<^  19*1929 ( I thaca , NY: Cornell Universi ty Press , 1973), 
p . 186, 
197 Agabekov, n , 192, p , 168. 
198 Fischer , n . 141, v o l , I I , p . 817, 
199 Thomas T. Hamaond, Red F],ag Over AfyfT]>}nlstan (Boulder, 
Coll West View Press , 1984), p . 18. 
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national interests of the country, Afghanistan 
must give Its neighbours assurances of Its 
friendly attitude while safeguarding the rights of 
reciprocity. Such a line of conduct Is the best 
one for the Interest of Afghanistan, 200 
Nadir Shah was really faced with an uphill task which was to 
make Afghan neutrality a reality and to convince among others • 
Moscow and the Islamic world - that he was not a tool of British 
imperialism. While refuting the charge that he had received 
British assistance in overthrowing Bacha, he saidt "It was only 
through the exclusive help of the Almighty God, and thanks to 
the sacrifices of the people of Afghanistan, unassisted by any 
201 
foreign power, that I took Kabul,** 
He adhered to a policy of non-involvement both in India 
and in Central Asia seeing in "positive neutralism** the best 
means of securing Internal stability and external independence. 
In May 1930, Afghanistan confirmed the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 
1921 and the Trade Convention of 1923 which had envisaged the 
tacit understanding that no Soviet trade agencies were to be 
opened in the eastern provinces of the Afghan Kingdom adjacent 
to India, At the same time Nadir Shah tried to put a stop to 
anti-British revolutionary activity in Afghanistan, He 
discouraged the activities of the Red Shirt Movement and the 
Afrldi and Mohmand tribal struggles on Indo-Afghan border by 
making clear to them that the "whole frontier policy of the 
Afghan government would be actuated by a desire for peace on 
both sides of the frontier and a spirit of true friendship 
200 Islah (Kabul), 8 July 1931. 
201 Ibid. 
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202 
towards His Ma;Jesty»a Government", 
King Nadir Shah a lso took s teps to fur ther normalize 
r e l a t i ons with the Soviet Union, While welcoming the enthrone-
ment of Nadir Shah the Soviet Foreign Minister , Maxim Litvinov, 
said t ha t Moscow intended to continue to be a good neighbour to 
Afghanistan and hoped to develop r e l a t i ons with i t on tlw bas is 
203 
of ex i s t ing agreements, Afghanistan concluded a non-aggression 
pact with the Soviet Union In 1931 which was in fact the 
r e i t e r a t i o n of the Afghan-Soviet t r ea ty of 1926. The new t r ea ty 
also gave Afghan commitment against the use of Afghan t e r r i t o r y 
as a base for subversive a c t i v i t i e s against the Soviet Union, 
Following the combined blows of Russian Army in Central Asia 
and the suddenly ef fec t ive Afghan border p a t r o l s , Basmachi 
a c t i v i t i e s were on the dec l ine . The r e l a t i ons between Kabul and 
Btoscow were fur ther improved by the signing of a Soviet-Afghan 
204 
agreement on the def in i t ion of aggression, 
2 l^^ is (^ntentet ^ Afghan-Soviet r e l a t i ons was accompanied by 
an expansion of t rade between the two coun t r i e s . Between 1928 
and*1932 Moscow gained a greater share of the Afghan market and 
in Herat and northern Afghanistan, goods made in Bukhara and 
205 
Tashkent dominated. 
202 Fraser -Tyt le r , n , 147, p , 236, 
203 Jane Degras, ed , , Soviet Documents on Foreign Poljgy 
(Oxford, 1952), vo l , I I , pp, 430-31. 
204 On th i s Soviet-Afghan Agreement, sea gs^a^, 
13 July 1933, 
205 Abdul Qadir Khan, "The Outlook in Afghanistan", 
ruly 1932, pp 
JQUCTal,Qf t^Q Ami O^nXr^l AHm S p p t e ^ (London), 
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However, the policy of Nadir Shah with regard to forging 
close relations with Moscow could in no way be interpreted that 
he was pro-Soviet. He was scrupulous In his adherence to the 
Afghanistan*s traditional policy of neutrality. He denied a 
Soviet request for establishing a commercial mission in 
206 
Afghanistan, In place of the departing Soviet advisers, 
Afghanistan acquired the services of experts from Germany, Italy, 
207 
Japan and India, Nadir Shah wanted "foreign advisers only 
those who were unlikely to be supported by neighbouring arn«d 
208 
forces in case of any disagreement*'. 
Besides, Nadir Shah also made attempts to have cordial 
relations with Islamic countries, especially Turkey and Iran, 
He also took steps in forging Afghan relations with Italy, 
209 
France, Germany, United States and Japan, The activities 
of the British and the Russians within Afghanistan were 
curtailed during Nadir Shah*s reign. 
The Vharkhl brothers especially Ghulam Nabl and other 
supporters of Amanullah were opposed to the regime of Nadir 
Shah, The execution of Ghulam Nabl in November 1P32 ushered in 
a brief spell of political violence in Afghanistan which 
206 Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan's Big Gamble, Part I**, 
Affi^ rton ?ntorsii?ies fmc^ st^ff Reports (A^FSR), 
vo l , 4, no. IV, I960, p , 14, 
207 Ib id , 
208 Anthony Arnold, Afffhantst>an { .T??f ,^9^49^ J^Y^^tQ^^ 
in Perspective (Stanford, Gain Stanford University 
P res s , 1985), p , 2 1 , 
209 For d e t a i l s see , Gregorian, n , 14, pp, 335-37, 
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culmtnaated In the assassination of Nadir Shah on 8 November 1933, 
On the same day, Zahlr Shah, the nineteen year old son of Nadir 
Shah, was proclaimed as^ the new King of Afghanistan, The young 
Zahir Shah was assisted by his paternal uncle Shah Kahmud Khan, 
Shah Wall Khan and Mohammad Hashim Khan, the latter being the 
Prime Minister and being in full control of M^ghanistaiT's 
210 
domestic and foreign policies* 
King Zahir Shah in a speach in 1934, said that the general 
foreign policy aims of Afghanistan were "shaped by the desire of 
the King and his government for world peace so that Afghanistan 
could continue to combat its socio-economic retardation and 
211 
catch up with progress. The Kins laid emphasis on three 
pointsi his desire to maintain friendly relations with all 
countries| his hope to live in peace and friendship with 
neighbouring countries, and his intention not to raise political 
difficulties or obstacles for other governmentn, e policy he 
212 
anticipated other governments to adopt for Afghanistan. 
Strict adherence to the tracUtional -oollcy of neutrality 
remained the main hallmark of Afghanistan foreign nolicy during 
the post-Nadir Shah period, Kabul assured th-? Soviet Government 
tlmt the Basmachis and other emigre elements from Turkistan 
would not be allowed to indulge in anti-Soviet activities from 
its territory. Despite British protests, the Afghan Government 
allowed the Indian freedom fighters like Raja Mahandra Pratap to 
210 Fraser-Tytler, n, 147, p . 243, 
211 For ful l text of King Zahir Shah's speech, see 
i^ aW Aleanagb ]P34»a5 (Kabul, 1937), p. 67. 
212 Ibid, 
62 
for* provis ional government in Afghanistan. The Afghan t r i b e s 
213 ^ 
also Indulged in ac t s h o s t i l e to B r i t i s h I n d i a . 
Afghanistan became the member of the League of Nations 
in 1934 and during the sane year Soviet Union a lso ;)oined the 
League, I n May 193&, Kabul and Moscov signed an agreement on 
an an t i - l ocus t campaign and t h i s agreement paved the way for 
mutual cooperation and a p re tex t for the convening of annual 
214 
meetings. I n 1936, Kabul renewed the Soviet-Afghan mutual 
215 
pact of 1931, which was extended upto 29 May 1946. This was 
followed by a commercial agreement in May 1936 which envisaged 
t r a n s i t f a c i l i t i e s for Afglians through Soviet Union and a 
f inanc ia l agreement between the Soviet Commissariat for 
216 
external commorce and the BanK-i-Mllli* Kabul and Moscow 
also decided to close t h e i r respect ive consulates in Tashkent 
and Mazar»i»Sharlf with an avowed object ive of non-interference 
217 
in each o t h e r ' s a f f a i r s . This move was welcomed by Great 
Br i t a in which had campaigned s ince 1921 agains t the establishment 
of Soviet consulate in the s t r a t eg ic regions of Afghanistan, 
213 Joseph Castagne, "Soviet Imperialism in Afghanistan*, 
E^ r^fljlnn Affairs (New Xork), July 1936, p . 703. 
214 Percy Sykes, "Afghanistan t The Present l a s l t l o n " , 
?Wgna3i Of «97al C^BttaiL M\m P<i^VM (London), 
April 1940, p . 161, 
215 For the t ex t of the agreement, see Jane Degras, ed . , 
(London, 1948), p , 152. 
216 I s l a l l , 23 May 1936. 
217 I b i d . , 25 April 1938. 
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By the time the Second World War broke out in Europe with 
Japanese Involvement in East Apia, Afghanistan had become heavily-
dependent on the financial and technical assistance of the Axis 
powers, especially Germany, Italy and Japan, The best way for 
the Allies "to have ended the dominance of the Axis in this 
strategic country was for the United States and Great Britain 
themselves to have extended technical assistance and long term 
218 
credits to the Afghan Kingdom but neither chose to do so**. 
However, the only alternative before Afghanistan was to turn to 
the Soviet Union instead o** the Axis powers. But such a move 
was not keeping in tune with the Afghanistan's traditional 
policy of neutrality and it would have been highly unwelcome for 
the British as well. Afghanistan was opposed to both Russian 
and British influence in the country. 
Thus, when the Second World War broke out in the early 
1?»39, it posed a big challenge to Afghanistan's foreign abd 
economic policies. As Vartan Gregorian has aptly observed* 
"The possibility that Afghanistan independence might be 
Jeopardized or that the country might become a battleground of 
219 
European diplomacy • even a theater of war - seemed very real," 
Consequently, King Zahlr Shah after consulting the Afghan 
Parliament, issued a decree on 6 September IP3P, proclaiming 
220 
the neutrality of Afghanistan. This proclamation was made 
218 Gregorian, n. 14, p. 382. 
219 Ibid., p. 383. 
220 Sa,][,y^ q^i^ »ve»Kabul (Kabul, 1940), pp. 46-47. 
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with a view to keep Afghanistan away from the flames of Second 
World War and safeguard i t s Independence, 
The decfee of n e u t r a l i t y r e s t r i c t e d the a c t i v i t i e s of 
na t iona ls of the be l l ige ren t powers; no propaganda a c t i v i t i e s 
were to be to lera ted and the dissemination of news was 
r e s t r i c t e d to o f f i c i a l press re leases by the government of the 
221 
bel l i t jerent in the Kabul dai ly I s l a h . 
In the wake of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact 
concluded in 1P3<>, Moscow did not pressur ize Kabxil to sever 
I t s r e l a t i ons with the Axis powers u n t i l 1P41, And the B r i t i s h 
being deeply involved in the war in Europe a lso did not r a i s e 
any eyebrow in th i s regard. 
During 1P3P-41 period, Gennany made fu r the r e f for t s to woo 
Afghans, Including the supporters of Amanullah, to crea te 
t roubles airong the tribesmen of the NWFP to weaken the pos i t ion 
of the B r i t i s h but King Zahir Shah's Government refused to comply 
with German overtures and r e i t e r a t ed i t s commitment to the policy 
222 
of s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y , F rase r -Tyt le r , who during tha t period 
was a B r i t i s h envoy to Kabul, described the s i t ua t ion as one in 
which " the Afghans f igura t ive ly buttoned t h e i r coats and turned 
t h e i r backs to the b l a s t , couching behind the f r a i l she l t e r of 
t h e i r in te rna t iona l f r o n t i e r s , and t h e i r proclaimed n e u t r a l i t y , . , 
223 
hoping t h a t the whirlwind would pass them by,.,** 
221 Adamec, n , l?i, p , 243, 
222 Gregorian, n , 14, pp, 385-87, 
223 Fraser -Tyt le r , n , 147, p , 253. 
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The events had taken decisive turn during the close of 
1941 and following the German Invasion of the Soviet Union, the 
l a t t e r had joined the A l l i e s . There were hundreds of Axis 
powers' na t iona ls In Afghanistan during t t e t period and the 
changed war scenario was found to give worries to Kabul, Both 
Iran and Afghanistan were of s t r a t e g i c s ignif icance for the 
A l l i e s , The presence of Axis subjects in Afghanistan was bound 
to a t t r a c t the a t t en t ion of the A l l i e s , In October 1941, Moscow 
and London sent s imi la r notes to the Afghan Government demanding 
224 
the ouster of German and I t a l i a n c i t i z e n s . This demand by 
the powerful neighbours of Afghanistan had created misapprehen-
sions among the minds of many Afghans, F ina l ly the Zahlr Shah's 
Government a f t e r consult ing the Lova, J l r g^ ^ decided to comply 
with the demand and a t the same time r e i t e r a t e d Afghanistan's 
« 
w i l l and determination to preserve i t s s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y , 
225 
Independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . 
Accordingly, Kabul was placed under s t r i c t survei l lance 
and gasoline ra t ioning was imposed in July 1941, During the 
Same month, the Afghan border guards shot two German agents on 
t h e i r way to the camp of the Fakir of I p i r e su l t i ng in the death 
of one and other was wounded. The then Afghan Prime Minister , 
Hashim Khan, conveyed his regre t s to the Germans over the 
226 
inc iden t . Following the B r i t i s h and Soviet invasion of Iran 
during the l a s t week of August 1941, the Germans were trapped 
in Afghanistan, Both Moscow and London exerted pressure on Kabul 
224 The Tln^s (London), 21 October 1«>41, 
225 JLa^ttl ,Algan^<?ft 1Q41-4S» PP» 280-85, 
226 Gregorian, n , 14, p , 389. 
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for the expulsion of Axis na t iona l s from Afghanistan, The 
German legat ion in Kabul was not s a t i s f i e d with the B r i t i s h 
promise of safe passage for the Axis nat ionals trapped in 
Afghanistan, However, on 15 October 1941, Najibullafe Khan, the 
Director-General of the P o l i t i c a l Department of the Afghan 
Foreign Ministry, explained Afghanistan's actions in yielding 
to Allied pressures as being prompted by his government's 
227 
des i re for peace. The B r i t i s h propaganda and repor ts in 
the Indian press continued report ing about the dangers inherent 
228 
in the continued presence of Axis na t ionals in Afghanistan, 
During t h i s period of c r i s i s , the Afghan Government 
r e i t e r a t e d i t s policy of peace and n e u t r a l i t y and expressed 
surpr i se over the excess propaganda over the presence of Axis 
na t iona ls in Afghanistan, The Lova J i r e a met during 5-6 November 
1941 to approve the dismissal of the Germans and a t the sane time 
i t confirmed Afghanistan's n e u t r a l i t y and as a warning issued a 
declarat ion tha t no fur ther f igh t or in terference would be 
229 
t o l e r a t e d . 
Following the departure of the Axis na t iona ls from 
Afghanistan there was no more fur ther pressure from Great 
Br i t a in or Soviet Union in t h i s regard and perhaps both London 
and Moscow were convinced of Afghanistan's adherence to s t r i c t 
n e u t r a l i t y . 
227 Adamec, n , 19, p , 257, 
228 l£ldQ,) 18 October 1941. 
229 illti& (Kabul), 8 November 1941. 
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The Durand Line Agreement was signed between Afghanistan 
230 
and British India in November 1893, Under this agreement, 
Afghanistan agreed to relinquish its control over all districts 
to the north of the tJpper Oxus in exchange for all districts, 
231 
not held by Afghanistan to the south of the Oxus river, 
Afghanistan was also allowed to retain Asmar Kunar and Blrmal 
Valley, Afghanistan in return promised not to advance or 
interfere in Ghitral, Bajaur and Swat and relinquished its 
232 
claim to Chagai, Dawa and Waziristan, The conclusion 
of the agreement was facilitated by Sir Mortimer Durand on 
behalf of the British Government and it came to be known after 
him. The line demarcating the frontier between Afghanistan and 
British India came to be known as Durand Line. 
The task of demarcation of frontier between British India 
and Afghanistan, as envisaged in the Durand agreement, was 
carried out for the most part by joint commission of the two 
countries during 1894-1896, except a small portion remaining 
233 
undemarcated in the vicinity of Mohmand and the Khyber, 
The Durand agreement instead of solving the border problem, 
envisaged more complications for, Afghanistan, The tribes 
inhabiting the areas which had come under British rule after 
230 For full text of the agreement, see Altchlson, n, 24, 
pp. 255,57. 
231 I b i d , , p . 218. 
232 I b i d . , p . 219. 
233 I b i d . 
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the demarcation, were opposed to the very Idea of dellmttatlon 
of the boundary and regarded it as an interference with their 
234 
independence. When the map demarcating tlie houndary-ltne 
was sent by the British to Abdur Rahman, the then Afghan King, 
the latter protested against it by pointing out many discr©. 
pancies but the British insisted that the frontier drawn on the 
map was final and Kabul was bound to follow it. The intransigence 
shown by the British led to large scale uprising on the frontier 
235 
areas in 1S97, Under these circumstances the Durand agreement 
came under sevei^ e criticism. According to Fraser-Tytler, the 
Durand agreement presented the concrete symbol of compromise, 
"the manifestation of a policy which, whatever its merit, was 
236 
not carried out to its logical conclusion". He regarded It 
illogical from the standpoint of ethnography, strategy and 
geography as it cut across the people, split the nation into 
237 
two and even divided the tribes. According to C,C. Davles, 
the Durand agreement was forced on Afghanistan and the new 
boundary line was not based on sound topographical data "for 
during the process of demarcation it was discovered that certain 
places marked on the Durand map, did not exist on the actual 
ground. Many ethnic absurdities were perpetrated ,,. the worst 
234 For details see, C.C, Davies, The Problem of the Norths 
Wes^ yrgnt^gr; ia^Q-l?Oa (Londom Cambridge University 
Press, 1932). p, 98.Also see J,W, Spain, The Pathan 
Border:|.^ s^ (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1963), pp, 177-80, 
235 Adamec, n, 19, p, 79, 
236 Fraser -Tyt le r , n , 147, p , 188, 
237 Ib id , 
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blunder of a l l was the arrangement by which the boundary cut the 
238 
Mohmand t r i b a l area into two separate parts '*, King Abdur 
Rahman refused to accept the agreement and permanent cession of 
239 
any Afghan t e r r i t o r y to the B r i t i s h under t h i s agreement. In 
1901, the B r i t i s h created the North West F ron t ie r Province (NWFP) 
Baluch and 
in which included Z Pakhtoon inhabited areas "grabbed" by the ' 
B r i t i s h from Afghanistan a f te r the Durand agreement. 
King Abdur Rahman and his successor ru l e r s of Afghanistan 
refused to accept the Durand agreement. In the wake of the 
p a r t i t i o n of the Indian subcontinent leading to the emergence of 
India and Pakistan as two sovereign and independent count r ies , 
the NWFP became the p a r t of Pakis tan, The Afghan Government 
regards the Durand agreement as inval id and hence i n s i s t s on the 
r i gh t to self-determination for the people of NWFP while Pakistan 
has denied Afghan content ion. Thus there ex i s t s difference of 
opinion between the two countries on th i s i s sue . 
The conclusion of the Second World War in 1945 changed the 
in te rna t iona l p o l i t i c a l scenario which had impact on the post-war 
Afghanistan as we l l . The war time a l l i e s — United States and 
Soviet Union emerged as the main r iva l s for dominating the world 
scene. The t r a d i t i o n a l great power - United Kingdom had l o s t i t s 
power and i t s withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent in the middle 
of 1947 changed the p o l i t i c a l configurat ions. The t r a d i t i o n a l 
Anglo-Russian r i va l ry was replaced by Soviet-US r iva l ry which 
ushered in an era of cold war, Afghanistan's response to 
super powers r i va l ry i s analysed in the succeeding chapters . 
238 Davies, n , 234, pp. 161-62, 
239 Mir Munshi, n . 63, p . 158. 
Chapter H 
BAS;C PQSTUI^ ATES OF AFGHAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Foreign policy Is the most slgf.lflcant coipponent of a 
country's political system. It defines "the needs and wants 
(the Interests) of a state and the means by which they are to 
1 
be pursued". The foreign policy also reflects an l^age of a 
future state of affairs and future set of conditions which 
govarntnents through individual policy makers aspire to bring 
about by wielding influence abroad and by cban'^ ing o^ * sustaining 
2 
the behaviour of other countries. 
It is now a well established fact that the foreign policy 
of a country is more than singly a series of responses to inter-
national stumull and it also takes into account the forces at 
work within a society which contribute to the quality and contents 
of its external behaviour. Thus the foreign policy of a country 
3 
is closely linked to and dependent on its domestic policy. 
The foreign policy pursued by a country Is the manifestation 
of the sum total of domestic and external factors like national 
interest, geo-political situation of the region or strategic 
significance of the country, its response to regional and global 
1 Werner Levi, |n1^frnat49n^,Pg.U^tc91 ^gW^^^t^^gBSigf tne,gYSl?9ff (Minneapolis: university of I'lnnesota Press, ic»74}, p. 88, 
2 Paul Seaburg, Power^ Freedom and Dlplomr^ cv (New Yorkt Random 
House, 1963), p, 86, 
Alfred J. K.nop, ip&b;, pp, 130-7, AISO see, tienry 
Kissinger, "DoHi«»tic Structure and Foreign Policy", 
Daedaluy (Boston), vol, XCV, no, 2, Spring 1Q66, 
pp, 503-29, 
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probleTBS etc. While analysing the basic postulates of the 
foreign policy of Afghanistan all these aspects coupled with the 
ethno-cultural characteristics of Afghanistan which have wielded 
a tremendous impact in the shaping and evolution of that country^s 
foreign policy, have also to be examined. This analysis of the 
basic postulates of Afghan foreign policy pertains to the period 
prior to the advent of Soviet-backed communist cout^  of April 1?»78 
in Kabul, Under the present circumstances, especially after the 
Russian invasion, the Kabul regime has not been pursuing an 
Independent foreign policy as it used to be in the past, 
Afghanistan has become just like other satellite countries of 
Russia and a dependent of Russian policy. According to Abdul 
Rahman Pazhwak, a veteran Afghan diplomat, now in the United 
States, the basic ingredients or essentials of Afghan foreign 
policy, prior to the communist COUP d'etat of April 1?578, could 
be summarized as followsj 
(1) Nonallgnment in the political and military 
affairs; 
(11) Independent Judgement on international issues 
on the basis of the merits of the issue; 
(ill) Mutual respect on the basis of equality among 
the nations whether large or small; 
(IT) Respect for the principles of peaceful coexistence; 
(•) Coordination and cooperation between the countries 
without any conditions; 
(vl) Good and friendly relations with all the countries, 
especially with the neighbouring countries; 
<Tli) Respect for the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, principles of Bandung Conference, 
and principles of the Nonallgned l^ ovement (NAM); 
72 
(vlll) Struggle against colonialism, neo-colonlallsm, 
and exploitation In all its manifestation, 
struggle for the attainment and preservation 
of political and economic, social and cultural 
rights of the nations, especially the right to 
self-determination by the free will of the people 
of each country; and fundamental human freedom; 
4 
(tr) Respect for the International law. 
The succeeding pages provide an indepth analytical assessment 
of the basic postulates of Afghan foreign policy. 
The concept of strategic significance embraces an overall 
view of strategy. Strategy being an integral component of foreign 
policy has emerged as an amalgamation of mllltajy and political 
ing 
policy areas. There is no deny the fact that the analysis of 
national security entails the study fields of strategic studies 
and foreign policy since it constitutes an integral part of the 
both. As J, Baylis and others have opined, "If anything, they 
reflect differences of emphasis rather than differences in subject-
5 
matter". 
The term "strategy" acquires added significance 1^ 
providing an option for action aimed at the maximization of ovnti 
values including interests, based on an indepth assessment of 
all potential gains and losses as well as the identification of 
4 Author's interview with Abdul Rahman Pazhwals, 6 February 
1986, Notet Pazhwak is a seasoned Afghan diplomat having 
represented his country in the United Nations, nonaligned 
suBanlt conferences and other international agencies. He 
has also served as Afghan Amba!5sador to London, He is 
presently staying at Washington D,C, 
5 J, Baylis ei,u,a^. Qm^^miQV%n Strategy \ Thoorlag ana 
Policies (Reprint) (Londom Groom Helm, 1976), p, 4, 
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hostile action which is also called "threat perception". This 
concept of threat perception Includes the whole threat spectrum. 
Thus the concept of "strategic significance" which is a derivative 
from the term "strategy" is prone to be closely linked to 
6 
perception, 
Rayirond Aron is of the view that the concept of strategic 
significance is viewed his tor ical ly in the same l ight as strategy, 
that i s , in terms of mili tary superiority and the ab i l i ty to wage 
7 
war. Broadly speaking, there are three determinants of strategic 
significance. In the f i r s t place, strategic significance is linked 
to the sunitotal of a country's capabi l i t ies . As Lerche and Said 
have observed* " I t is the general strategic role played by a 
s ta te in world pol i t ics that raises issues of capability in the 
8 
f i r s t place," 
Besides, the role perception of a country in the global and 
regional context is another determinant, "A second manifestation 
of the impact of the state's international strategic position upon 
capability is derived from its intarpretation of the position it 
9 
occupies in the world". Thirdly, the perception of other states 
in the international political system is also important because 
this perception determines the strategic significance of a country. 
6 N,J, Padleford and G,A, Lincoln, Ihe Dvnagl^ cs Qf ^nt^gmtlonal 
Politics (Second edn.) (New Yorki The Kacmillan, 1P67), p. 52, 
7 Raymond Aron, Peace and War (Translated by D,R, Howard) 
(London: Weldenfeld and Kicolson, IP66), p, 52, 
8 C.O, Lercho and A, A, Said, Concepts of Internation^ 
Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1963), p, 67, 
9 Ibid,, p, 68, 
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Accordln(5 to Padleford and Lincoln: "The relations of states are 
partly the interaction of the way the people and leaders of one 
Gtatc view the world situation and reopond to It, as contrasted 
with the ways other people and leaders view the same situation 
10 
and factors. 
Thus the strategic significance is perceived as the 
interaction between a country's capabilities, its geo-perception 
and the perception on the part of the external environment. Thus, 
the concept of strategic significance is perception oriented. 
The strategic significance of a country is dependent on 
its own national power and capabilities in coinparison to those 
of other countries, which "indicate a relative power relationship 
11 
and influences the strategic significance of that country". 
In essence, the relative strategic significance of a 
country is defined within the scope of a dynamic international 
system. It is subject to comprehensive security interests and 
shifting configurations and is based on the particular role 
perceptions of the countries in terms of national capabilities, 
as well as the perception of the same factors by other countries 
in the external environment at a given time. 
While applying this thesis of strategic significance to 
Afghanistan, it is essential to analyse the geographical situation 
of Afghanistan. Hany geographers have called Afghanistan as the 
10 Padleford and Lincoln, n, 6, p, 52, 
11 H.S. Clive, %rld Power Assessment i A Calculus of 
Strategic Drift,(Washington^ D.C, : Georgetown 
university, 1975), p, 8, 
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12 
heart of Asia. I t Is a mountalneous landlocked country bounded 
on the nortb by "the Soviet Republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
and Turkmenistan? on the west by Iran and on the south-east by 
13 
Pakistan", I t also shares a short boundary with the Slnkiang 
province of People»s Republic of China, 
I t s geo-political location has been of tremendous Importance 
for enhancing I t s strategic significance. The various forces, 
especially the contemporary great powers during the different 
Intervals of the history had been Influenced by Afghanistan's 
s trategic location. This aspect has been dealt In detai ls In the 
f i r s t . chapter, 
(11) Na^^Qpaxsffl,, an<t Islam 
The people of Afghanistan have a strong sense of 
nationalism. The Afghan national character Is reflected in the 
literature and culture of that coiantry. Throughout its history, 
there has always prevailed a cohesive national unity in 
Afghanistan, It is because of their love for motherland that 
Afghanistan has never been subject to alien rule. Even in the 
vak© of Russian invasion of Afghanistan in December 1P79 and the 
continued presence of Russian troops, the majority of Afghans 
have since been fighting for the liberation of their homeland. 
12 George B, Cressey, ^s^^'s Lands and Peoples(Third edn,) 
(New Yorks McGraw Hill, l<?63), p, 77. Also see, Louis 
Dupree, "Afghanistan" in Donald N, Wilber, ed.. The Katiops 
pf Asia (New Yorkt Hart Publishing Co., 1064), pp. 35-36, 
13 M,A. SohaU, "Contemporary Afghanistan", Afghanistan News 
(London), vol, 4, no, 4, August i960, p, 11. 
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Since the emergence of Afghanistan as a national entity 
14 
under the leadership of Ahamad Shah Durrani in 1747, Afghanistan 
consolidated its inner strength to become a force to reckon with. 
The subsequent Afghan rulers followed a genuinely nonaligned and 
independent foreign policy even in the midst of Anglo-Husstan 
rivalry, during the two world wars, cold war and subsequent period 
in the post-Second World War, All the rulers of Afghanistan have 
kept the national interest as uppermost while pursuing the foreign 
policy. 
Islam has played a pivotal role in consolidating the forces 
of nationalism in Afghanistan, Prior to the advent of Soviet 
backed coranunlst coup in April 1P78, the change of regime in 
Kabul had never been instrumental in envisaging any alteration 
in Afghan national outlook* King Abdur Rahman once saidx "If I 
showed any inclination towards the English, my people would call 
me an Infidel for joining hands with infidels and they would 
15 
proclaim a religious holy war against me," It is evident that 
even the King could not go against the wishes and aspirations of 
the Afghan people. 
The Afghan spirit of nationalism is reflected in its 
policy of genuine nonalignment and its espousal for the right 
to self-determination, faith in the principles of the UK Charter 
etc. which are analysed in succeeding pages. The famous historic 
announcement of King Amanullah made on 13 April If^lf* reflects 
14 He is also known a? Ahamad Shah Abdall, 
16 Mir Kunshi, ed.. The I^ f^Q ^f Abdur Rahman (London, 1900), 
vol, II, p. 117. 
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the towering spirit of Afghan nationalism. He said* 
,,, I have declared myself and my country 
free, autonomous and independent, both 
internally and externally. My country will 
her€?^ fter be as independent a state as the 
other states and powers of the world are. No 
foreign power will be allowed to have a hair's 
breadth of right to interfere internally and 
externally with the affairs of Afghanistan, and 
if any ever does I am ready to cut its throat 
with this sword, 16 ' 
This spirit of nationalism has been the main bulwark of Afghan 
foreign policy which has remained unchanged in the wake of 
changing regimes in Kabul, The ruling elites of Afghanistan 
had never been guided by any alien ideology but for Afghan 
nationalism. While elaborating this aspect, President Sardar 
Mohammad Dauod said sometime in lP7At "... We have no connection 
with any group, and to link us to any group or any movement 
17 
4^other than IslamJ'^  is a sin. We serve only our nation," 
Again in ic»76, President Dauod declared that ",,. Afghanistan 
has never been anybody's satellite and it is not a satellite 
18 
but in the orbit of its own nationalism," 
Thus it emerges, from the above analysis, that sense of 
nationalism has been a great determinant of Afghan foreign 
policy. 
16 National Archives of India (NAt), Foreign Section 
F , Nos 705-806, October 1920, No, 720. 
17 Louis Dupree, "A Note on Afghanistan t 1P74", American 
gnly^l -s fe F^ej^ S%^fX Repons (^UFSfi), v o l , m t , no, 8 , 
September 1964, p , 6, 
18 Af^ti^n^sl^an Republj.c Annu^ (Kabul, 1977), p . 37 , 
%.. ^^^.^^A 
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(111) <?OT08lt4ffl %Q 0Ql9^X^U^Vi 
Opposition to all forms of colonialism and neo-coloniallsm 
In all njanl-PestatloBS has been on© of the main basts of Afghan 
foreign policy. Its chenuered history as an Independent nation 
having never been subject to be colonlssed has been Instrumental 
In Afghan opposition to all forms of colonialism and neo-
colonlcaism. "Afghanistan was the first country to support the 
countries of Central Asia against Russian hegemony and expansionism 
during the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth 
19 
century*. 
Following the conclusion of the Second World War which also 
proved instrumenttil in inaugurating the procesc of decolonization, 
many a coimtries in "8la and Africa attained their independence 
from the colonial rule during late 1940s and IPSOs. In December 
1P60, the UN General Assembly adopted a declaration on 
Decolonisation, While welcoming the UN Declaration, the head of 
the Afghan delegation, A,R. Pashwak said that a declaration on 
the abolition of colonialism should have been one of the first 
Jobs of the United Nations and he regretted that it had been 
20 
delayed so long. 
Besides the points covered in the UN Declaration, the 
Afghan delegate made further suggestionst 
(a) •,• immediate abolition of the system of domination 
of any people by any alien people in all its foriai 
and manifestations; 
19 Interview with Abdul Ratean Pazhwak, n, 4. 
February 1961, p. 15, 
20 4fg^Wigt^W Nffl?, (London), vol. 4, no. 42, 
Februarv 
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(b) Independence from domination should apply not only 
to those peoples and territories which are usually 
called colonies but to all dependent peoples; 
(c) abolition of domination by giving independence 
should bo completed; 
(d) Independence should not mean only political 
independence but should mean economic and 
cultural independence, free from any direct 
or indirect influence or exercise of pressure 
of any kind on peoples and nations in any form 
and under any pretence; 
(e) the implementation of the provisions of the 
declaration on decolonization should be 
universal and should apply to all peoples 
and territories, 21 
These suggestions reflected Afghan concern for colonialism. 
While ecVioing similar sentiments, the then Prime Minister of 
Afghanistan, Sardar Moliarmad Dauod told the first nonaligned 
summit held at Belgrade in September l?»6l that although colonialism 
was being forced to withdraw, it still sought through "intrigue and 
22 
deception to retain its self-interests in other forms and shapes", 
Afghanistan, because of its strong opposition to 
colonialism and active support for the UN efforts in the process 
of deGoloni25atlon was made a member of the Special CommltteG with 
Hegard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It has played 
an active role in this regard both in the UN and at other inter-
national fora. 
While addressing the twenty-sixth session of the General 
Mohammad Mousa 
Assembly, the Afghan Foreign Minister, shafia, saldj "We 
21 Ib id . 
22 
p^~83; 
WLP,mi C g y n ^ ? ? , (7-n S?y^;?n!b9r 22^ (Belgrade, I 9 6 l ) , 
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have always supported the struggle of majority of the peoples 
of Southern Rhodesia /"now ZimbabwoJ7, peoples of Nacjibia, Angola, 
Mozsambique and other territories still unc"'or domination,* 
CoBmending the work done by the UN Comirittee on 
Decolonization, Afghanistan i-eiterated its support to the 
Committee and "oui* sympathy and our backing for all nations and 
24 
peoples still struggling for the recognition of their rights". 
Since the advent of United Nations till April 1?>78 when 
Afghanistan was pushed into the Soviet orbit, the legitimate 
regimes in Kabul always rendered \anqualif ied support to the 
people subject to colonial rule. During 1P75-77 countries like 
Angola, Mozambique and Seychelles had attained independence and 
joined the United Nations. While welcoming these nations, the 
Afghan delegate, Mangal, a member of the Afghan delegation, told 
the General Assembly on 7 December 1977 that it was a matter of 
Satisfaction that a number of small territories had been "able 
to exercise their right to self-determination and some of whom 
had reachtad complete internal self-government and on the 
2S 
threshold of independence," The Afghan delegate said that 
it was another achievement of the UN in the field of 
decolonization. 
23 
84 
Official Records of General Assembly (hereafter GAQg), 
Twentyaixth session, Plen, Meeting 1P61, 11 October 
1P71, p. Q. 
Ibid,. Twentyseventh session, Plen, Meeting 2060, 
10 October 1972, p, 2, 
25 Ibid,, Thirtysecond session, Plen, Meeting 96, 
7 December 1977. p, 1590, 
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It is evident from the above analysts that Afghanistan has 
been consistently opposing coionlaltsio and always esooused the 
cause of decolonization, 
(IT) SuT^ tiort for National Liberation Moygm^ t^ ts 
Another cornerstone of Afghan foreign policy has been its 
full support for the national liberation movements and struggles 
for the attaininent of independence from the colonial domination. 
Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the freedom 
fighters of Algeria^ when the latter was struggling for Indepen-
26 
dence. Sven at the first NAM suinnlt held at Belgrade in 
September 1961, Sardar Mohairmad Daiiod, Prime Minister of 
Afghanistan, announced his country's support for the Algerian 
struggle. While addressing the General Assembly on the Algerian 
question, Afghanistan's chief delegate to the UN, A.R, Pazhwak 
saldj "Afghanistan is convinced that its support for the cause 
27 
of the Algerian people ,,, is right and Just," Afghanistan 
also welcomed the admission of Algeria into the UNt "It is a 
great privilege ... to welcome the admission of Algeria to the 
United Nations, on behalf of the Afghan Crovernment and the 
28 
people of Afghanis tan**. 
Besides, Afghanistan has also rendered support for 
liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola 
and expressed solidarity with the people of Palestine in their 
2B Interview with A.R, Pazh'.fak, n, 4# 
S7 i£ghaaistaaJ|gs[£, vol, 5, no, 54, February 1962, p, 16, 
28 Ibid,, vol. 5, no, 64, December 1962, p, 19. 
8S 
struggle against Zionism, These aspects are analysed In 
succeeding pages. 
Regime of South Afir^ ^^  
Strong opposition to the racial and ep^rtheld policies 
pursued by the white minority regime of South Africa has been 
another bulwark of Afghan foreign policy. Be it the General 
Assembly or other international forum, Afghanistan always 
espoused the cause of the people of South Africa and severely 
condemned the apartheid regime, 
Zalmai Mahmud-Ghazi, a member of the Afghan delegation 
to the UN, told the Ad hoc Political Committee of the General 
Assembly in April ic>6i that Afghanistan was shocked to note the 
blatant violation of basic principles of freedom and equal 
29 
opportunity by the racist regime of South Africa, While 
reiterating the Afghan opposition to racialism and apartheid, 
Afghan Foreign Minister, K.M, Shafiq, told the twentyslxth session 
of the General Assemblyt "We have never failed to condemn apartheid 
and all forms of racial discimination as flagrant violation of 
30 
principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations,** 
Afghanistan keenly watched the developments with South 
Africa and the steps taken by international r^ ommunlty in that 
direction. While addressing the thirtyfirst session of the 
General Assembly, the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Wahed 
Abdullah, saldt 
29 Ibid,, vol, 4, no, 45, May l^ S^l, p, 21, 
30 M8M.i Twentysttth session, Plen, Meeting 1961, 
11 October 1971, p, 10, 
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AS a staunch supportei- of the principles of 
freedoRj, natlonallsiB, and respect for the rights 
of nations, Afghanistan hopes that those efforts 
will eventually enable the people of Southern 
Africa, who have suffered under the oppression of 
the privileged classes to attain their ideals and 
aspirations, 31 
In 15576, when the racist regime of South Africa resorted 
to massacres and massive repression against the Innocent people, 
Afghanistan not only condemned them but expressed its whole-
hearted support to the "legitimate struggle of the people of 
South Africa for self-determination and the eradication of the 
32 
inhuman policy of the apartheid". 
The United Rations had' taken certain measures against 
racist regime of South Africa but these measures could not 
dissuade the latter to abandon the policy of apartheid. While 
addressing the thirtysecond session of the General \sseinbly, 
a mernber of the Afghan delegation, noted that though 
certain measures had been initiated by the world comcunlty to 
reverse this trend but regretted that "the nefarious doctrine 
33 
of apartheid and social discriiElnation still prevails", 
(vi) Support for Narolbira 
Afghanistan has consistently supported the r)eople of South-
West Africa, known as Namibia, for their struggle to attain 
Independence from the racial regime of South Africa, The Union 
of South Africa was given the mandate over Namibia by the League 
31 Ibld,^ Thlrtyflrst session, Plen, Meeting 10, 
29 September l?t76, p. 161, 
32 Ibid,, Plen, Meeting 52, 2 November 1076, p, R76, 
33 Ibid,, Thirtysecond session, Plen, Meeting 96, 
7 December 1977, p, 1591, 
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of Nations with specific responsibilities to ensure the welfare 
of the local popu4.ation. 
However, after the Second World War, South Africa annexed 
the territory and the people of JTamlhia have not only been 
denied independence but subject to repression. In May 1961, 
Dr, A.H, Tabibi, Councillor to the Afghan Permanent ?ftssion to 
the OK, said that the situation in South-West Africa was tragic 
because South Africa had violated all the political, legal and 
35 
BJoral obligations embodied in the UN Charter, Keeping in view 
the fact that efforts of the United Nations had borne no fruits 
until 1?*62, Afghanistan regretted that the endeavours of the UN 
to solve the problem of South-West Africa by peaceful means had 
failed because of the unrelenting obstinacy of the South African 
36 
racist regime. 
With the passage of time, there was no change in South 
African policy of repression towards the people of Namibia, 
Afghanistan's reaction to it became irore vehement and strong. 
While addressing the thirtysecond session of the General Assembly, 
a member of the Afghan delegation, saidt "Wo believe 
that apartheid in Namibia means not only racial discrimination, 
segregation in homelands, and slave labour but also tlie 
37 
fragmentation and brutalization of the Namibians ,,,*• 
34 UN, y ^ ?nAt,'?<? N^^JOTS At fgrtr. (New York. logS), p, 71, 
35 Afghanistan News, vol, 4, no. 45, May 1P61, p, 21. 
36 F,A, Sikria, Afghan representative's statement before 
the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, 
Ibid,, vol, 6, no. 65, January 1P63, p. 17, 
37 SLW^J Thirtysecond session, Plen, Meeting 96, 
7 December 1977, p, 1591, 
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Thus, Afp:hoii support for the p'^ople of Kamlbla was keeping 
in consonance with I t s foreign policy which was cons is ten t ly 
pursued, 
<vli) SytppQrt £9r..Palq8ttne 
Afghanistan has been the ardent supporter for the people 
of Pa les t ine In t he i r s t ruggle against Zionism and has r e i t e r a t e d 
I t s support for the ina l ienable r igh t s of the Pa les t in ians to 
re turn to the i r homeland. The problem of Pa les t ine arose in 1947 
when the UN General Assembly recomirended the p a r t i t i o n of Pa les t ine 
in to two t e r r i t o r i e s — one for the Pa les t in ians and the other for 
the Jews, However, the Zionis ts u n i l a t e r a l l y declared the 
establishment of a Zionis t State of I s r ae l in Kay 1948 and usurped 
38 
other areas by force . 
Since then, the Pa les t in ians are s truggling to regain t h e i r 
motherland. The Arab-Israel wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973 and 
continued h o s t i l i t i e s have fur ther added to the miseries of the 
Pa l e s t i n i ans , The formation of the Pa les t ine Liberat ion Organiza-
t ion (PLO) and I t s recognit ion by the in te rna t iona l community in 
1974, as the sole representa t ive of the Pa les t in ians have been 
welcomed by Afghanistan, While voicing Afghanistan's concern, 
Kallkyar, the Afghan representat ive told the t h i r t y f i r s t session 
of the General Assembly! 
The posi t ion of Afghanistan on Pales t ine i s c l e a r . 
The quosfclon of Pa les t ine , the essence of which i s 
the res to ra t ion and exercise of the ina l ienable 
r igh ts of the Pa les t in ian people forms the core of 
the s o l u t i o n , . . I t i s obvious tha t th i s purpose 
38 For a de ta i led background see Pamela Ann Smith, 
lelm, 1984), ^£.gUnQ a^g t^Q,-^%l^?^lPto3 I87?*lf?B3 (I'Ondoni room Ei' 
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cannot be achieved unlef^ s Iisraol withdraws from 
all the occupied territories, 39 
Afghanistan continuously insisted that the total and complete 
withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories and 
the restoration of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian 
people including the right of self-detenaination and the 
40 
establishment of a Palestinian State would only solve the problem. 
Thus, Afghan support for the' Palestine people has been 
keeping in tune with its objectives of foreign policy, 
(7111) s^pppy^ t a r .t^^ MF,^% XQ s,^xf-D?t?rTP4nat4OT 
Afghanistan has attached tremendous signif icance to the 
r igh t for self-determinat ion whether in the UII General Assembly 
or other in te rna t iona l forum, Afghanistan has cons i s ten t ly and 
ardently espoused the cause of exercising r igh t to self-determinat ion 
by the people s t i l l under domination. 
The UII Charter recognizes the r i g h t to se l f -determinat ion. 
Ar t ic le 1(2) envisages tha t one of the purposes of the United 
Nations i s i ••to develop f r iendly r e l a t ions among nations based on 
respect for the pr inc ip le of ecual r igh t s and self -determinat ion 
of peoples, and to take other appropriate rr-oasures to strengthen 
41 
universal peace". I t was Afghanistan which suggested for the 
f i r s t time tha t the r igh t to self-determinat ion which pr io r to 
39 QAQH,. T h l r t y f i r s t sa-s ion, b'len. Meeting '?2, 
aSNovember 1976, p , 1122, 
40 Statement of Abdullah, Afghan r ep re sen t a t i ve . 
I b i d , , Thirtysecond session, Plen. Meeting 7?^, 
4 October 1977, p . 349, 
41 UN, Bvervone^s Unlte.d Nations (Ninth edn.) ^ f ^^ery p  
(New York, 1P79), p, 382. 
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that was incorporated as a political principle in the UN Charter 
and Universal Declaration on Human Rights to be treated as a 
42 
fundamental right, Afghanistan's vigorous espousal in this 
regard resulted in the incorporation of right to self-determination 
in the first Article both in the UN Charter and both the UN 
43 
Covenants on Human Rights, 
Afghanistan's vigorous espousal for the right to self-
determination forms the cornerstone of its foreign policy and 
opposition to colonialism, racialism, apartheid and support for 
the national liberation movements, all these stem from Afghan 
support for right to self-determination. This point was made 
clear by A,R, Pazhwak in his address to the nineteenth session 
of the General Assembly when he said: 
Afghanistan reaffirmed its belief in the principles 
of coexistence and asked for a clearer understanding 
of these principles through their codification and 
declaration to the world as principles which would 
include mutual respect for all^ support of the right 
of all nations to choose their own political, econonlc 
and social system^ respect for the undeniable and 
inherent right of al^ peoples to self-determination,,, 44 
Elaborating further the Afghan stand on right to self-determina-
tion, Pazhwak told the twentieth session of the General Asgeroblyi 
In all cases, we have believed and expressed our 
belief tliat peace and stability depend solely on 
the respect for and observance of self-determination. 
The sincerity of those who uphold this right can bo 
fully tested only by observing whether they adhere 
to It in all cases and in all places, 45 
42 Interview with A,R, Pazhwak, n, 4, 
43 Ibid, Also see, G^^, Fifth session, December 1<^ 50, 
UN Doc, A/C.3A.88, 
44 GAOI^ . Nineteenth session, Plen, Meeting 1323, 
IS December IP64, p, 8, 
45 Ibid,, Twentieth session, Plen, Meeting 1362, 
21 September ic»65, p, 7, 
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Afghanistan has continuously championed tho cause of dependent 
people throughout the world and pleaded for the exercise of right 
to self-de tersit nation. The Afghan delegate Hassrat, a member of 
Afghan delegation, while addressing the twentyserenth session 
of the General Assembly, said on 20 October l?»72j 
,,. In view of the prevailing situation, our 
delegation most strongly demands the Implemen-
tation of the right of the dependent territories 
to self-determination and Independence on the 
basis of the undeniable conviction held by the 
majority of the members of the international 
community, 46 
This is evident from the above analysis tJiat Afghanistan has been 
vocal enough in championing the cause of dependent people and 
territories with a view to enable them to exercise the right to 
self-determination. 
Afghanistan has played a key role in the framtrg and then 
adoption by the General Assembly of Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, It has not only actively participated but made positive 
contribution In improving the working of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, l^ April 1961, Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, the then chief 
Afghan delegate to the United Nations, suggested that the 
Commlsf^ ion should transmit without delay a general recommendation 
47 
to all the governments on the preparation of periodic reports. 
The Afghan suggestion was adopted unanimously. 
46 Ibid,, Twentysoventh session, Plen, Meeting 2069, 
20 October 1972, p. 14. 
47 Afghanistfip News, vol. 4, no. 45, May 1961, 
pTsi. 
89 
In April 1963, Aji, Pazhwak was unanimously elected as 
the chairman of the Human Rights Coramisslon. Speaking on the 
occasion, Paashwak said tha t his unanimous e lec t ion was a honour 
for his country and his person and his impar t i a l i ty had been 
the consequence of Afghanistan's basic policy in the i n t e r e s t 
48 
of in te rna t iona l cooperation and peace among mankind, 
Afghanistan was opposed to the encroachment upon Ind iv idua l ' s 
basic r i g h t s . While speaking on the occasion of the f i f t e en th 
anniversary of Declaration of Human Rights , A,R, Pazhwak emphasized 
tha t though the co l l ec t ive r igh t s of peoples to digni ty and equal i ty 
within the United Nations were an accepted f ac t , the world would 
b e t t e r prosper i f forces of res i s tance against the r i g h t s of 
individuals and peoples did not p e r s i s t in most par t s of the 
49 
world. 
The call for New International Economic Order (HISO) was 
given by the Algerian nonallgned summit in 1P73, which was later 
adopted as a Declaration and Programmo of Action on the Establish-. 
ment of a Kew International Economic Order by the General Assembly 
50 
at its sixth special session held in April 1974, 
The Declaration adopted by the General Assembly, proclaimed 
the determination of the Member States to work urgently for the 
establishment of a new international economic order based on 
48 Ibid,, vol, 6, no, 69, Kay 1963, p, 10, 
49 I b i d , , v o l , 7, no, 73, February 1969, p , 16, 
50 IggrTflpe's UH, n , 4 1 , p . 122, 
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equity, sovarolgn eqnaXlty, Interdependence, common Interest and 
cooperation among all cotjntrles which would correct Inequalities 
and redress existing Injustices, make It possible to eliminate 
th9 vldenlns gap between the developed and developing countries. 
It was but natural for a less developed and landlocked 
country like Afghanistan to support the speedy Imolementatlon of 
new international economic order, A close analysis of the 
pronouncemonts made by Afghan statesmen, especially by 
A,R. Pazhwak, reveals that Afghanistan liad been pressing for 
NIEO even prior to its being adopted by the General Assembly* 
While making a statement before the Economic and Social Council 
(BGOSOC) on 12 July 1?)60, Pazhwak saldi "As a representative of 
a less developed country, I should think that it is in favour of 
both of underdeveloped countries and also the lessening of 
tension if more emphasis is put on the necessity of international 
51 
cooperation," He also called for the liberalization of trade 
and stabilization of commodity prices. Being a landlocked 
country, Afghan5.stan has no direct access to the sea. Hence it 
is faced with numerous problems like transit facilities from the 
neighbouring countries. The resultant impact is increased burden 
on Afghanistan in foreign exchange. 
A conference on International Economic Cooperation was 
held in Paris in 1?>77 to discuss the developments made in 
52 
implementing the NIEO, However the least developed countries 
including Afghanistan were not represented in this conference. 
51 frf p)n^ nls^ an NewB^ vol* 4, no, 34, September I960, p, 15, 
62 For details see UN Doc, A/3l/478/Add, 1. 
91 
Afghanistan's concern about this was expressed by the Deputy 
Wahed 
Foreign Minister, Abdullah, In his statement before the Thirty-
second session of the General Assemblyt 
How can a meeting which Ignored the existence of 
such an important section of the International 
community and Its problems, safeguard the Interests 
of the least developed landlocked countries and 
consequently reach decisions benefiting the whole 
mankind Including those countries... I propose 
that in future that factor should be taken into 
consideration, 53 
Apart from voicing its own' problems, Afghanistan took up the 
case of other least developed and landlocked countries with a 
view to got their problems solved, 
V 
(xl) Support for Plsarroament 
Unqualified support for general and complete disarmament 
forms the bedrock of Afghan foreign policy. Be it In General 
Assembly or Disarmament Commission or in nonallgned conferences, 
Afghanistan has called for the halt to arms race, liquidation or 
destruction of nuclear weapons and vigorously espoused for the 
attainment of complete disarmament in the larger Interest of 
mankind. Reiterating Afghan stand on disarmament, the permanent 
Afghan delegate to the UN, A.R, Pazhwak, told the First Committee 
of the General Assembly in December 19601 
We agree that no time should be wasted and 
situation should not be allowed to develop in a 
manner which would make the efforts for disarma-
ment more difficult. We share the grave concern 
that any delay in the solution of the disarmament 
problem will result in more serious situation and 
grave consequences, 64 
53 QAOR> Thirtysecond session, Plen, Meeting 19, 
4 October 1977, p. 349, 
54 Afghanistan Newa. vol. 4, no. 41, January 1961, p. 20. 
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Along with other non-nuclear weapon countries, Afghanistan has 
also expressed Its opposition to nuclear tests from time to 
time. In December 1?>61, A.R, Pazhwak told the General Assembly 
that his country vas against nuclear weapons of any size by arw* 
55 
country. He further added that Afghanistan felt that it was 
iii5)erative that the concern of the General Assembly should be 
expressed regarding the tension which liad been caused by the 
56 
nuclear powers to resume nuclear testing. 
The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was signed in 1963, 
Afghanistan while welcoming the PTBT urged the General Assembly 
to work out a comprehensive test ban treaty. In October 1963, 
A.R, Pazhwak told the General Assembly that though the PTBT had 
no practical effect on Afghanistan but his country adhered to it 
57 
in the larger interest of world peace. He further added that 
the climate of the agreement between the big powers could be 
extended through a cocprehenslve treaty covering underground 
tests, Afghanistan was convinced that durable peace could only 
be attained if general and complete die armament tinder effective 
68 
control was achieved. 
Commitment and strict adherence to the principles of 
nonalignment forms the cornerstone of Afghan foreign policy. 
55 Ibid,, vol, 5, no, 53, January 1962, p, 8, 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid,, vol, 6, no, 75, November 1963, p, 15, 
68 ^^Q^% Thirtysecond session, Plen, Meeting 19, 
4 October 1977, p. 349, 
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Afghanistan Is one of the oldest nonallgned countries. The 
present analysis of Afghan commitinent to the policy of 
nonalignment pertains to the period prior to the advent of 
Soviet-backed communist coup in April l<^ 78 In Kabul, According 
to Abdul Rahman Paxhwak, Afghanistan has been the first nonallgned 
59 
country in Asia and one of the fore-runners of the NAM, 
Afghanistan throughout its history has essentially remained 
a free country and in case it was invaded or some of its territory 
was under alien occupation, the people of Afghanistan fought tooth 
and nail acalnst the invaders and liberated their territory. The 
three Anglo-Afghan wars are testimony to it. This Afghan 
tradition of resistance to alien occupation continued until the 
period of Abdur Rahman when the Afghan foreign policy had come 
under the British Influence. But in its internal affairs 
60 
Afghanistan was totally fl-ee. 
At a time when the Anglo-Russian rivalry was at its 
zenith, Afghanistan pursued a policy of genuine nonalignment. 
This aspect is analysed in detail in the first chapter, 
Afghanistan maintained strict neutrality during the First World 
War, between First World War and till the outbreak of the Second 
World War and even during the World War II period, 
"Following the advent of the NAM, it was natural that 
those countries which wanted to bring this movement into life, 
found in Afghanistan a country which had traditionally followed 
the policy of strict neutrality in the past and which now formed 
59 Interview with A,R, Pazhwak, n, 4, 
60 Ibid, 
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the toasts of nonallgnment". In ear ly 1950s when the Idea for 
laxjnchlng HAM was mooted "by Yugoslavia, Egypt, India , Indonesia 
and o thers , the Afghan leaders were a l so consulted In th i s 
regard. President Nasser of Egypt paid a v i s i t to Afghanistan 
a f t e r the Bandung Conference to e l i c i t Afghan stipport for the 
62 
NAM. 
Afghanistan had never been subject to alien rule and 
the principles of nonallgnment as understood in the current 
connotation of the term have formed the very basis of Afghan 
foreign policy even before the concept of NAM gained cxirrency. 
While addressing the first NAH summit held at Belgrade, the 
Afghan Premier, Sardar Mohammad Dauod said that "nonallgnment 
has been the traditional basis of Afghan foreign policy which 
63 
It has followed under the name of Impartial judgement." 
Afghanistan not only pursued the policy of nonallgnment 
rigorously but also played a pivotal role In the NAM summits. 
The term "nonallgnment" gained currency only In late 1950s and 
prior to that Afghan foreign policy was called "neutral policy". 
The Afghan leaders criticized those who regarded neutralism as an 
escapist policy and reiterated that "our neutrality Is not a 
passive but an active one and we reserve our freedom of judgement 
64 
In all questions of world Importance", 
61 Ib id , 
62 Ib id . 
63 Speech of Afghan Prime Mlnlater Sardar Mohammad Dauod a t 
the Belgrade Summit, ^he Conference ^f Heads of Sta te or 
Q.9X?ynie"ts gf N0ft..A3,4ffl^ a,.GQmq1^y^es, n. 22, p . 80, 
64 Statement by an Afghan Foreign Minister c i ted In 
H,C, Tausslng, "Afghan Neutralism", Eastern World, 
v o l , 15, no. 12, December 1961, p , 11 , 
P5 
While further elaborating the Afghan concept of "neutralism", 
the then Prime Minister of Afghanistan said on 24 August IPSP that 
the Afghan neutrallsir should "never be Interpreted as lack of 
interest. For even though we take a neutral stand In the 
differences of views and struggles ,,, we cannot remain aloof 
and disinterested In the problems which affect humanity at 
65 
large," 
The change of leadership or government In Kabul had never 
affected Afghanistan's s teadfas t commitment and adherence to the 
p r inc ip les of HAM, A,R,.Pashwak, the Permanent Afghan Representa-
t ive to the United Nations, while addressing the eighteenth 
session of the UN General Assembly in October 1P63 said tha t 
Afghanistan's t r a d i t i o n a l policy of nonalignment had remained 
unchanged. He fur ther pointed out t h a t the policy of non-
alignmeAt had enabled Afghanistan in the past and s t i l l enabled 
i t t a maintain lmt)ar t la l l ty towards a l l peoples and to remain 
67 
absolutely Independent of a l l in te rna t iona l s i t u a t i o n s . 
Similar stance was r e i t e r a t e d by Afghan representa t ive 
M.M. 
to the General Assembly, Shaflq, in his address on 11 October 
1P71 when he said: 
Afghanistan i s the o ldes t nonaligned member of 
the UN, I should l i k e to s t a t e t ha t we sha l l 
continue our pos i t ive and act ive policy of 
nonalignment within and without the United 
Nations, based on our f ree Judgement of a l l 
in te rna t iona l s i tua t ions on the basis of t he i r 
65 Afghanistan News, vo l . ?>, no. ;>6, October 1?>59, p . 7 , 
66 I b i d . , 7o l . 6, no, 75, i%'ovember 1P63, p , 15, 
67 I b i d . 
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merits, V/e believe that the policy of non-
alignment and the principles adopted by the 
different nonallgned conferences of the non-
aligned countries of the world .,. have made 
a significant contribution to the noble cause 
of world peace and international security, 6S 
The Afghan leaders had espoused the cause of nonalignment 
vigorously by active participation in the nonallgned summit 
conferences, in the General Assembly and other international 
forums. Until the advent of communist regime in Kabul in April 
1?^ 78 and subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979 which virtually eroded the nonallgned status of Afghanistan, 
it had a chequered history of steadfast commitment to the norms 
of nonalignment. This is evident from the statements of Sardar 
Mohammad Pauod, then President of Afghanistan, made on 14 August 
1976 at New Delhi on his way to Sri Lanka to attend the fifth NAM 
Summit at Colombo* He said that "the Republic of Afghanistan has 
explicitly, clearly and consistently respected the principles of 
nonalignment and will always follow these principles. We are 
69 
against any motive which will weaken these principles," 
Since Afghanistan had been a staunch supporter and 
adherent to the principles of the NAM, it expected the other 
nonallgned countries to be steadfast in their commitment to the 
norms and ideals of the NAM, As President Dauod saidj "The non-
alignment movement will have better meaning when its principles 
are adhered to and put into practice and Afghanistan has always 
68 fiiQS, TtrftntyslKth session, Plen, Meeting IPBl, 
11 October 1971, p» 7, 
69 Kabul Times. 15 August 1976, 
Off 
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firmly adhered to the principles of this movement," 
Thus It Is revealed from the aforementioned analysis that 
steadfast commitment and adherence to the principles of NAM 
constituted the cornerstone of Afghan foreign policy prior to 
April 1978. The erosion of the nonaligned status of Afghanistan 
after April 1978 will be analysed in Chapter 7, 
Sl^y9T)g^^epte x^^ Unit^ .q NqtlQ^ s^ 
According to A,R, Pazhwak, member countries of the United 
Nations can strengthen the world body in two ways . economically 
71 
and morally, Afghanistan, like majority of other economically 
poor countries, has used only tho moral support as a potent 
instrument in strengthening the United Nations, 
Afghanistan has an unflinching faith in the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, It was 
associated with negotiations at Sun Francisco which led to the 
establishment of the UK, Afghanistan was Inducted as a full-
fledged member of the UN on 19 November 1946, While applying 
for membership, the then Afghan Premier, Sliah Kahmud in a 
telegram transmitted on 2 July 1946 stated that "Afghanistan 
has long showed Itself to be a peace loving state devoted to the 
Ideals of International cooperation for which the United Nations 
72 
s tand," 
70 Ib id , 
71 Interview with A,R, Pazhwak, n , 4 , 
72 yearV^^ ffK of tn? Vm\^i ^^XXm^\ lf?4g-47 (New York, 1947), 
p . 416. 
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In Its debut participation, the Afghan delegate, Abdul 
Hussain Aziz, while addressing the General Assembly on 
IQ November 1*S46, openly declared his country's full support for 
the Ideals of the UN and hoped that the untiring efforts of the 
United IT at Ions would ultimately succeed in achieving tl^ ever-
73 
lasting peace. 
Since its ad^ nission Into the UN, Afghanistan has played 
a positive and constructive role in the various organs of the 
UU and its specialized agencies. On most of the issues, 
AJ'ghanistan h?iS cast its positive vote based on free and 
liripartlal judgenents, Abdul Rahman Pazhwak recalled that once 
when the deadlock over amending the Article IP of the UN Charter 
erose, which otherwise could have paralyzed the functioning of 
the General assembly, he ao a permanent Afghan envoy to the 
General Assetrbly played a pivotal role in evolving a consensus 
74 
tn that regard and the impasse was overcoice, 
Afghanistan had played a significant role in various 
committees and commissions of the United Nations, Abdul Rahman 
Pazhwak had for long time been AfghanlRtar's permanent represen-
tative to the UN, In an interview with the Bakhtay, news agency 
of Afghanistan in June 1961, he said that Afghanistan had been 
taking active part in the task of facilitating international 
75 
matters relating to the United Nations, He further added that 
73 QAOR^ First session, Plen, Meeting 48, Part II, 
19 November 1946, p, 66, 
74 Interview with A,R, Pazhwak, n. 4. 
75 Afghanistan N«vs, vol. 4, no, 47, July Ip6l, p. 16, 
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Afghanistan in its capacity as the Chairman of the Coraulttee to 
review the UN Charter had played a constructive role which was 
76 
highly appreciated by other countries, 
Afghanistan had been traditionally a nonaligned country 
and it was aligned only with the United Nations. This was 
reiterated by Sardar Kohamniad Nairn, then Foreign Minister and 
Deputy Premier, In his address to the fifteenth session of the 
General Assembly on 18 September I960! 
I speak strictly for a small peace loving country 
with the most impartial and independent position 
in international affairs having the deepest 
conviction in the UN. the only alliance to which 
we belong under its Charter, where our record is 
well knovm and our friendship with all cannot be 
questioned, 77 
Besides its own active participation, Afghanistan felt 
happy over the Increasing Eef^ bership of the United Nations, She 
was of the view that increasing popularity of the UN facilitated 
by the induction of new member countries was indicative of 
universal application of the principles of the UN Charter, In 
this regard Sardar Mohammad Nairn, the then Foreign Minister and 
Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan in his address to the 
General Assembly on IB September 1960 said that with the 
increased number of merrbers the UN was approaching the ideal of 
78 
universality. 
While reiterating the similar hope, Sardar Mohammad Nairn 
in his address to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly 
76 Ibid, 
77 Ibid,, vol, 4, no, 39, November I960, p, IS. 
78 Ibid,, p, 17. 
10® 
further noted that the Increasing membership of the UN was 
because of the great achievements of the world body in securing 
the rights of the peoples and nations to independence and their 
equal rights tc contribute to the work of building up a secure 
79 
and peaceful viorld, 
A strong and stable United Nations, in Afghanistan's view, 
was essential for maintaining peace and security in the world. As 
Sardar Ibhammad Nairn told the seventeenth session of the General 
Assembly* "It is a strong United Nations that comes first as an 
international instrument in uhich we can place our hope for the 
80 
solution of all major and nlnor problems confronting the world." 
Being an ardent supporter of Q strong UH, Afghanistan 
renOoied its fullest cooperation in strengthening the world 
body. It had been of the view that the TCI could become strong 
only if its member countries extended fu!l,l cooperation. This 
point was stressed by the Afghan delegate to the General Assembly 
iii his address to the thirtyfirst session of the General 
Aftsemblyj 
The success or failure of the UN in carrying out 
Its responsibilities under the Charter for the 
maintenance of international peace and security and 
for the realization of the right to self-determination 
and independence depends upon the amount of support 
which Meaber States extend to this organization; and 
to the extent of their compliance with the principles 
of the Charter and the resolutions of this 
organization, 81 
79 Ibid,, vol, 5, no, 63, November 1962, p, 10, 
80 Ibid,^ p, 11, 
81 QAOR f Thirtyfirst session, Plen, Meeting 85, 
1 December 1976, p, 1307, 
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In Afglian is tan's view, if all Member countries of the UN 
rendered full cooperation to the world body it could certainly be 
strengthened• As Abdullah, the Deputy Foreign Minister, told the 
thlrtysecond session of the General Assembly: ",,. what must be 
wrong, therefore, is the lack of political willingness on the part 
of Member States to bring into being a more effective United 
Nations and our reluctance to accept to be guided in international 
82 
gatherings by the norms of reason and justice." 
Thus it is evident from the analysis suprg. that Afghanistan 
since its induction into the UN as a fullfledged merrber had 
played a constructive role in strengthening the world body. At 
the same time it also urged the other nsember countries to render 
full support and cooperation to the UN» It was through mutual 
cooperation and support that the United Nations cou3.d be 
strengthened. 
The above-mentioned points highlight the main postulates 
of Afghan foreign policy. It is in the light of these basic 
postulates that the relations of Afghanistan with Super Powers 
in the post-Second World War would be analysed in the succeeding 
chapters. 
82 Ibid,. Thlrtysecond session, Plen. Meeting 19, 
19 October 1977, p, 348, 
Chapter I I I 
AFGHAN-SOVIET RELATIONS » THE POST-WAR PERIOD 
This chapter purports to analyze the relat ions between 
Afghanistan from the po8t*World War I I period uiitll the i i^eht 
of Soviet-backed conmiunlst coup In Kabul In April 1978• Relations 
between the two countries prior to the Second World War have been 
examined In the preceding second chapter, 
AS we have seen In the preceding chapter, Afghanistan ' 
maintained a policy of s t r i c t neutral i ty throughout the course of 
the Second World War, Thus ending of the hos t i l i t i e s had leas t 
effect on the Internal and external s i tuat ion of Afghanistan, 
However, the global geopolitics underwent a tremendous change 
immediately after the war. The status of the United Kingdom (UK) 
as a great power had been relegated to the oblivion paving way for 
the United States, However the Soviet Union retained i t s great 
power s ta tus . Rather i t emerged as much more stronger. As 
analyzed in the fourth chapter, the United States (US) declared 
I t s policy of global containment of communism and the Truman 
Doctrine inaugurated the onset of the cold war between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, both Super Powers, 
Despite the onset of the cold war in la te 1945, Afghanistan 
was not faced with any immediate threat ei ther from Bri t i sh India 
or Soviet Union, Thus, as a t radit ional adherent to the policy of 
s t r i c t and positive nonalignment, Afghanistan kept aloof from the 
manoeuvres of both the Super Powers, The then Afghan rulers 
addressed themselves to envisage an allround development of 
Afghanistan, In the early months of 1946, Shah Mahmud Khan took 
103 
over as Prime Minister of Afghanistan, In May 1946, Shah Mahimid 
declared that the principle of establishing friendly relations 
with all countries, especially with the neighbouring countries 
1 
formed the bedrock of Afghan foreign policy. On 13 June 1946, 
Kabul and Moscow signed an agreement to define the Amu rirer 
2 
border, thus settling the ownership of some 1,191 islands. 
However prior to signing this treaty, the Russians always claimed 
without ;5ustification that the Amu river* s boundary lay on the 
3 
southern bank - on Soviet side. Signing of this treaty showed 
a relatively benign post-war Soviet attitude to Afghanistan which 
was because "perhaps Afghanistan seemed too unimportant, too 
unthreatening to be worth the trouble and outcry of a territorial 
4 
grab". Besides Moscow also wanted to get the sympathy of 
Afghanistan. 
As stated earlier, the Afghan Government was addressing 
itself for promoting the economic development of Afghanistan, As 
the then Prime Minister Shah Mahmud saidi ",.. for the first time 
in our history, we are free of the threat of great powers' using 
our mountain passes as pathways to empire. Now we can concentrate 
on talents and resources in bettering the living conditions of our 
people". 
1 ISlSll (Kabul), 15 May 1946, 
2 For t ex t of the Treaty see, United Nations (UN), 
Treaty Ser i e s , Vol, 31 (New York, 1949), pp. 147-68. 
3 Roman T. Akhramovlch, QtiUtoe H^stgry Qf.AfKnanJstan 
After the Second World War (Moscow. 1966)^ ^ ' 6Q-
4 Henrv S. Brads her, AlghanJiStan M th^ ^ml^.1i ?^lon (Durha», N.C, s Duke Press , 1983), p . 16, 
6 New York Times. 9 August 1946, 
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The partition of the Indian subcontinent In August 1<547 
resulted In the emergence of India and Pakistan as two Independent 
sovereign countries. Pakistan emerged as the immediate neigtibour 
of Afghanistan. A major area of Pushtunlstan as a sequel to Durand 
6 
Line demarcation of 1893 had been inherited by Pakistan after the 
partition. "The Afghans saw perhaps their last chance to retrieve 
7 
by negotiation their lost territories in the NWFP" which was 
originally annexed by the British, At the time of partition, the 
question of Nortb-West Frontier Provinces (Kl^ fPP) was to be decided 
whether it should go to India or Pakistan. The Afghan case was that 
sines it was the aggrieved party, it should have been involved. The 
plebiscite conducted under the aegis of the British awarded NWFP to 
Pakistan. It was claimed that 9? per cent of those who voted in 
the plebiscite opted union with Pakistan. However only 55,5 per 
8 
cent of the enfranchised electorate turned out to vote. The 
Afghan Government rejected the "plebiscite" and thus the issue 
of "Pushtunlstan** became the major irritant in Afghan-Pakistan 
relations. The detailed analysis on this aspect is beyond the 
scope of present study. The issue is analyzed in light of Afghan-
Soviet relations. 
6 See Chapter I , 
Anthony Arnold, M-Kt^Plst^an L.,|he Sgytet Ipv^sion l a 
PQyspectivf (Revised edn.) (Stanford, Calif7s Stanford 
University), p . 26. 
8 Louis Duuree, "Afghanistan's Big Qample t Part I I , BconomLc 
and Strategic Aspects of Soviel 
n^^ ? W f Pgffgrii, ( M ^ , vol. 
Spects^f t Aid", ifflillsm-HaksaisiJa: 
., 4, no. 4, nay l^oO, p . 6, 
106 
On 26 July 1949, a Lovah Jlrga|7 In Kebul formally and 
specifically abrogated all of Its international treaties which 
supported the Durand Line as a border or which referred to the 
9 
status of the Pushtuns, 
The Soviet Union after the Amu river agreement was gradually 
increasing its influence in Afghanistan, On 14 June 1946, the New 
York Times reported that the Soviet Embassy in Kabul had about 600 
personnel and Soviet officers were in^arting training to the Afghan 
10 
Air Force personnel. 
On the Pushtun issue, the Soviet Union supported Afghan 
stand. The Soviet scholar A, I>srakov commented that the British 
and Americans were planning to establish military bases in the 
11 
Pushtun region. Another Soviet scholar, E, Atramonov while 
supporting the Afghan stand on Pushtunistan, wrote that UK and 
United States were determined to create instability in the region 
12 
by jjnciting Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
In 1947, there was an agreement to establish a telegraph 
link between Kabul and Tashkent, In the wake of its strained 
relations with Pakistan over Pushtun issue, and a Super Power as 
its neighbour, the Afghan Government sought military and economic 
assistance from the United States in 1948-49, However it got 
9 Louis Dupree, J^gh^j^st^n (Princeton, N,J, t Princeton 
University Press, 1973), p, 492, 
10 Hew York Tjgies. 14 June 1946, 
11 For details see, A, Dyakov, "A Partitioned India", 
New Times (Moscow), 14 January 1948, 
12 B, Atramonov, "How the British and American Imperialists 
are Interfering tn the Afghan-Pakistan Dispute*, ibid,, 
22 June 1949, 
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only economic assistance and military aid was denied because OS 
preference was for Pakistan, This aspect is discussed in details 
in Chapter IV, It is suffice here to say that the US refusal to 
accede to Afghan request for supply of arms was one of the main 
blunders which made Kabul dependent on Moscow for arms supplies, 
A^R%mU\R Of spvjtgt „Qpport\mlU?§. 
The Soviet ventures in post-war Afghanistan commenced with 
economic aid. In July 1950, Moscow and Kabul signed a four year 
trade agreement which envisaged Soviet petroleum products, cotton, 
cloth, sugar and other commodities in exchange for Afghan goods • 
wool, fur, raw cotton, fruits and nuts at a higher currency 
13 
exchange rates and duty free exchange, 
Pakistan's Joining of US sponsored military alliances -
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 and 
Central Treaty Organization (CEHTO) in 1955, further heightened 
Afghan apprehensions of Pak military might. The US refusal to 
provide military assistance to Afghanistan in October 1954 made 
Afghanistan feel dejected. In the meanwhile, Sardar Mohammad 
Paoud took over as Prime Minister of Afghanistan in 1953 and he 
wanted to make Afghanistan a. strong and prosperous country. 
In January 1954, Kabul and Moscow signed a major agreement in 
terms of which the Soviets lent ^ 3,5 million for the construction 
of grain elevators at Kabul and Pul»l-Khumri and a flour mill and 
14 
bakery at Kabul, Until the death of Stalin on 5 March 1963, 
13 Dupree, n, 8, P« 3, 
14 Marshal I . Goldaan, Spviet Foreign Ai^ (New York, 1967), 
p , 115. Also set Peter G. Franck, AfiHanls^an ^gtw?gn 
East and West (Washington, I960), p . 55, 
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Moscow had not favoured the policy of forging close relations with 
the Third World countries. When Khrushchev succeeded Stalin, th« 
official policy towards Third World began to change quickly. 
According to Rubinstein, Moscow began to represent itself abroad 
as the champion of developing countries, helping the latter to 
IS 
establish economic as well as political independence. The 
Soviet leader, Khrushchev in 1953 told visiting US Congressmen 
that •*We value trade least for economic and most for political 
16 
reasons". Thus it becomes evident that after 1953, Moscow 
adopted the strategy of using economic aid as a bait to hoodwink 
the developing countries into its orbit of influence. In pursuance 
of this policy, Moscow augmented its economic assistance to Kabul, 
In July 1954 an agreement worth ^  1,2 million was signed between 
the two Countries for the construction of a gasoline pipeline 
17 
across the Amu river. In August 1954, another agreement worth 
fS 2 million was signed between the two countries for road building 
18 
equipment. Again it October 1964, Soviet Union advanced another 
loan worth j? 2,1 million which provided for an asphalt factory and 
19 
equipment. According to Bradsheri "These were early examples of 
a Soviet talent for getting maxiinuin propaganda value from aid 
80 
projects,,," On 28 June 1955, Afghanistan negotiated a new 
16 Alvin Z, Rubinstein, Tftfl ^ Or^tgP PQIA^Y Qt S<?Yl9t Hn^gn 
(New York, i960), pp. 395-7, 
16 Ibid,, p, 383, 
17 Goldman, n, 14, p, 116, 
IB Franck, n, 14, pp, 56-58, 
19 Ibid, 
20 Bradsher, n, 4, p, 24, 
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agreement on duty-free transit of Afghan goods through Soviet 
territory based on Article 6 of the 1921 treaty between the two 
21 
countries. 
On 15 December ic>55, the First Secretary of the Soviet 
Communist Party, Nikita S, Khrushchev and Soviet Premier, 
Nikolai A. Bulganin, paid an official visit to Afghanistan, The 
Soviet dignatories were given a rousing welcome at the Kabul 
airport by King Zahir Shah and Prime Minister, Sardar Mohammad 
22 
Dauod, and other Government officials. While thanking the 
Afghan people, Bulganin hoped that the visit would help in forging 
23 
closer relations between the two countries. 
The visiting Soviet leaders being aware of the Afghan 
sentiments over Pushtunistan saidt "Wo sympathise with Afghanistan's 
policy on the question of Pushtunistan. The Soviet Union stands 
for an equitable solution of this problem which cannot be settled 
correctly without taking into account the vital interests of the 
24 
people inhabiting Pushtunistan", The Afghan Prlne Minister, 
Sardar Mohammad Dauod in his welcome address said that Afghanistan 
was the staunch adherent of the principles of nonalignment| 
"Afghanistan will accept economic assistance with gratitude but it 
21 Arnold, n, 7, p, 35, 
22 Islahy 16 December 1P55, 
23 N,A, Bulganin and N.S, Khrushehev> Spg^ ectMs During 
golQum U\ Xn'iiai ,?urnia and Afg i^anaLstani ^9Ym}i9T^ 
December 1955 (Hew Delhi. 1956). p . 173. 
24 I b i d , , p , 176, 
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25 
Should not be linked with political strings". 
Both the Soviet leaders also announced the gift of 100-bed 
hospital to be built in Kabul with Russian aid» It was also 
promised that Soviet Union will give a credit worth ^ 100 million 
26 
repayable in thirty years at two per cent interest. The Soviet 
leaders also visited the military training school at Kabul and 
thereafter Bulganin said that his country fully appreciated the 
27 
Afghan desire for modernizing their armed forces. After paying 
a five day visit to Afghanistan, the Soviet leaders returned to 
Itoscow, 
While recounting the Soviet thinking during th i s period 
on Afghanistan, Khrushchev l a t e r in his memoirs said? 
America was courting Afghanistan, appearing to 
give t ha t country economic aid but ac tua l ly 
being much more in te res ted in carrying p o l i t i c a l 
f avour , , . At the time of our v i s i t i t was c l ea r 
to us tha t the Americans were penetrat ing 
Afghanistan with the obvious purpose of s e t t i ng 
up mi l i t a ry b a s e , , . The c a p i t a l which we've 
invested in Afghanistan hasn ' t been wasted. We 
have earned the Afghan's t r u s t and f r iendship , 
and i t has not f a l l en into the American t r a p , , . 
The amount of money we spent in gratui tous 
ass i s tance to Afghanistan i s a drop in the ocean 
compared to the p r ice we would have had to pay 
in order to counter the t h r e a t of an American 
mi l i t a ry base on Afghan t e r r i t o r y . 28 
The Soviet leaders extended an inv i t a t ion to the Afghan leaders to 
29 
v i s i t Soviet Union and Prime Minister Dauod accepted the i n v i t a t i o n . 
26 Goldman, n , 14, p . 115. Also see Dupree, n, 9 , pp. 508-9» 
27 Bulganin and Khrushchev, n, 23 , p . 176, 
28 Nlk l t a S, Khrushchev, ^nrush9?lgy figffl9Bl??rff (Boston, 1971), pp» 560-2, 
29 ILfiiallt 1^ December 1955, 
no 
On IS December 1955, both the countries concluded a treaty 
under which the Article 8 of the Treaty of June 1931 ensuring the 
neutrality and non-aggression was amended and the treaty was 
extended for further ten years. It also contained a provision 
that either side could abrogate the treaty by giving an advance 
30 
notice of six months* 
Following the visit of the Soviet leaders to Afghanistan, 
the Kremlin started evincing keen interest in Kabul. In March 
1956, the projects selected by a Joint Afghan-Soviet sxirvey team, 
though excluding railroads, were linked to a large extent with 
creating and modernizing other transportation facilities. These 
included two airport projects, one major highway linking Kabul 
with the strategic Soviet border, one river port facility, 
31 
construction of bridge, auto repair workshops etc. 
In March 1956, both countries signed an agreement that 
32 
provided for regular flights between Tashkent and Kabul, The 
Article VI of this agreement provides a curious fact of Soviet 
strategic concerns in Afghanis tarn ''Bach side has the right to 
refuse or amend flight permission to the other if it does not 
have proof that the majority ownership or actual control of that 
enterprise is being realized by citizens or organs of that 
33 
country". This provision makes it evident that Moscow did not 
30 For details of the Treaty see, Buiganin and Khrushchev, 
n, 23, pp, 188-92, 
31 Franck, n, 14, p. 57, 
32 T,M, Vinogradov, aL-fli* ©ds,, Sovetskn-Afghanskive 
9,1m9sn?nlYa l,ffl9"lt^§g,(Moscov» 1971), P P . 129-34 as cited 
in Arnold, n, 7, p , a6, 
33 Ibid. 
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want any other country to challenge the Soviet monopoly in 
Afghanistan. At that period, 49 per cent of the Ariana Afghan 
Airlines, th© only ^kU^Uj&ea of Afghanistan, with which the 
Soviets had concluded the said agreement, was owned by one 
Peter Baldwin, an American businessman who had sported that 
34 
airlines in April 1955, At this Juncture the inclusion of such 
a provision in the agreement insisted by Moscow aimed at 
alleviating the American influence. However, in 1957, the Pan 
American Airways boiight out Baldwin's share in the Ariana Airway 
for ^ 400 thousand and actively helped the Ariana with its 
operation and maintenance problems for more than two decades 
35 
thereafter. 
During March 1956, another agreement was signed between 
Kabul and Moscow under which the Soviet specialists were to be 
stationed in Afghanistan for the purpose of establishing, 
maintaining and training the Afghan personnel regarding various 
36 
projects to be jointly set up. These Soviet specialists were 
also supposed to oversee the Afghan construction activities 
according to the approved project plans. 
In January 1956, the Soviet Vice-President A, Mikoyan 
visited Afghanistan during which the earlier mentioned agreement 
37 
woth jl 100 million credit was signed. in February 1956, the 
34 Louis Dupree, "American Private Enterprise in Afghanistan i 
The Investment Climate as it Relates to One Company*** 
4UF8^ vol, 4, no. 9, December I96u, p, 4, 
35 Franck, n. 14, p. 461, 
36 Arnold, n, 7, p, 38, 
37 I£Lala, 29 January 1956, 
Soviet leaders sent messages of greetings to mark the twenty-
SB 
fifth anniversary of Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty of 1931, 
Soviet media and scholars tried to project a rosy picture of 
"friendly relations« betwewQ Moscow and Kabul and emphasised 
that Soviet economic assistance to Afghanistan was without any 
39 
"political strings*, 
fiim M n^lg^ gr Pflwd'^  nn% %Q %ssia 
On 17 October 1956, Sardar Moharmad Dauod reached Moscow 
40 
on an official visit. He was given a warm welcome on his arrival. 
The leading Soviet daily Pravda in its issue of 18 October 1956 
while welcoming the visit of Afghan Prime Minister commented 
41 
that Afghan-Soviet friendship had stood the test of time. 
Concluding his fortnight's visit to the Soviet Union, 
the Afghan Prime Minister said that his visit had been very 
fruitful because there had been a frank exchange of views between 
42 
the leaders of the two countries. However Sardar Mohammad 
Dauod remained very cautious about his views on global Issues, 
He stressed emphasis on Afghanistan's traditional policy of 
neutrality, 
in July 1957, the King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, along 
with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Naiin 
38 Moscow New> (Moscow), 29 February 1956, 
39 For details see S, Ineutin and V, Peterkhov, "The Consolida-
tion of Soviet-Afghan Friendship and Cooperation**, 
Ii^ ternfttional Affairs (Moscow), no,l, January 1956, pp. 41-49, 
40 181^^. IB October 1956, 
41 Moscow News. 20 October 1956, 
42 Ibid,, 30 October 1956, 
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and other rainistors visited Soviet Union. They were given vara 
43 
welcome on their arrival in Moscow, In his welcome address 
the Soviet President Varashilor said that the visit of Afghan 
King was of tremendous significance because it was sjrmbolic of 
the growing friendship between the two countries professing 
44 
different political systems. 
In his reply the Afghan King referred to the growing 
friendly relations between the two countries. On 30 July 1957, 
at the conclusion of the visit of King Zahir Shah, a joint 
coxmrunique was issued* Both the countries expressed their faith 
in the principles of peaceful coexistence and Afghanistan was 
45 
praised for pursuing the policy of strict neutrality. According 
to a report published in EiaJtda of 31 July 1957, the Foreign 
Ministers of both countries agreed in principle to concluded an 
agreement regarding the demarcation of border areas between the 
46 
two countries. The Soviet Union attached great Importance 
to this visit because since King Amanullah's visit, it was the 
second visit by any Afghan King to the Soviet Union, Moscow 
promised Kabul to advance a credit worth fS 15 million for the 
47 
development of natural gas exports to the Soviet Union, 
43 Pravda (Moscow), 18 July 1957, cited in 
Hew Times (Moscow), July 1957. 
44 
45 
46 
Ibid, 
Ib id , , 31 July 1957, 
Ibid, 
47 FranlBk, n, 14, p, 57, 
X14 
The beginning of 1950s had witnessed the inauguration of 
the penetration of Soviet military Influence in Afghanistan, 
According to Bradsher, Afghanistan was first in the Third World 
to receive Soviet economic aid and second to receive irllltary 
48 
aid. In August 1955, Afghanistan negotiated a cash deal worth 
49 
fS 3 million for Czechoslovak weapons. According to Anthony-
Arnold, "Afghanistan signed an agreement with the Soviet TJnion 
in August 1956 on re-equipping Afghanistan's armed forces with 
Soviet materials". Of necessity, given the complexity of modern 
armaments, this agreement involved the training of Afghan officers 
in Soviet military schools and the stationinij of Soviet experts at 
Afghan military bases. This gave the USSR an opportunity for 
assessing and recruiting individual officers to servo Soviet 
50 
political alms is self-evident, and it was not ignored. 
In the wake of these developments, many observers on 
Afghanistan apprehended that Dauod was pushing his country into 
Soviet vassalage. Others perceived his actions as a high-risk 
gamble to Improve his country's lot by playing off the great 
51 
powers against each other. However Louis Dupree is optimistic 
of Dauod*s policies during 1950s, According to him, Afghanistan 
had become an "economic Korea where the con5)etltlon between the 
48 Bradsher, n, 4, p, 27, 
49 "Soviet Bloc SconomLc Ac t iv i t i e s in the Near East and Asia 
)ocument8 
. . , . if. 
50 Arnold, n , 7, p , 3 8 , 
51 I b i d . 
as of Nov«iiber 25, 1955" in the Declassified pocuments 
^ftrQSpflgtlYt C9U^<?UYfl (Washington, 1976), 3F. 
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Bast and the W«at benefited a local population without endangering 
52 
its independence'*. During 1966-58, Afghanistan got substantial 
econorotc assistance from Moscow as well as Washington. Between 
1950 to 1<^ 59, the OS assistance to Afghanistan totalled to 
^ 143 million, while the Soviet assistance amounted to fl 246.2 
million. The bulk of the US assistance comprised in the form of 
53 
outright grants, the Soviet provided long-term loans. The US 
objective in augmenting its Afghan share of aid aimed at securing 
••majcinura internal political stability, promoting friendly economic 
relations with her /"Afghanistan*sJ7 Free World neighbours} and 
minimizing any possibility that Afghanistan might either be a 
54 
victim of, or a pathway for, Soviet domination in South Asia.** 
However, a close analysis of the Soviet strategy of 
extending economic assistance and trade facilities to Afghanistan 
reveals that between 1950 and i960, Kabul's dependence on Itoscow 
for arms had become almost hundred per cent, for petroleum 
products from 10 per cent to 90 per cent and in case of foreign 
55 
trade from 17 per cent to almost 50 per cent. 
Under the cover of providing economic assistance for 
transportation and road construction, the Soviet Union was also 
concentrating on strategic areas. The Soviet highway project 
that ran from the Soviet border at Kushka to Herat and Kandahar, 
52 Dupree, n. 9, pp. 5151-16. 
53 Richard S Newell, gglUlcp 9t.Mg};i^i\ls%^Xi (Ithaca, NY* 
Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 128-9. 
54 Franck, n. 14$ p , 72. 
55 Dupree, n. 8* p . 2'i 
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lli&ed up there with the other highway to Kabul being constructed 
by the US assistance. Thus the Kremlin was building up strategic 
highways linking Its border with Important parts of Afghanistan 
which It could use one day for exerting Its control over that 
country, as happened In December 1979« Moscow had stipulated 
such clauses In Its agreements with Kabul which It could exploit 
at short notice. Article 2i of the border agreement between the 
two countries signed on 18 January 1958 envisaged that at 48-hour 
notice either side could examine those parts of International 
bridges linking the two countries that were situated on the 
56 
other side's territory. 
In Kay 1059, Moscow and Kabul signed another agreement on 
building the Kushka-Kandhar road. In July 1959 both countries 
signed another agreement regarding the construction of three 
new bridges across the Besud, Kameh and ASmar Rivers, The 
construction of the bridges was to be carried out by the Afghan 
57 
workers under the supervision of Soviet Union, 
On 2 March i960, the Soviet Premier N, Khrushchev visited 
Afghanistan, King Zahlr Shah while welcoming tlje visit of Soviet 
Prime Minister, hoped that the relations between the two countries 
68 
would improve further, Khrushchev lauded Afghan foreign policy 
56 Vinogradov, jaiufllA* i^« 32, p, 156, as cited in Arnold, 
n, 7, p, 39. 
57 I b i d , , pp. 179-82. 
58 HaTiPlnftss Ar^ t^  Peace for tha Peppiest N.S^ Khrushchev's ppl a nd e onl i >S. rushchev 
ebruarv 11 - March 5 . i960 (Moscow. 1960). p . 266. 
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of nonallgnment, Internatlon peac© and econoisLc development. He 
also referred to the growing political, economic and cultural 
59 
relations between Soviet Union and Afghanistan. 
Just a couple of months ago, prior to Khrushchev's visit 
to Afghanistan, Soviet Union and Afghanistan had signed an 
agreement in January i960 in which Moscow promised to give 
economic assistance worth ^ 22,4 million during the five year 
60 
development plan for 1960-65, Even during his visit in March 
3960, Khrushchev offered to finance the entire Afghan five year 
plan for 1960-65 on the condition that Soviet advisers be placed 
at the highest levels in all Afghan ministries. But Prime Minister 
of Afghanistan,Sardar Mohammad Dauod, was cautiously skeptical and 
61 
he reportedly turned down the Soviet offer. 
The visiting Soviet Premier visited various projects 
launched with the Soviet help. In a dinner hosted by Soviet 
leader Khrushchev in favour of Afghan Prime Minister, Mohammad 
Dauod on 4 March 1960, the Soviet Premier repeatedly emphasized 
the fact that it was Soviet leader, Lenin, who first recognized 
62 
the independence of Afghanista, The Prime Minister of 
Afghanistan, Sardar Mohammad Dauod, in his reply, said that Soviet 
Union under the leadership of Lenin recognized independence of 
Afghanistan and the latter also took no time in according 
59 Itoid., pp, 266-7. 
60 Ngy y9rK Tto^s, 21 Januaru i960. 
61 Louis Dupree, "The Mountains Go to Mohammed Zahlr", 
iMMi vol , 4, no. 6, 
62 Khru8hchgv»a Vis i ts , n, 58, pp. 288-90. 
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recognition to the new Government which assumed power after the 
63 
October Revolution, This was characteristic of Dauod to tell 
the Soviets that Afghanistan did not lag behind In repaying the 
gratitude It owed to others. 
On 4 March i960, both countries signed a cultural 
agreement to promote and cooperate In the fields of science, 
64 
art and culture. The joint communique Issued on 5 March I960 
at the conclusion of Soviet Premier's visit to Kabul, reiterated 
65 
the desire of both countries to further Improve their relations. 
The above analysis makes It evident that Afghan leader-
ship while accepting Soviet economic and technical assistance, 
did not compromise the foreign policy of Afghanistan but rather 
Secured Soviet endorsement of Afghanistan's Independent and non-
aligned policy. In early 1963, Sardar Dauod Khan resigned as 
Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Some Western experts on 
Afghanistan are of the view that Sardar Dauod during his 
premiership (3S63-63) allowed Soviet influence to Increase in 
Afghanistan unhindered. According to Leon B, Poullada, during 
Dauod»s rule of a decade "the USSR had established a firm base 
66 
of operation In Afghanistan", 
However Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad Dauod until 1963 
had remained cautiously skeptical about the Soviet motives In 
63 Ibid,, p, 291, 
64 Ibid,, pp, 293-6, 
65 Ibid., pp. 302-3, 
66 Leon B, Poullada, "The Failure of American Diplomacy in 
Afghanistan", Wgr^d AffaU'g (Washington), vol, 145, no, 3, 
Winter 1982/83, p7 242, 
119 
Afghanistan, In reply to a question about Soviet subversion in 
1956, Dauod had, while referring to the 1948 Coinmunist takeover 
in that country, repliedt "Does anyone think we have not heard 
67 
of CzeehoslovjOEla?* 
Poullada cites another example to prove his dictum that 
Dauod dismissed in 1956 a warning from an American Ambassador 
that Soviet economic aid was laying a logistical infrastructure 
for invasion and the Soviet training of Afghan military officers 
68 
could create a fifth column in the armed forces. Such 
misgivings about Dauod»s foreign policy might have been prompted 
in the light of the fact that he ignored such "warnings" or 
••advicesw. 
Despite heavy US arms and economic assistance to Pakista-
during 1953-63, with which Afghanistan had strained relations 
over the issue of Pushtunistan, Dauod neither criticized the 
United States nor sought massive arms aid from the Soviet Uniohf 
rather he pursued a policy of genuine nonalignrosnt. Dauod had 
declared sometime in 1960» "Our whole life, our whole existence, 
revolves around one single focal point - freedom. Should we 
ever get the feeling that cur freedom is in the slightest danger, 
from whatever quarter, then we should prefer to live on dry bread, 
or even starve, sooner than accept help that would restrict our 
67 Quoted in Bradsher, n, 4, p, 27, 
68 Leon B, Poullada, "Afghanistan and the United Statest 
The Crucial Years", The Middle East Jouyna:^ ^ vol, 35 
(1981), p. 187. 
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6© 
fr«9dom»* By the early 1960s, the people of Afghanistan had 
realized thatt 
«.. Soviet actions were always motivated bv their 
own interests and by those alone. But £ the Afghans^ 
reasoned assuming Soviet planners to be reasonable 
iron, i:1syse Interests could only be augmented by wa 
attack on Afghanistan, The country would be an 
economic liability to the USSR, to control it would 
be difficult and costly} and most important, anor 
such aggression would mve disastrouis repercussions 
among the neutralist nations in Asia and Africa, 70 
Thus on the basis of above analysis, it is clear that 
though during the period 1953-63, Soviet Union did render 
considerable economic assistance to woo Afghanistan to its 
fold, the latter did not fall a prey to Soviet overtures and 
pursued an independent and genuinely nonaligned foreign policy. 
Following the ouster of Sardar Mohammad DauDd in 1963, 
Dr, Mohammed Yusuf Khan became the new Prime Minister of 
Afghanistan, He could remain in office for a short time and 
in October 1965, Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal was appointed as 
the new Prime Minister of Afghanistan, 
Mohammad Zahir Shah, the King of Afghanistan paid an 
official visit to the USSR from 3 to 16 August 1965, The King»s 
entourage was accompanied by other ministers and officials of 
71 
Afghanistan, During the visit the Afghan King had meetings 
69 Quoted in Gunther Nollau and Hans Jurgenwiche, 
Russia's South Flartl^  (New Yorki Praeger, 1963), 
p, 136. 
70 Arnold Fletcher, Afgtenlffm t Hlgt^aY $g CwqW^t 
(Ithacaj Cornell University Press, 1965), p, 261, 
71 united States, jB^rtganJsrgXKB ?Qll9r I Ciamnt 
Docuffent^ (Washington, D,C. t Government Printing 
Office, 1968), P. 608. 
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with Leonid Brezhnev, A.N, Kosygln and other Soviet leaders. 
The talks between the leaders of the two countries proceeded in 
72 
an atmosphere of friendship, sincerity and mutual understanding. 
The tw® sides expressed full satisfaction with the 
continuous development of friendship which had a traditional 
basis and mutual confidence, and comprehensive cooperation 
between the two countries. Both sides reaffirmed that they 
73 
would not penult aiy damage to be done to these relations. 
The Joint communique issued at the end of Afghan King's 
visit to Soviet Union also noted the conviction of both countries 
that "the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of their 
countries is a brilliant example of the realization of the 
principles of peaceful co-existence of states with different 
economic, social and political systems and that there is an 
Important factor in the consolidation of peace in this part of 
the world and corresponds to the sincere designs of all the 
74 
peoples of the world." It was further acknowledged that the 
Soviet economic assistance had played Important role In Inqple-
mentlng the first and second five year plans for the development 
of Afghanistan and that the "continuation of this assistance toward 
the realization of the third five year plan will have a great and 
76 
positive effect on the economic development of Afghanistan", 
72 Ibid., p, 609. 
73 Ibid, 
74 Ibid. 
76 Ibid, 
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The Afghanistan side emphasised and reaffirmed Its policy 
of neutrality and nonallgnment which was In the Interest of the 
people of Afghanistan and of peace throughout the world* The 
Soviet side reaffirmed that "this policy of Afghanistan 1» an 
Important contribution to the cause of relaxation of Inter-
national tension and the strengthening of peace and friendship 
76 
among the people*. Thus the visit of Afghan King to Moscow 
proved Instrumental in procuring Soviet endorsement of Afghan 
foreign policy. 
Between 1963-73 the Soviet-Afghan relations continued on 
the friendly pattern. There was no major point of departure In 
the traditionally friendly relationship. Between 1967-70| the 
value of Russian assistance approximated 70 per cent of the total 
77 
aid received by Afghanistan from all sources. On 6 February 
1968 both Afghanistan and Soviet Union signed an agreement for 
economic and technical assistance. Under this and earlier 
agreements, Afghanistan was bound to export 2.5 billion cubic 
metres of natural gas, on average, to the Soviet Union upto the 
78 
year 1985* Though under the agreement of 1968, it was envisaged 
that the prices of the natural gas would be "determined by the two 
sides** but in practice the Soviet Union unilaterally determined the 
price it would pay and controlled all information regarding the 
quantum of gas It imported, "In fact, the Soviet Union never paid 
76 Ib id , , p . 610, 
77 Newell, n, 53, p , 147. 
78 Abdul Tawab Assifl, "The Russian Ropei Soviet Economic 
Motives and the Subversion of Afghanistan", World Affairs (Washington), vol , 145, no, 3 , Winter 1982/83, p . 255, 
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Afghanistan more than twenty percent of the going world market 
79 
price for natural gas««. 
In the wake of growing schism between Soviet Union and 
People's Republic of China (PRO) In the late 1960s, Moscow sought 
to Isolate China from the world Conmiunlst movement and In Asia, 
In late May 1969, the then Soviet Prime Minister A, Kosygin 
during his visit to Kabul, proposed regional economic cooperation 
among Afghanistan, Pakistan and India as a step toward creating 
80 
peaceful environment In the region. On 7 June 1969, the Soviet 
leader Leonid Brezhnev, while addressing the International 
Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties held In Moscow, 
declared! "We are of the opinion that the course of events is 
putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective 
81 
security in Asia", This concept of collective security in Asia 
came to be known as •TSrezhnev Doctrine", The Soviet leader 
Brezhnev did not elaborate his doctrine in 1969. However, it 
was on 30 March 1972, that Brezhnev statedJ 
Collective security in Asia must, in our vlew,be 
based on such principles as renunciation of use of 
force in relations between states, respect for 
sovereignty and the inviolability of borders, 
noninterference in internal affairs and the broad 
development of economic and other cooperation on 
the basis of full equality and mutual development, 82 
79 Ibid,, p. 256. 
80 Alvln Z, Rubinstein, "The Last Years of Peaceful Coexistence! 
Soviet Afghan Relations 1963-1978", The Middle East Journal. 
Tol. 36, no, 2, Spring 1982, p . 170. 
81 W^Y Tort T to? t 8 June 1969. 
82 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter 
FBIS), FBIS/OSSR, 21 March 1972. 
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In pursuance of Brezshnev Doctrine, the Soviet Union wooed 
Afghanistan to endorse the plan for Asian collective security. 
However, Afghanistan kept cool towards this plan and reiterated 
its commitment to the policy of nonallgnment. During May 1973, 
the Soviet President, Podgoriiy visited Kabul, The joint conmunlque 
Issued after his visit spoke of the great Importance which the 
Soviet Union attached to "Afghanistan's policy of positive 
neutrality and nonallgnment". It further notedi 
Considering that observance of the principles of 
peacefia coexistence of states with dlfferity social 
and political systems Is an effective way toward 
establishing lasting peace both In Asia and other 
parts of the world, the USSR and Afghanistan again 
declare that In order to guarantee security In Asia 
It Is essential for all countries of the area to 
make joint efforts in that direction, 83 
However this could not be considered as Afghan endorsement of 
the Brezhnev Doctrine, 
Sardar Mohamirad Dauod who had resigned in 1963, seized power 
In Kabul In July 1973 In a bloodless ggx^ by overthrowing the 
monarchy. After about a year of his assun5)tlon of power, President 
Sardar Mohammad DaUod paid an official visit from 4-7 June 1974 to 
Soviet Union and "accepted Soviet-drafted language In a joint 
84 
communique endorsing the Brezhnev Doctrine**, The joint 
communique noted* "The Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan 
are deeply Interested In ensuring peace and cooperation In Asla and 
83 FBIS/USSR, 26 May 1973, 
84 A,0, Hooranl, ••Soviet Ambitions In Soviet ASla", 
tnttrmtrtnnat ^^garttYt vol, u , wmter 1979-80, p. 41. 
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consider that the creation of a system of security by the 
collective efforts of all the states of Asia would correspond to 
85 
the interests of the Asian peoples". The Soviets proved thelr-
selves elefver enough to extract Afghan endorsement of Soviet plan 
but did not repay the favour. Both Moscow Radio and Tass oAtted 
86 
reference to Pakistan from Dauod's speech at Kremlin banquet. 
After having private talks with President Dauod, the Soviet 
President Podgoriy publicly said that Afghanistan's "great and 
complex talks Cot J renovating political, economic and cultural. 
life ,,, can be solved successfully, when the course charted la 
pursued firmly, when broad popular masses are drawn into the work 
of building a new life and when the forces which are sincerely 
interested in strengthening the new system act vigorously and in 
87 
close unity". This was a direct suggestion by the Soviets to 
President Dauod to work closely with the pro-Moscow communists of 
88 
Afghanistan, Henry S, Bradsher has also supported the analysis, 
Soviet Union also granted an interest free ten year moratorium on 
a % KX) million debt and promised another ^  428 million in 
89 
development aid to Afghanistan, 
In December 1976, the Soviet President, Podgorny visited 
Afghanistan, tJnlike earlier visits, this visit lacked enthusiasm, 
both in Kabul and Moscow, The official Soviet reports spoke coolly 
86 FBIS/aSSR, 10 June 1974, J. 4. 
8« See Ibid,, 4-12 June 1974* 
87 Ibid,, 6 June 1974, pp. Jl-3, 
88 Bradsher, n, 4, p« 64« 
8» Tfag BffflnOBlig^  'London), 3 August 1974, pp. 29^0, 
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of Podgorny»s visit to Afghanistan and mad© reference to Soviet* 
90 
Afghan relations in a stereotyped fashion. The Joint comnunique 
issued after the visit of President Podgorny made only an oblique 
reference to Asian security plan without any mention of Afghan 
91 
endorsement. One could notice the "cool-off" stage In Afglmn* 
Soviet relations. 
Perhaps by then Sardar Mohammad Dauod had realized that 
the growing Soviet Influence was contrary to Afghanistan's 
traditional policy of genuine nonallgnment. Thus with a view 
to alleviate Afghan economic dependence on Soviet Union and 
keeping In consonance with the principles of nonallgnment. 
President Dauod took positive measures to Improve Afghanistan's 
relations with Pakistan, Iran, and other Islamic countries. In 
October 1974, Iran promised Afghanistan to provide ^  2 billion 
in economic aid over a period of ten years, and a part of this 
aid was to be spent on the construction of a railroad from Kabul 
to Iran, which eventually would have provided Afghanistan with 
a trade route through Iranian ports, thereby decreasing Afghan 
92 
dependence on Soviet trade. This shows that President Dauod was 
following an independent and nonaligned policy by developing close 
relations with nonaligned and Islamic countries. 
President Dauod visited Soviet Union from 12 to 15 April 
1977, Before visiting Soviet Union, President Dauod had taken 
90 FBIS/tJSSR, 10 December 1975, 
91 Ibid., 17 December 1976, pp. Jl-3, 
92 liouis Dupree, "Afghanistan 1977 t Does Trade Plus Aid 
Guarantee Development?" AUFSR> vol, 21, no, 3, August 
1977, p, 3, 
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certain measures in his own country which included the removal 
of Soviet military advisers from the lower levels of the Afghan 
©3 
armed forces. In the Soviet Union, Brezhnev had become President 
by removing Podgorny, 
An analysis of the statements made by the Soviet Union and 
Afghan President in Moscow during the visit do not show that Afghan-
Soviet relations had deteriorated. The Soviet President, Leonid 
Brezhnev, did ask his Afghan counterpart about the need for a 
"concerted effort of all the people**. However President Dauod 
was more frarik when he said that good relations "stand on the firm 
foundations of good neighbourliness, frankness, sincerity and 
96 
disinterested and worthwhile cooperation". While reiterating 
his Government's decision to promote economic development, President 
Dauod said that his country was "creating premises for rapid socio-
economic and political development ••« ^th&tj^ demand all round 
efforts from the people and government of Afghanistan. Cooperation 
and disinterested aid from friendly states will play a valuable 
96 
part in this undertaking". The communique issued at the end of 
the visit envisaged that talks took place in an atmosphere of 
"friendship, trust and understanding and there was a circumstantial 
97 
exchange of opinions on urgent world problems". On his return to 
Kabul from Moscow, President Dauod expressed his confidence that the 
93 Bradsher, n, 4, p, 65, 
94 FBIS/USSR, 13 April 1977, pp, J3-S. 
95 Ibid,, pp. JB-9. 
96 Ibid, 
97 Ibid,, 18 April 1977, pp, Jl-3; 
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relations between Afghanistan and Soviet Union were based on "good 
neighbourliness, mutual respect and non-interference in domestic 
98 
affairs". 
However Bradaher claisa that "Daud's proclaimed confidence 
99 
was more diplomatic than real"» Most of the scholars agree that 
there was hot exchange of views between President Dauod and Soviet 
leaders, Thomas T, Hammond has quoted an incident, which is based 
on his interviews with persons having close contacts with Afghan 
100 
developments^ According to this accoimt during President Dauod*a 
visit to Moscow, Breahnev addressed the Afghan President in a rude 
manner and raised objections to certain policies pursued by the 
Afghan Government, President Dauod then reportedly told Brezhnevi 
"I want to remind you that you are speaking to the President of an 
independent country, not one of your Bast European satellites. You 
are trying to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and 
this I will not permit". Thus, it is evident that Sardar Mohammad 
Dauod behaved in a true Afghan tradition. 
There is no doubt that there were signs of deteriorating 
relations between Kabul and Moscow during the mid 1970s and 
Moscow seemed to be displeased v/ith Dauod Government in Kabul. 
98 IMd,, p. J-4» 
99 Bradsher, n, 4, p, 65. 
100 Thomas T. Hammond, Red Fl^g Over Afghanistan (Boulder, Colot 
Westview Press, 19845\ 
This incident is also substantiated by Henry S, Bradsher 
who after interviewing various Afghan officials in Kabul 
has confirmed it. See Bradsher, n, 4, pp» 65-66. 
Chapter IV 
AFGHAN-U.S. RBLATIWS 
This chapter endeavours to make an indepth analysis of 
Afghan-tJS relations since their advent t i l l April 1978 when the 
Soviet backed People* s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 
seized power in Kabul by staging a bloody coup_> 
Afgban-us M a U o n ^ PistQ t?^ 9, gna 
of, SMona World Vfar. 
The formal diplomatic lelatlons between Kabul and Washington 
were established In 19408 but efforts In this direction were 
initiated during King Amanullah's time. However it was during the 
middle of nineteenth century that some American missionaries made 
efforts to establish contacts with Afghanistan. The American 
Presbyterian missionaries made a pioneering atteupt to direct 
1 
contact with the Afghans. They established a mission at Ludhlana, 
where several prominent Afghan refugees, including the former Amir 
2 
Zaman Shah and Shah Shuja were staying. However, the American 
mLsslonaries failed to establish contacts among "the ex 1 1 ^ Afghan 
3 
leaders or their ratines". 
Until the advent of the regime of King Amanullah in 1919t 
there were virtually no direct or indirect contacts between Kabul 
and Washington, King Amanullah gave a new direction to Afghan 
Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modem Afghanistan 
(California, 1969), p, 69. 
3 Gregorian, n, 1, p» 69, 
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foreign policy by seeking to establish friendly relat ions with 
Soviet Union, United Kingdom (UK) and Turkey. Anjanullah sent his 
personal emissary to explore the poss ib i l i t i es of establishing 
friendly relations with the tftiitsd States and other Baropean 
countries. 
In July 1921, an Afghan nil ss ion headed by Mohammed Wall 
4 
Khan visited the United States. On his arrival in New Tork on 
11 July 1921, I^hammed Wall Khan said that he had come to explore 
the possibilities of establishing friendly relations between 
6 
Afghanistan and the United States. Prior to his meeting with the 
then US Secretary of State, Charles E, Hughes, Wall Khan told the 
press on 17 July 1921 that the establlslment of relations between 
Afghanistan and the United States would provide ample opportunities 
6 
for American businessmen to invest in Afghanistan, However despite 
all such optimistic pronouncements Wall Khan was not sure about the 
7 
success of his mission. Leader, of the Afghan mission n^t some 
officials of the State Department of the US before he could meet 
the Secretary of State, However, the New York Tlm^s commented that 
the welcome accorded to the Afghan Mission by the United States 
could not be interpreted as US recognition of King Amanullah»s 
8 
regime in Kabul. The then US Secretary of State, Charles B, Hughes, 
%rrote to the US President on 18 July 192it "Apparently we have, 
4 f^fV T9r^ lte??t 12 July 1921, 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid,, 18 July 1921. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid,, 20 July If21, 
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h i t h e r t o , had no r e l a t i ons with Afghanistan d i r ec t ly as formerly 
our dealings with tha t country were through Great B r i t a i n , I n 
9 
1919 Great Br i t a in "recognized the Independence of Afghanistan**. 
However, the UK did not l i k e Afghan policy of foreign r e l a t i ons 
with other European powers, Hughes in his l e t t e r to the 
President conveyed the B r i t i s h fee l ings about Afghan Mission 
t h a t "the B r i t i s h Government did not look with favour on i t s 
/"Afghan M i s s i o n ' s ^ a c t i v i t i e s or i t s endeavours to conclude 
agreements with other Governments, as Afghanistan, though 
os tensibly independent, was s t i l l within the B r i t i s h ' sphere of 
10 
p o l i t i c a l influence*,** 
The US Secretary of Sta te expressed the view t h a t there 
was no way of having r e l a t i o n s with Afghanistan '*at t h a t time 
uailess they are had d i r ec t l y and there i s nothing in the B r i t i s h 
pos i t ion which precludes our recept ion of the ^ AfghanJ^ Mission**, 
The US was aware of Afghanistan's Treaty of Friendship with Soviet 
Union, signed in September 1920, and r a t i f i e d by Afghanistan in 
August 1921, The US Secretary of S t a t e , Hughes, expressed the 
view t h a t Afghanistan's r e l a t i ons with the Soviet Union did not 
prevent the United Sta tes to e s t a b l i s h close r e l a t ions with Kabul, 
He wrote to President Hardlnge tha t "the Soviet Government had 
dealings with other powers with which we are in r e l a t ions and I 
do not bel ieve t h a t the Soviet Treaty with Afghanistan furnishes 
9 United S t a t e s , "Secretary of State to President Hardlnge", 
IB July 1921, Papers Uglatlng to ,te/or^lgn Rglatton? .QI 
t^ United States. IQSI f hereafter US Foreign Relatir^ nsK 
Vol. I (Washington, 1930), p. 258. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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a reason for precluding ourselves from the opportunities which 
12 
otherwise might be open In that country**• Thus the US Secretary 
of State advised the US President to receive the Afghan Mission 
and opined that he did not think "however, that pending further 
Inquiries, it is necessary or advisable to go beyond their 
13 
courteous reception". 
Consequently, the Afghan Mission was received by the 
Secretary of State on 20 July 1P21. Secretary Hughes in another 
letter to the President Hardlnge on 2i July 19S1 Informed the 
latter that the Aifehan Mission was In the United States for the 
U 
establishment of diplomatic relations," There did not prevail 
or exist formal or informal diplomatic relations between Kabul 
and Washington, In view of the fact that the Great Britain had 
15 
"relinquished her protectorate" over Afghanistan, the United 
States could establish direct relations with Afghanistan, But 
the then US Secretary of State did not favour the establishment 
of direct diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. He advised the 
President that "nothing further should be said at this time and 
16 
that the matter will be taken under careful consideration". 
The Afghan Mission met the US President Hardlnge on 
26 July 1921, Mohammed Wall Khan, leader of the Afghan Mission, 
handed over a personal letter from the Afghan King, Amanullah, to 
12 Ibid . 
13 Ib id , , p , 259, 
14 "Secretary of s ta te to President Harding", 21 July 1921, 
ib id , , pp, 259-60, 
15 Ibid, 
16 Ibid, 
n^ 
Prasldent Hardlngt* Aolr Aroanullab wrot«i "As I used to have the 
slncero wish to establish permanent friendly relations between 
Afghanistan and the high Government of the United States, I 
expect that Tour Excellency's high Government may be satisfied 
17 
with the keeping of that friendly relations too." President 
Hardlnge In his reply to Amanullah's letter wrotei 
It Is my wish that the relations between the 
United states and Afghanistan may always be 
of a friendly character, and I shall be happy 
to cooperate with Your Majesty to this end, I am 
constrained, however, to confirm to Your Majesty, 
what was stated orally to G, Mohammed Wall Khan, 
that with respect to the United States, the 
question of the creation of a Diplomatic Mission 
and of the appropriate action to that end by the 
Congress of the United States must be resen'-ed for 
further consideration, 18 
It becomes clear from the above analysis that the United 
States had deferred the Afghan request of establishing diplomatic 
relations between Kabul and Washington. The fact that the US did 
not recognize Amanullah*s regime in 1921 could not be interpreted 
as the negation of US interest in Afghanistan, 
There occurred a spell of about four years when there was 
discernible effort on either side to resume negotiations on 
establishing dlplOTiatlc ties between the two cou*^tries. In 
October 1926, the Afghan Ambassador to France,Fi,dir Khan, 
contacted the US Ambassador in France, Merrick, in that 
connection. On 30 October W26, Nadir Khan wrote a letter to 
Merrick urging hi» to resume negotiations regarding the 
17 Affllr Amanullah*» letter to President Hardlnge 
(no date). Ibid,, p. 260. 
18 President Hardiiige to Amir Amanullah, 29 July 1921, 
Ibid,, p. s n . 
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•stablistament of diplomatic relations betvedfi the two countrits. 
The Afghan Ambassador In his letter had also attached a draft 
proposal for a treaty to be concluded between the two countries 
which Incorporated provision for Aiflbassador level relations and 
20 
Increased econoBilc cooperation between the two cotmtries, 
Merrick forwarded Afghan Ambassador's letter along with the 
21 
proposed draft treaty to the US State Department. The US 
Secretary of State, Frank B, Kellogg Informed Merrick to convey 
to the Afghan Ambassador the appreciation of US Government's 
appreciation of friendly sentiments towards the United States 
and also enclosed a draft reply purported to be sent to Afghan 
22 
Ambassador* The proposed note, a copy of which was handed over 
to Nadir Khan on 20 February 1926 in Paris, conveyed the apprecia-
tion of US Government towards Afghanistan's friendly sentiments and 
assured that "careful consideration will be accorded to the draft 
23 
treaty which you have presented". In 1927 and 1928, the exchange 
of communications between Kabul and Washington used to be through 
either French Ambassador in Kabul or through their respective 
missions in Paris, 
In the wake of the downfall of King Amanullah in April 
1929, the process of negotiations between Afghanistan and the 
19 Nadir Khan to Merrick, 30 October 1925, ibid., pp. 557-58. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Merrick to Secretary of State, 4 November 1925, ib id , , 
1926, vol . I , p . 557. 
22 Secretary of State to Merrick, 26 July 1926, ib id . , p . 559. 
23 Draft Note from Ambassador Merrl<*: to the Afghan Ambassador 
in France (no date) . Ibid, , p . 560. 
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24 
United States suffered a setback. Nadir Shah who succeeded 
Amanullah as the new King of Afghanistan could remain in power 
from the end of 1P29 to 1933, During this period the Government 
of Afghanistan did make certain efforts to establish diplomatic 
relations with the United States, In 1931, the Afghan Ambasaador 
in London made att^ipts to containt the US ambassador in London, 
Consequently, the US ambassador in London informed the Department 
25 
of State and requested for further instructions. However there 
was no positive response by the State Department to Afghan 
proposal. The Secretary of ?tate directed the US ambassador in 
London that if Afghan ambassador raised the question of recognition 
•*you should state that you are not authorized to discuss the 
26 
matter with him". 
The Department of State was informed in September 1931 by 
the US ambassador in Italy, Kirk, that the Afghan Government 
believed that the United States might be inclined to establish 
27 
official relations with Afghanistan, The Afghan ambassador in 
Rome had contacted ambassador Kirk there and conveyed to the latter 
his government's desire to "establish relations with the United 
28 
States Government and was prepared to negotiate a treaty". The 
Afghan ambassador had further informed that in case the US 
24 Gregorian, n. i, p, 266, 
25 Dawes to the Secretary of State, 15 April 1931, n, 9, 
1931, vol. I, p. 825. 
26 Secretary of State to Dawes, 16 April 1931, ibid,, p, 825, 
27 Kirk to Secretary of State, 19 September 1931, Ibid,, 
pp, 825-26. 
28 Ibid. 
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Govtpnatiit gave- du« veightage to the Afghan proposal, hla 
governBient would undoubtedly empower him to undertake preliminary 
St 
negotiations in Rome* Thuf the Department of State was requested 
by the US ambassador in Rome to issue instructions to the latter in 
30 
this matter* 
The US Secretary of State in his reply to ambassador Kirk 
wrote that the Afghan ambassador could be informed that "no recent 
consideration has been given to by his Government to the question 
of the establishment of official relations with the Afghan Govern-
ment and the present moment is not considered to be opportune to 
31 
negotiate a treaty". The US Department of State regarded the 
question of establishiiig official relations with Afghanistan at 
that time as prematujre "since the present regime in Afghanistan 
32 
has not yet been recognized by this Government", 
Consequent upon the death of King Kadir Shah, in 1933, Zahlr 
Shah took over as the new King of Afghanistan, The new King adopted 
measures to improve Afghanistan's relations with Japan, Italy, 
France and Czsechoslovakia and also made efforts to procure 
33 
economic assistance from these countries. In July 1934, King 
Zahir Shah sent a letter to the US President through Afghan 
ambassador in Paris expressing his desire to strer^then political 
29 Ibid, 
30 Ibid . , p , 826, 
31 Secretary of State to Kirk, 24 September 1931, 
ib id , , p , 826, 
32 Ibid, 
33 John C,L, Clare, "The West Byes Afghanistan", 
M i a (London), vol* 38, no, 1, p , 747. 
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34 
and economic relations between Afghanistan and the United States, 
The then US Acting Secretary of State, William Phillips, vrrote to 
the US President Roosevelt that although the US had never entered 
into direct diplomatic relations vith Afghanistan, President 
Hardinge in 1921 received an official mission from that country by 
which it was generally accepted that "recognition had been accorded 
35 
to the regime of King Amanullah who was then in power". However 
the US reluctaiKie to establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan/ 
was evident from his statement? "We have been naturally conservative 
on the subject of establishing relations with Afghanistan owing to 
the primitive conditions in that country, the lack of capability 
or other guarantees to the safety of foreigners and the absence 
of any Important American interest," However the Acting Secretary 
of State further wrote that he could see no reasons "why we should 
37 
withhold recognition of Afghanistan", President Roosevelt in his 
reply sent to King Zahlr Shah wrote* "I cordially reciprocate the 
sentiments which you express in extending recognition to Tour 
Majes^'s Goverrasent, take this opportunity of assuring you of 
ray hope that friendly relations will always exist between the 
38 
United States and Afghanistan," Thus it was for the first time 
34 Marriner to the Secretary of State, 30 June 1934, n, 9» 
1934, vol, II, pi 747, 
36 Acting Secretary of State to President, 21 August 1934, 
ibid., p, 749, 
36 Ibid, 
37 Ibid* 
38 President Roosevelt to Zahlr Shah, 21 August 1934, 
Ibid,, p, 750, 
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that th© United States accorded recognition to Afghanistan, A 
friendship treaty between Afghanistan and the United States was 
39 
proposed by the former In October 1934* The then US Secretary 
of State In his reply to US ambassador In France, Straus, wrote 
that although the United States was not opposed to "concluding a 
treaty of friendship and commerce with the Government of Afghanistan, 
it considers that the purpose which the two Governments have In mind 
might be accomplished more expeditiously and satisfactorily by the 
40 
conclusion of a less formal agreement," 
Subsequently a draft proposal envisaging proposed US 
amendments to the Afghan draft treaty was sent to Afghanistan. 
The proposed agreement consisting of seven articles envisaged 
41 
political and economic relations between Washington and Kabul* 
The resultant impact of these negotiations was that on 26 March 
1936, the agreement was signed between Kabul and Washington at 
42 
Paris, Thus by March 1936, the United States had recognized 
the Afghan Government and both countries had signed a formal 
agreement* Accordingly on 4 May 1936, Hornybrock, presented his 
credentials to the Afghan Government at Kabul as the first US 
43 
ambassador, in Afghanistan, with his headquarters at Tehran, 
39 US Ambassador in France to Secretary of State, 
13 October 1934, Ibid,, 1935, vol, I, p, 555. 
40 Secretary of State to Ambassador Straus in France, 
2 January 1935, ibid,, p, 556, 
41 For full text of the draft agreement, see ibid,, 
pp, 557-58, 
42 Ambassador Straus to the Secretary of State, 26 March 1936, 
ibid,, 1936, vol. III, p. 7, 
43 Ngv lorfe; Ttef ?, 6 May 1936, 
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The year 1937 marked the beginning of the econonlc 
cooperation between Kabul and Washington when Afghan Govomment 
granted its first concession to the American Inland Bxpioratlon 
Compare a 75-year option on the exploration of the Ore resources 
available In Afghanistan, However, negotiations In this regard 
44 
had started In October 1936 and on 20 November 1936 an agreement 
was signed between the representatives of the Inland Exploration 
45 
Company and the Afghan Foreign Minister, Falz Mohammad Khan, 
Under the terms of this agreement, the US Company acquired the 
rights of exploring oil In Afghanistan and the agreement proved 
46 
very useful for the Company. Reports Indicate that German 
Foreign Office and Berlin based Soviet Ambassador made frantic 
47 
attempts for thwarting the conclusion of this agreement. 
Realizing that their efforts In thwarting the conclusion of the 
said agreement could not succeed, the Soviets adopted other 
measures to exert pressure on Afghanistan, Consequently, Moscow 
laid claim over Afghan territory along the Afghan-Soviet border* 
48 
which vas refused by the then Afghan Government, 
Such reports also emanated from Moscow, The acting US 
Ambassador In Moscow, In a letter to the Secretary of State, 
44 US Ambassador In Germany's letter to the Secretary of State, 
24 November 1936, n, 9, 1937, Part II, pp, 597-98, 
45 American BCOHIOIBIC Counsellor in Germany's letter to the 
Secretary of State, 30 November 1936, ibid,, pp, 596-99. 
46 MemorandttB by Raymond A, Hair of the Near-Eastern Affairs, 
26 January 1937, ibid,, pp. 599^601. 
47 US BconoBdLc Vlce»Cfe«yftiilloj' in Karachi to Secretary of State, 
13 March 1937, ibid,, p. 602. 
48 Ibid,, p, 603, 
xm 
Informed the latter that within a few days after the American 
Company had concluded bll exploration agreements with Iran and 
Afghanistan, the Afghan Ambassador In Moscow told the former that 
tlm Soviet officials were annexed because of having not beeb 
consulted by Tehran and Kabul in connection with conclusion of such 
49 
an important agreen^nt. The Soviet attitude niLght have been 
governed by the fact Moscow regarded Afghanistan under its sphere 
of Influence and hence It dism^ed any third country to become its 
50 
rival. 
At the same time, Moscow also did not allow transition 
facilities to Afghanistan, There also did not exist any treaty 
or agreement between Kabul and Moscow In this regard. The Afghan 
Ambassador in Moscow is on record of having said that it would ^ 
have been better if the Americans avoided using Soviet rail 
transport for supplying their material to Afghanistan, otherwise 
51 
Moscow could exert undue pressure on Afghanistan, The Afghan 
Ambassador had further observed that Russia was not prepared to 
provide transition facilities through its territory because Moscow 
was trying to impose a trade agreement on Afghanistan which could 
52 
have undermined Afghan interests* The US Company was also 
accorded the right to explore the mineral deposits subject to 
further negotiations. The Inland Brploratlon Company on its part 
49 US Ambassador in Moscow to the Secretary of State, 
3 December 1937, ibid,, p, 762. 
60 Head of the Near Eastern Division to US Ambassador 
in Tehran, 24 December 1937, ibid,, p, 756, 
61 Ibid., p. 757. 
62 Ibid, 
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agreed to pay ^ 330,000 In the first years of the concession and 
53 
20 per cent of the concessions thereafter. However within a 
year, the Inland Co^any surrendered Its concessions pleading 
that the rich oil deposits of Afghanistan were virtually Iraiccesslble 
54 
and would require about JS 300 million to exploit them* Even the 
global situation was not suitable for foreign Investment In 
Afghanistan, By io38, the possibilities of the outbreak of 
hostilities In Europe had become almost certain. The management 
of the Inland Company thought that In the vent of war, oil fields 
In Afghanistan could be vulnerable to Soviet attack and thus their 
Investment woiild be wasted. 
The Inland Company's decision served a blow to Afghan policy 
of seeing supporti services and Investments from distant countries 
which were, It was hoped, politically disinterested In Afghan 
affairs. In the wake of US disinterestedness in large scale and 
long-term investments, Afghanistan became determined to disallow 
concessions to the Soviets and British nationals and rather thought 
of relying on German , Italian, Japanese and Czech investment and 
55 
technicians, 
Ifflpfl'st Qf sgggnd WQria war 
In the wake of the outbreak of Second World War, the Afghan 
economy was adversely affected because its exports of Karakul to 
the Western Europe had almost stopped. During 1940-41» out of 
63 Jjlaii» 3 May 1937, 
54 Gregorian, n. 1, p. 381* 
65 Yasudeo B, Kehta, "Changing Afghanistan", United Epmlra^ 
November 1939, p, 1109, 
X42 
2 toiuidirttd thousand hid««sklns, Afghanistan could export only 
56 
38»04O Skins to Germnmy and Soviet Union. At this crucial 
juncture, the United States came to Afghanistan's rescue to help 
it export its Karakul in American markets. 
By January 1941, the US had not established any diplomatic 
mission in Kabul. Murray, the Chief of State Department's Near 
Eastern Affairs Section, had observed that as long as the US 
interests continued to be slight, there was no possibility of the 
57 
United States establishing diplomatic mission in Kabta. It was 
only in December 1941 that the US initiated a move to establish a 
diplomatic mission and it was on 6 June 1942 that the US diplomatic 
mission was Inaugurated in Kabul, While addressing the Lova 
Jj.rgah on 16 June 1942, King Zahlr Shah, welcomed the opening of 
US mission in Kabul and expressed the hope of better economic and 
69 
political relations between Kabul and Washington, On 25 July 
1942, Cornelius H, Van Higeit presented his credentials as US 
Ambassador in Kabul to King Zahlr Shah, Ambapsador Bn-jert and 
King Zahlr Shah exchanged views on mutual cooperation and world 
60 
peace. 
56 Government of Afghanistan, The Flve-Year Bconomic 
PfYglgpB?n!f Plan gf Afs^^ntstan (Kabul, 1956), p, 175, 
67 Murray to US Ambassador in Tehran, 28 January 1941, 
n, 9, vol. III, pp, 255«58. 
58 Thyes to the Secretary of State, 6 June 1942, 
ibid., 1942, vol, IV, p, 50. 
59 Ibid., 17 June 1942, p. 6. 
60 Biiteert to Secretary of State, 25 July 1942, 
ib id , , pp. 51»62# 
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In August 1942, the Afghan Foreign Ministry urged the US 
Government to help It in exporting 900 bales of Karakul, 100 hales 
of Fur, 250 tonnes of Wool and 40 tonnes of Plstachiu, which were 
61 
lying at the KaraeM p©rt to the American markets. The Afghan 
Government also expressed hope of similar US cooperation in future* 
The US ambassador in Kabul even suggested to station some US Air 
Force bombers in Kabul during the war period with a view to boost 
62 
the morale of Afghan Government. However, the US Government 
63 
rejected this suggestion. 
The US State Department had come out in December 1942 with a 
proposal of constructing a motorable road passing through India, 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union to reach China with a view to 
64 
Supply material to China through road transport. Consequently a 
US official, Gordon Bowles, reached India to explore the possibility 
65 
of such a plan. Following the Soviet refusal to allow any 
66 
American national on its territory even for survey purpose 
67 
and Afghan reluctance to do so, the US had to abandon such 
a plan. 
61 Bngert to the Secretary of State, 5 August 1942, 
ibid., pp. 63-54. 
62 Ibid., 7 Aiigust 1942, p. 54. 
63 Secretary of State to Bugert, 29 October 1942, 
ibid,, pp. 57*58• 
64 Ibid., 9 December 1942, (1943), vol. i, p. 614. 
65 Secretary of State to US Representative in India (Phillips), 
28 January 1943, ibid,, p. 618, 
66 US Ambassador in Moscow to Secretary of State, 
28 December 1942, ibid., p. 6l6, 
67 Phillips to Secretary of State, 16 January 1943, 
ibid., p. 616. 
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A9 Is well-known, the Afghan Government had declared to 
pursue policy of strict neutrality during the Second World War. 
In this regard, King Zahlr Shah had issued a farmai> on 17 August 
68 
1940, proclaiming the continuance of the policy of neutrality. 
During the war period, there had been no major breakthrough In 
political of economic relations between Afghanistan and the United 
States, In April 1044, John L, Savage, a US engineer, visited 
69 
Afghanistan to help the latter in devising its irrigation plans. 
In the beginning of 1P45, the US envoy in Kabul, presented a 
memorandum to the Afghan Government urging the latter to bring 
the production of opium in that country under strict control for 
exclusive use in medicine and other scientific purposes. The 
Afghan Governn©nt, while acceding to American request, declared 
that it was going to ban the production of opium from 21 Iferch 
70 
1945, 
Thus during the period of Second World War, the relations 
between Afghanistan and the United States had become friendly 
and formal. During this period, the US diplomatic mission was 
established in Kabul, Afghanistan while proiroting its diplomatic 
and economic relations with the United States, pursued a policy of 
strict neutrality during this period. 
68 Louis Dupree, Afgt\anlst^ ?(l (New Jersey, 1973), p, 480. 
69 Bngert to Secretary of State, 27 May 1943, n, 64, 
pp, 54-63, 
70 L,M, Goodrich and Mary J, Carole, eds,. Documents on 
tori<saT> F<?rfll«!B.Pfta^lQfls» V^^Y Ifl44 •• Tune 194S 
(Princeton, 1947), vol , VII, pp, 695-99, 
14S 
l§T.Afghan Relations h£%^T ^hc sg<?9n<? worM war 
During tYm immediate postwar years, the era of good feelings 
lingered and Afghan leaders reall25ed that "the United States would 
be the Ideal substitute for receding British power, since distant, 
71 
America was no Imperialist threat to Afghanistan*. 
In May 1946, the Afghan premier, Shah Mahmud Khan, had 
given gestures of cementing bonds of relations between Kabul and 
Washington, He said that he was "convinced tliat America's 
championship of the small nations guarantees my country's security 
72 
against aggression, America's attitude Is our salvation,* 
Even when the clouds of war had not completely faded in 1944, 
the US Ambassador in Kabul Cornelius Von H, Bngert, had recommended 
to the State Departmenti 
With a view to further consolidate our gains. It 
is essential to continue our present policy during 
the war period and subsequent period of reconstruction, 
I am little worried about the fact that during the 
immediate period preceding the war, the requirements 
of Afghanistan may not get due priority to U,S, 
foreign policy. Therefore I request the Depart-
ment of State, Washington and the future policy 
makers to take into consideration the fact that 
Afghanistan, besides being an Independent Musliai 
country, is also strategically Important for the 
United States' policy in the Middle Bast. 73 
Inaedlatily after the conclusion of the Second World War, the 
Afghan Govemment asked the United States to send American teachers 
and engineers. In 1946, an agreement was signed between the Afghan 
71 Le©n B, Poullada, "Afghanistan and the United States i 
The Cruclsl Years", ^ (3<|lf ,,1^^ JQ^malf vol. 35, Spring 
1961» Pi 131, 
78 I Slab. 9 May 1946» 
73 Sngert to Secretary of State, 11 November 1944* 
I (Washington, 1965), v^ oX« v, p. 54i 3?nfT4:aR:Z^  
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G@v#rim«nt and th« Morrlson-Knudsen Company of the United Stat«s 
worth ^  17 million for repairing the dams and their reconstruction, 
74 
and the construction of 350 miles long highway. All these plans 
were to be lii5)lemented in the Helmand Vall^ region. The Helmand 
Valley project was so far the most ambitious project undertakne by 
the Government of Afghanistan, It was the multipurpose water and 
land development scheme for which initial sur/^'S had been done 
75 
by the Japanese engineers in the 1930s» 
By the end of 1948, the Afghan Government after having 
launched ambitious developmental projects, fell short of foreign 
exchange and thus required foreign assistance. Consequently, it 
turned to the United States, Accordingly, in 1949, Abdul Majld 
Zabull, the Afghan Minister of National Economy, and a financial 
genius, visited Washington to negotiate loans for Afghan econodc 
76 
development plan, Zabull asked for the loan worth ^  118 million. 
The US Department of State Instead of acceding to his request, rather 
made him shuttle to the US Export-Import Bank (Bxlm Bank) "which 
completely failed to understand the quality and integrity of his 
plan and offered Instead to finance the ongoing work of the 
77 
Morrlson-Knudsen Company in the Helmand Valley", 
74 Peter G, Franck, Afghan i s^ P9W??F^ %^t ^^ ^%»% (Washington, I960), p« d6t 
75 Richard S, Newell, Pol i t ics of Afghanistan 
(Ithaca, 1971), p» ISOl 
76 Franck, n, 74, p* 38• 
77 Leon B» Poullada, "The Failure of American Diplomacy in 
Afghanistan", M^rld Affitirs (Washington), vo l , 145, no, 3 , 
Winter 1988/83, p» 233, 
147 
As compared to original Afghan request for j? 118 million, 
78 
the Bxlm Bank sanctioned only a loan of ^  21 million, Bven 
this loan was also sanctioned because of the Morrlson-Knudsen 
79 
Company's political Influence. Zahull Insisted that such 
unbalanced development would be a mistake and tlmt the loag 
payback of a multipurpose reclamation project like the Helmand 
would cause serious problems for Afghanistan, So he recommended 
to his Government to decline the loan, "but his Afghan superiors 
overruled him because they wanted to establish close economic 
80 
relations with the United States for political reasons", 
Zabuli had also requested the United States to provide 
American weapons so that Afghanistan could modernize Its armed 
forces in the wake of possible Soviet danger. He saldt 
,,, Properly armed, and convinced of US backing, 
Afghanistan could manage a delaying action in the 
passes of the Hlndu-Kush which would be a contri-
bution to the success of the armed forces of the 
West and might enable them to utilize bases which 
Pakistan and India might provide ,,, When war came 
Afghanistan would, of course, be overrun and occupied. 
But the Russians would be unable to pacify the country, 
Afghanistan could and would pursue guerrilla tactics 
for an indefinite period, 81 
However, Zabull's request for US arms assistance was rejected, 
Bven the Afghan Government seemed to have not taken a serious 
view of Zabuli*s requests and US offers and rejections, Kabul 
78 Pranck, n» 74, p, 39, 
79 Poullada, n, 71, p, 1B2, 
80 Poullada, n, 77, p, 233. 
81 US. yQrgjLKn.^ f^ilaUQns QT t^ i^  ?rj|t^a s^a^gs, j ^ 4 8 . 
Vol. 5, Part I (Washington, 1975), pp, 491-93. 
im 
rather accepted the meagre loan offered by the United States* 
Even Afghan Prlnie ^ a.nlste^ , Shah Mahmud had observed In a 
conversation with the US President, Truman: "The Afghan Government 
tends to think of the loan as of political as well as of econonic 
Importance, possibly increasingly so in the light of manifestations 
82 
of Soviet interest and offers of assistance to Afghanistan," 
Repeated requests for weapons were put off, even though in 1949 
Afghan officials suggested that "unless US gave Afghanistan 
83 
more assistance, Afghans might turn to USSR«, 
Actually, Afghanistan had made requests for US arms 
84 
assistance as far back as in 1?44, Since then the repeated 
Afghan requests for American arms had been Ignored by the United 
States, According to Leon, B, Poulladai "Afghan overtures to 
America were met at first with bureaucratic and legalistic 
evasions and finally with a clear negative response. True, the 
Afghan approaches were often naive and awkward, but sophistication 
on the tortuous ways of American policy iraking could hardly be 
85 
expected". The US Birbassy in Kabul reconmended arms sales on 
4 January 1950 "to exclude Soviet influence, cement Afghan-American 
friendship, maintain internal security and promote settlement of 
86 
differences with Pakistan", However, in Washington the policy 
82 Cited in Poiaiada, n, 77, p, 233, 
83 The Bconomist (London), 2 August 1980, p. 4. 
84 Poullada, n« 71, p, 186, 
85 Ibid* 
86 Alrgrant No, A»2, 4 January 1950 from Embassy Kabul 
to Department of State, cited in ibid» 
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raakers were underscoring the strategic significance of Afghanistan, 
As Is revealed from an assessment made by the US National Security 
Council in early IPSlt 
The Kremlin apparently does not consider Afghanistan's 
relatively meagre assets to be worthy of attention and 
probably believes that it can take Afghanistan easily 
whenever its broader objectives would be served. There 
is little doubt that Afghanistan could be conquered 
regardless of its will to resist. In the event of an 
invasion, it is possible that certain elements . 
particularly the Afghan (Pathan) tribesmen, would 
continue to resist, 87 
However, the then US Assistant Secretary of State, George McGhee, 
visited Kabul on 12 Farch 1951 and discussed the Afghan defence 
requirements with Sardar Moharrmad Dauod, then Minister of War, 
George McGhee suggested a formal request by diplomatic note with a 
detailed list of desired equipinsnt attached and assured Dauod that 
88 
It would receive "sympathetic consideration*', Poullada claims 
89 
that Dauod understood it to mean that approval was assured. The 
Afghan Government had never made a formal official request xanless 
it was assured befrorehand that it would be approved. 
The Afghan Prime Minister, Shah Mahmud, during his visit to 
the United States in April 1951 took the matter with US President, 
Truman, However even prior to the visit of Afghan premier, the OS 
Department of State in a note to the President on 21 February 1951 
had observed* "Afghanistan continues to maintain toward the USSR an 
attitude of cautious correctness combined with firm resistance to 
Soviet efforts at penetration,,, S© far, Soviet pressure has not 
87 Inder ^ Declassified Documents (Airllngton, Virginia, 
1978), NO, 377A, 
88 Ibid, 
89 Poullada, n. 71, p, 186, 
ISO 
bten severe nor has the Soviet Influence In Afghan territory 
contiguous to the Soviet Central Asian Republic /T^taJ been 
90 
extensive**. The State Department further advised the US 
President that the Afghan requests for arms were being ignored 
rather than refused. President Truman was further advised to 
tell the Afghan Prime Minister of "the limitations of the ability 
of the US to furnish military assistance" to stress reliance on 
collective security within the United Nations, and to hold out 
91 
hope for more financial and technical aid**. But the Afghan 
Government still insisted on procuring am® from the United States 
and by August 1951, a formal request with arms list was presented 
to the United States, On 27 November 1951, the US Government 
Instructed its Ambassador in Kabul to tell the Afghan Government 
that "the arms requested will cost ^  25 million. They will have 
to be paid in cash. Transit through Pakistan will have to be 
arranged with no help from the United States, The sale will have 
to be made public, and it would help if the Pushtunistan claim is 
92 
dropped," It aopeared that the US was ready to supply arms to 
Afghanistan on cash payment and simultaneously it expected 
Afghanistan to strike a deal on Pushtunistan, a step which no 
Afghan Government could ever undertake. Thus there was a clear 
indication that US was reluctant to supply arms to Afghanistan, 
And the issue was shelved for the time being by both sides. 
90 H »^ Foreign Helations of the United S^^tea lQfil> 
Vol, VI, Pa r t 2 (Washington, 1977), pp, 2006-10. 
91 I b i d , , p . L966. 
• 2 US, National Archives, F i l e No, 890, 20/7-2048 as 
c i ted in Poullada, n. 71 , pp. 186-87. 
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Until the beginning of 1952, the United States had been 
taking the growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan very lightly* 
But it was compelled to revise Its assessment* On 9 September 1952 
the U8 Charge 4*Affaire in Afghanistan Horner In a despatch to the 
Department of State wrotes "Over past year Embassy ^Sj^ has 
reported evidences increasing Soviet interest in Afghanistan,,, 
It may suffice to say that we have felt earlier estimates of 
relative Soviet non-interest in this country xo be in need of 
93 
radical revision,*' On 9 September 1952, the then Afghan Foreign 
Mnistor, All Fohammed Khan, in a conversation with Philip Beck and 
Louis de Lalve, two members of the United Nations (UN) technical 
assistance mission, confirmed that the Soviet Charge d*Affaires in 
Kabul, Shpedko, had delivered a stiff ^ide memoire to the Afghan 
Government on 7 August 1962, which inter-alia noted that Soviet 
Union would regard Afghan plan for oil drilling in northern part 
by a French firm under UN auspices "to be unfriendly act and 
94 
specific violation of the non-aggression treaty of 1931**, During 
the first week of September the Soviet Foreign Minister Vishlnsky 
had called the Afghan Ambassador in Moscow, Sultan Ahmad, and 
95 
warned him orally "in a severe tongue lashing**. However on 
8 September 1952, the Afghan Government In a written reply handed 
over to the Soviet Charge d»Affaires in Kabul asserted that the 
96 
proposed oil exploration "was purely an Internal matter** of 
93 US, "The Charge in Afghanistan (Horner) to the Department 
of State", 9 September 1952. |'<?rgto ??l8tlgps gf t^e Untt?d 
States. 19S2-19S4. Vol, XT (Washington, 1985), p. 1447. 
94 Ibid» 
96 Ibid. 
96 Ibid, 
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Afghanistan, The Afghan Foreign Minister regarded the Soviet 
y^pa^ ygl^  regarding oil as having broader Implications, 
The US Ambassador in Kabul further noted that any US advice 
to Kabul in that regard depended upon evaluation of overall Soviet 
intentions and he solicited the views of the Department of State oli 
97 
the matter. In his view it was difficult to Imagine that Soviet 
Union would take any overt steps against Afghanistan at that 
particular juncture. The Afghan Government seemed to be disturbed 
over the Soviet demarche^ The First Under Secretary in Afghan 
Foreign Ministry, Abdul Hamid Khan Aziz, told the US Ambassador 
in Kabul on 9 September 1952t "Afghanistan considered US her really 
true friend and counts on US £^SKJ to help Afghanistan take her 
98 
place among free and democratic nations of the world,** 
The US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson did not feel that 
the Soviet d^^arche was precursor of ar^ r immediate Soviet threat 
99 
to Afghanistan, He regarded the Soviet demarche as the first 
step in Soviet campaign to prevent the entry of Westerners in 
north of Hindu Kush "in line with long standing Soviet policy and 
an endeavour to prevent economic improvement amongst peoples who 
100 
are potentially exploitable by the Soviets on ethnic grounds". 
In Kiddle of September 1952, the Afghan Government announced 
its plan to construct modern roads in the north Afghanistan, The 
97 Ibid., p, 1448. 
98 Horner to Department of State, 9 September 1952, 
ibid,, p* 1450* 
99 The Secretary of State to Embassy in Afghanistan, 
12 September 1952, ibid,, p, 1460, 
100 Ibid,, pp. 14S0<»S1« 
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PS Attbassador in Kabtja recoBnended to the Department of State 
to provide ^ 1 million worth of economic assistance to 
101 
Afghanistan In this regard. In Its view, the granting of 
such assistance woiildt ^ 
(1) strengthen Afglmn will to resist Soviet presence; 
(11) provide additional Incentive towards development 
of north; 
(111) provide effective means for overall economic 
strengthening of Afghanistan; 
(Iv) reduce the possibility of the success of Soviet 
economic pressure on North Afghanistan; 
(v) Increase Afghan potentiality to combate subversion 
and subversive rebellion In north; 
(vl) . . . . 
(vll) • . . • 102 
Strangely enough the US Department of State instead of considering 
seriously the recommendations of its Ambassador In Kabul, rather 
noted that Afghanistan, aside from a desire for friendly advice 
from the United Kingdom and the US, "may well be capitalizing 
oi^  demarche^  in attempt to achieve (1) Increased economic 
assistance; (11) military assistance; and (111) US-UK pressure 
103 
on Paklftan to negotiate Pushtunlstan agreement with Afghanistan,** 
It further noted that the Soviet d[emarche when considered In 
historical perspective, did not pose any threat to Afghanistan. 
101 Horner to the Department of State, 23 September 1952, 
Ibid,, p, 1453. 
102 Ibid,, pp. 1453-54. The clauses vi and vll are deleted 
in the original, 
103 Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, 
20 September 1952, Ibid,, p, 1454. 
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However Ambassador Horner while expressing his doubts over the 
instructions of the Department of State asserted that '*no account 
seems to have been taken of Afghan psychology or existence of 
teportast eleisents l^re willing to come to terms with the 
104 
Soviet**• He further Informed the State Department that the 
Afghan cabinet was coming around to view that "accommodation 
105 
with Soviets must be sought at almost any cost". Thus 
Ambassador recommended that "we should not promptly and 
positively and not wait until eneuy /"Soviet UnlonJ'' is 
106 
already within g ates". 
The available evidence shows that Washington did not take 
Soviet demarche to Afghanistan seriously and only expressed Its 
moral support In that regard. It also expressed its inability 
107 
to provide Increased economic assistance to Afghanistan. 
Besides, in the wake of these developments, the US did not 
apprehend ai^jr danger of Afghanistan's falling "into Soviet 
108 
camp". 
Since 1951, the United States had been involv6d in 
establishing a military alliance In the Middle East to strengthen 
104 Horner to the Department of State, 2 October 1952, 
Ibid., p. 1456, 
106 Ibid, 
106 Ibid. 
107 The Secretary of State to the anbassy in Afghanistan, 
11 October 1952. Ibid,, p, 1462, 
lOe Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State For Near 
Eastern, South Asia and African Affairs (Byroade) to 
the Under Secretary of f'tate (Bruce), lo October 1952, 
ibid,, p, 1460# 
w$ 
Its posltioB. The news reports that Pakistan woiild join the 
proposed US defence alliance created worry and anxiety In 
Afghanistan. The proposed alliance was named as Middle Sast 
Defence Organization (MBDO), The Secretary of state lafornied 
the US Smbassy In Afghanistan that the MBDO was conceived to he 
military planning organization only, not Involving formal 
alliances or commitments. He further added that when the 
organization was established "perhaps It would Invite other 
nations of general area for example, Afghanistan or Pakistan, If 
109 
they are then interested**« However the Department of State 
wondered whether Afghanistan would Join MSDO in view of its 
geographic proximity to the Soviet Union and Article 2 of the 
U O 
Afghan-Soviet treaty of June 1931» 
The year 1953 marked a change of leadership in Afghanistan 
when on 6 September 1953, Sardar Mohammad Dauod Khan took over as 
Prime Minister of Afghanistan, In the United States, John Foster 
Dulles had taken over as the Secretary of State, Dulles provided 
a new impetus to American cold war policies by establishing 
defence alliances with active US support and involving countries 
having geographic proximity to the Soviet Union and People*i 
Republic of China. By 1953, Pakistan had started receivii^ 
massive economic and military aid from the United States which 
was bound to create an alarm for Afghanistan which had strained 
relations with Pakistan over the issue of Pushtunistan. However 
109 Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, 
20 February 1953. Ibid., p. 1465• 
110 Ibid. 
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the United States s t i l l Ignored the s t r a t e g i c s ignif icance of 
Afghanistan, I t i s evident from a sec re t study conducted in 
1953 by Jo in t Chiefs of Staff which iT^ter»^|.fi concluded! 
Afghanistan i s of l i t t l e OP no s t r a t e g i c la^ortance 
to the United S t a t e s , I t s geographic loca t ion 
coupled with the r e a l i z a t i o n by Afghan leaders of 
Soviet c a p a b i l i t i e s , presages Soviet control of 
the country whenever the s i t u a t i o n so d i c t a t e s . 
I t would be des i rable for Afghanistan to remain 
neu t ra l because otherwise i t might be overrun as 
an avenue to the Indian subcontinent. Such 
n e u t r a l i t y w i l l remain a s tronger p o s s i b i l i t y I f 
there i s no western-sponsored opposition to 
conanunism in Afghanistan, which opposition in 
i t s e l f might p r e c i p i t a t e Soviet moves t o take 
control of the country. 111 
In December 19S3, the then US Vice-President, Richard Nixon 
v i s i t e d Kor thern- t ie r countr ies including Afghanistan, During his 
tour to Afghanistan, Niron t r i e d to Impress upon the Afghan rul ing 
e l i t e the need for forging an a l l i ance between I ran , Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, He gave the impression as if he d is l iked the non-
aligned policy of Afghanistan and regarded the prevai l ing 
112 
controversy between Afghanistan and Pakistan as of l e s s inportance. 
He however, assured Afghanistan of continued US help for Helmand 
Valley pro jec t but no assurance was given regarding the mi l i t a ry 
113 
a s s i s t ance . 
The supply of US mi l i t a ry ass is tance to Pakistan in 1963-54 
evoked general concern in Afghanistan, the Afghan Ambassador in 
111 lui^ gf Ptqafs^ft^^d pg<?mB n^^ g (Arlington, 
Virg in ia , 1979), no, 33A, 
112 For de t a i l s see, gfgartOTPt Of ? t a t ? Bu^l^^tn (Washington), 
15 June 1953« 
113 Louis Dupree^ "The Mountains go to Mohammed Zaheer", 
AffltrJLsan ^ B l f t f l t t y n ^ l j g |afr nmvM (hereaf te r tfff'SR). (New York>y vol* 4^ no* 6, Jime I960, p» 3 ; 
1 ^ 
Washington met the US Secretary of State In early January 1954 and 
urged the latter to maintain economic and military balance in the 
U 4 
region. While explaining his country's reaction over US military 
assistance to Pakistan, the Afghan Ambassador further expressed 
the tope that his government expected the US to maintain existing 
military balance in the region. 
In early 1954, the military cooperation pacts were signed 
between Pakistan and Turkey and Pakistan and United States* The 
Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed between Pakistan 
116 
and the United States at Karachi on 19 May 1954. In the wake 
of these developments, the belief was growing in the Afghan 
Governmental circles that "the US has turned its back to 
Afghanistan**, Tho US Ambassador in Afghanistan, Ward, expressed 
the view that the Soviet Union had been taking moves to strengthen 
its ties with Kabul through trade on terms very favourable to the 
Afghans and through credits for economic development accompanied 
117 
by technical assistance. He further asserted that stould 
Soviet efforts be intensified and in the absence of any effective 
counter move by the United States, "We can expect the Soviets to 
establish effective control in the trans-Hindu Kush area of 
114 !?.§¥ XQTP\ Tlift^ t 6 January 1954. 
lis For text of the Agreement, see US, Unrated St^ l^ es Treaties 
and Other Int^rnatlonql^ Agreements (Washington^ 1958)^ 
vol. 5, p. 1954. 
116 Memorandum to the Deputy Director, Office of South Asian 
Affairs (Smith) to Donald D. Kennedy of the Bureau of Near 
Eastern, South A*ian and African Affairs, 23 June 1954, 
n. 93, p. 1474. 
U 7 Ibid. 
lii 
lis 
Afghanistan wltbin the foreseeablt fittirt*** Tlnis h» emphasized 
that there should be an appraisal by the appropriate US military 
authorities of the importance of Afghanistan, both direct and 
indirect, for the United States, Ward reDommended the supply 
of US mLlitary assistance to Afghanistan in the context of a 
regional arrangenient - an association with Turkey or Pakistan or 
both in arrangements similar to those existing between Pakistan 
and Turkey, He also suggested to the/Department of Ptatet "We 
should be forth right in making clear to Afghanistan that we can 
make no commitments beyond the language of the mutual defence 
120 
assistance agreement. We cannot guarantee Afghanistan's borders". 
He also cautioned not to overlook the fact that the Soviet Union 
might react to US move of providing arms assistance to Afghanistan 
and asserted that "this possibility exists whether or not we 
121 
extend military assistance to Afghanistan", 
The United States also seemed to be worried about the 
growing Soviet economic penetration into Afghanistan. A note 
prepared by the US Department of State In June 1954 entitled 
"United States and Soviet Interests in Afghanistan", noted that 
the dangers of the increased Soviet activity in Afghanistan 
Included the military, aspects of road and oil storage construction 
and the subversive activity by Soviet "technicians" who were of 
lis 
119 
ISO 
121 
Ib id , , p . 1475. 
Ibid, 
Ibid, 
It^id, 
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122 
th« sasMi racial stock as the Afghani* The note called for a 
review of US economic policy in Afghanistan to counter the 
moiintlng Sojviet influence. It inter*alia suggested the three 
following alternativest 
(i) Keeping our presetit policy without significant 
increases or decreases in our aid} 
(il> inininLze our losses by gradually reducing our 
activity and our aid to a miniinuin consistent 
with achievement of bare economic results; and 
till) countering the Soviet moves so as to preclude 
infiltration by Soviet technicians or mitigate 
their effectiveness, 123 
However with regard to the third alternative, the note envisaged 
that it mieht be expensive as it would probably be possible only 
upon US acceptance of likely Afghan requests for substantial 
additional US economic aid and US military aid on c ertain 
124 
guarantees, 
The Afghan Ambassador in Washington met the US Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs 
on 27 July 1954 and expressed his Government's villingness to 
consider US military assistance on a bilateral basis without 
reference to a regional organisnation, with the avowed objective 
of bolstering its internal strength and of improving its capacity 
125 
to resist aggression from whatever direction it should come. 
122 Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, 
Office of South Asian Affairs (Flucker) to the Deputy 
Director of that Office, 26 June 1954, ibid,, p. 1476, 
123 Ibid., p. 1477. 
124 Ibid. 
126 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Sastem, South Asian and African Affairs (Byroade) to the 
Secretary of State, 27 July 1954, ibid,, p, 1479. 
160 
Byroad* while accepting that the Middle Sast being a viilnerable 
area was threatened by increasing Soviet interest, added that 
the conclusion of a US-Afghan military aid programme might 
provide a very strong Soviet reaction thus undermining the 
126 
interests of both the countries. The Afghan Ambassadop also 
met the US Secretary of State on 27 July 1954 and told the 
latter that the United States had not yet taken any decision 
127 
on Afghan request for American arms. The Secretary of State 
told the Afghan Ambassador that his country shoiald proceed slowly 
in the matter ••«,# JCQUAJ some of the more immediate imponder-
ables in considering military aid for Afghanistan were the 
nature of the aid programme for the coming year, the character 
128 
of our current commitments and future contingencies,,,," 
In October 1P54, the National Intelligence Estimates 
Committee, an inter-departmental wing of the National Security 
Comicil (NSC) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) prepared a 
129 
report entitled "Outlook for Afghanistan", The report noted 
that the growing Afghan reliance on Soviet Union for trade and 
loans with technical assistance made it highly vulnerable to 
130 
Soviet pressures, Afghanistan's participation in a Western-
backed defence arrangement or its acceptance of substantial 
126 Ibid. 
127 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in 
Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs, 27 July 1954, 
ib id , , p , 1480, 
128 Ibid, 
129 For details fee, ibid,, pp. 1481-97, 
130 Ibid,, p, 1482, 
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W«it«rn military aid was botmd to evok© adverse Soviet reaction. 
It wat further observed that the USSR could easily take over 
Afghanistan If It chose to do so, but openly aggressive action 
against Afghanistan would "alciost certainly entail antfclsSovltt 
reactions elsewhere, particularly in the Arab-Asian bloc which 
131 
the USSR would wish to avoid*. However the report expressed 
the hope that the Afghan Government was likely to continue with 
Its fundamental policy of attempting to play off the great 
powers to Afghanistan's advantage, meanwhile continuing its 
132 
association with the Arab-Asian bloc in the United Fations. 
However the report also noted the future policy which Afghanistan 
might pursue! 
Afghan leaders will attempt to obtain additional 
wastern economic aid to counterbalance that 
received from the USSR and will probably display 
continuing interest in the idea of participating 
la Western-backed milltaiy aid programmes. However, 
it is unlikely that the Afghans would actually 
accept numbership in a Western backed area defence 
arrangement since they almost certainly realize 
that no foreseeable arrangement could furnish 
them sufficiently realistic protection against 
Soviet attack to condensate for the increased 
Soviet hostility toward them which would almost 
certainly ensue, 133 
In October lo54, the Afghan Foreign Minister, Sardar 
Mohammed Nairn met the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles 
and pleaded for the supply of US arms to Afghanistan, However 
Dulles replied! "After careful consideration, extending military 
aid to Afghanistan would create problems not offset by the 
131 I b i d , , pp. 1482-83• 
132 I b i d , , p , 1483, 
133 I b i d , 
162 
strength It would generate. Instead of asking for arms, 
134 
Afghanistan should settle the Pushtunlstan dispute with Pakistan," 
Thus by the end of 1954, It had becoine evident that the United 
States was reluctant to provide arms assistance to Afghanistan* 
Leon B, Polluada has observed that "American failure between 
1942 and 1954 to respond to the genuine economic and security 
needs of a friendly and pro-V^estem Afghan government, and to 
understand the political imperatives behind the Pushtunlstan 
problem, set the stage for the stunning success of Soviet 
135 
diplomacy," 
On 16 December 1954, the US Acting Secretary of State 
emphatically said that the United States would not, for present, 
extend military aid to Afghanistan. However it could consider 
doing So upon "attainment of improved Afghan relations with 
136 
Pakistan and Iran", 
The increased US economic and arms assistance to Pakistan 
but rejection of Afghan proposal for the supply of arms by the 
United States had perturbed the policy-makers in Kabul, 
Consequently "in January 1955, Daud approached the USSR regarding 
long standing doviet offers of military aid which Afghanistan had 
137 
previously rejected*. However the visit of top Soviet leaders 
to Burma, India and Afghanistan in the later period of 1955 which 
134 Cited In Poullada, n, 77, p» 235. 
136 Ibid. 
136 The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in 
Afghanistan, 16 December 1954, n. 9S, p, 1497, 
137 Poullada, n, 77, p. 235, 
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•n^ risaged prorolse of Increased Soviet help for Afghanls.tan, 
perhaps prompted Washington to review its policy towards the 
region especially Afghanistan, The New York Times had opined 
138 
that Moscow had 'Challenged the US policy towards Afghanistan, 
The afterraath of these developments was the emergence of 
three schools of opinion in Washington regarding US policy towards 
Afghanistan, One school was of the view that the US should counter 
the Soviet influence in Afghanistan, The second school of thought 
favoured Afghanistan to be left to its own fate and in case it 
tilted towards Moscow, it would be a warning to other nonaligned 
139 
coixntries. The third school of opinion, espoused for the 
continuance of incremental help to Afghanistan, Hamilton F, 
Armstrong, the editor of prestigious quarterly Foi^ien Affairs. 
while supporting this view wrote in an articlet "It would seem to 
indicate the right position for us to take realistically and 
140 
morally as well, but only in the conditions and up to the point," 
He further expressed the view that the conditions were such that 
"the Afghans, who sincerely want to protect themselves from 
domination from ar^ quarter, shall be intelligent and farsighted 
141 
in their steps to avoid dangers of crisis". The author 
strongly pleaded for the supply of US arms to Afghanistani 
138 Nfw jQiTj Itoga,» 22 December 1955. 
139 "The Russian Moves in Afghanistan", Th^ Reporter 
(New York), 5 April 1956, 
140 Hamilton F, Armstrong, "North of the Khyber", 
Foreign Affairs (New York), vol, 34, no, 4, 
p* 619, 
141 Ibid. 
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.,, Afghans are tough and resilient lot and it is 
possible that even the subtle programme on which 
the Soviet Union seems to be embarked for dis-
arming them economically and financially will fall. 
Nothing that we can do can guarantee that result* 
But we can encourage the fSl^n leaders to feel 
that they are not alone, we can continue our aid 
in moderate amounts, giving them time to get their 
bearing; we can pernaps he of service to them 
politically, and we can warn against further steps 
which will end almost automatically in delivering 
their country to foreign hands even if seeing that 
result as iirminent they belatedly revolt against 
it, 14S 
The augmentation of Soviet economic and military aid to Afghanistan 
had unnerved the US policy makers for a while. Recognizing this 
fact, the US Secretary of State, Dulles, said that the success 
of Soviet aid and resultant increase in its influence was 
discernible from the pace of developmental programmes being 
143 
carried out in Kabul. Report Indicated that when Soviet 
leaders were in Kabul in December 1955, President Eisenhower wrote 
a letter to King Zahir Shah expressing concern over deteriorating 
144 
relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, The contents of 
this letter were never made public, Dulles also saidt "I cannot 
disclose the contents of the correspondence ,,. both sides have 
145 
not published it," 
In view of the growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan, the 
failure of US policy to abate It had bfeen subject to criticism at 
142 I b i d , , p . 618. 
143 US, House. 84th Congress, Second Session, Subcommittee of 
the Committee on Appropriation, Hfartngs on Mutual SQ^yyttr* 
APffrgpyaia^lffl f<?? l^f?? (Washington, 1957), p . 35 , 
144 Kay york Times^ 19 December 1955. 
145 PgpartBtM 9t g tat^ M l ^ U n <*«fc»bl"gton), 2 January 1956, 
X6S 
how»m Lesley- B« Crane, an American engineer, vho had worked In 
Afghanistan, said in an interview with the ?S News ^nd World Repor^ 
that the United States had spent millions of dollars in Afghanistan 
146 
without gaining any advantage. There were some who favoured a 
positive attitude towards Afghanistan. Adam C, Powell told the 
House of Representatives that by remaining neutral during the two 
world wars, Afghanistan had earned/Admiration of world community 
which was evident from the fact that Kabul's admission to the 
147 
United Nations was done unopposed in 1946. The official circles 
in Washington also acknowledged that Soviet package-aid deals had 
great impact on the developing countries of South Asia especially 
Afghanistan, but at the same time they expressed the view that 
14B 
Washington had not lost Its interest In Afghanistan, 
The United States provided air-travel facilities to over 
149 
1000 Afghans for Haj pilgrimage in June 1956, During this period 
Afghanistan was hit by food shortage and it urged the US to supply-
ISO 
foodgralns to meet the shortage, Th»? International Cooperation 
Administration of the United States declared on 17 November 1956 
that Afghan Government had accepted the aid worth /? 100,000 for the 
reconstruction of a part of Hablbia College and the Department of 
S^te Bulletli[^  called it an expression of US friendship towards the 
146 US Nawa and World Renort (Washington), 16 AprU 1956, 
147 SongTZfigSlQnal .^ g^Strd, House 84th Congress, Second Session 
(W&shington, 1956), vol• 102, Part II, pp. 8976-77, 
148 P^pftrtiPfflt Qt ^%%%f B^x^i^tn. ^ ^^y ^^56. 
149 Ibid,, 2 July 19S6, 
150 Nfy ^gfX T|aig> 23 August 1956, 
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151 
people of Afghanistan. William M, Routry, a senior official 
of the Department of State told the Committee on Foreign Relations 
that the tJS Investments in Afghanistan in 1956 were to the tune of 
152 
^15.6 million. in 1?^ 57, the Unlijed States agreed to provide 
Afghanistan technical aid worth ^ 3 million and /? 11,4 million for 
153 
development purposes. The International Cooperation Administra-
tion in cooperation with the Department of State prepared a report 
which analysed the impact of US assistaiKse on Afghanistan. The 
report noted that the US aid proved instrumental in saving 
154 
Afghanistan from being pushed into the Soviet camp. 
The pattern of Afghan-US trade had remained always uneven. 
In 1957, the Afghan US trade was worth 994,66 million Afghanis. 
However during 1956-57, the Afghan imports from ths> United States 
155 
accoiinted for only 3.4 per cent of former's total Imports. 
Afghan exports to that country during the same period accounted 
156 
for 21,3 per cent, 
Afghanistan an<a ^is^plravgr Pg<?trlni 
The US President Dwight D, Elsenhower in a message to the 
US Congress on 5 January 1957 said that the countries of the Middle 
151 Departaient of State Bnlletln, 3 December 1956. 
162 US HoUSe, 85th Congress, First Session, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, l^arlnRS.on Witttal SggurtW hfi\ 1^57 
(Washington, 1957), Part I, p. 794. 
163 Ibid, Also see Department of State Bulletin, 9 April 1967. 
154 Ibid,, p. 615. 
156 GovernMent of Afghanistan, ACglanl?,tam HTY^T Qf frQKMSg. 
1^ 6Q (Kabul, 1960)Y p. 209. 
166 Ibid., p, 205, 
1«7 
Bast were facing the threat of conrniunlsin. He further added that 
the United States In pursuance of Its policy of global containment 
of communism, wanted to provide Increased economic and military 
assistance to the countries of the Middle Bast with a view to stem 
the tide of Soviet coconunlsm. This message later came to be known 
157 
as "Elsenhower Doctrine". James P, Richards, a senior officer 
of the Department of State, visited Afghanistan In early 1957 as 
part of his touf to the Middle Eastern and South Asian countries, 
to explain the purpose of the Elsenhower Doctrine and Its Importance 
158 
In safeguarding the Independence of these countries, Richards 
tried to convince the Afghan rulers th» benefits of joining the US 
sponsored alliances under the Elsenhower Doctrine, However, 
Richard's mission was not In keeping with the wellknown Afghan 
policy of traditional neutrality, Afghan acceptance of tl:» 
Blseonhower Doctrine meant renouncing Its centuries old and time-
tested policy of neutrality which Kabul could not afford. 
The Afghan Prime Minister, Sardar Fohamniad Dauod Khan paid a 
fortnight's visit to the United States starting from 24 June 1958# 
He was given a warm welcome on his arrival. In his reply to the 
warm welcome at the airport, Sardar Dauod hoped that his visit 
would be helpful in further strengthening the relations between 
159 
two countries. The officials of the State Department were 
1$7 For details see, PfffartBfflt 9t ^tatl BuHttto* 21 January 1957, 
1S8 yhtnffntt^ g Q%%%^^ m Worl^ Affair? 1,1?{?7 (New York, 1958), 
p* 1S1» 
160 
quoted as having praised the Afghan policy of neutrality. 
The discussions between the Afghan Prime Minister and the 
US leaders were marked by cordiality and genuine friendship, which 
161 
characterized Afghan-OS relations. The OS President explained 
the objectives of US policy In the field of international affairs 
and Prime Minister Dauod similarly described the attitude of his 
government in the field of International affairs including Its 
162 
traditional policy of neutrality and Independence. Afghanistan 
was assured of the continuing readiness of the United States to be 
of assistance to Afghanistan in its high objectives of developing 
the resources of the country for the welfare of the people. It 
was further agreed that cooperation which already existed in the 
development of Afghan civil aviation, the Helmand Valley, surface 
transportation projects and the Afghan educational system, would 
be continued with a view to making each of these projects as 
163 
efficient and effective as circumstances would allow. On 
26 June 1958, a ctiltural agreement was signee between the two 
countries as a symbol of warm relations and as an indication of a 
desire of the two nations to base their relations on mutual 
164 
understanding. Both the sides expressed their desire to 
maintain and Strengthen the cordial understanding between the 
160 Hqw Y^rk Times. 25 June 1958, 
161 Dfinartment of State Bulletit^ , 21 July 1958. 
162 Ibid, 
163 Ibid, 
164 Ibid. 
169 
165 
two countries. Thus the visit of Sardar Mohammad Dauod to th« 
Unitod States proved successful and a milestone in the Afghan-tJS 
relations, / 
President Slsenhover's Ylgit to Afghaflistan 
In December 1959, US President, Eisenhower visited 
Afghanistan, The news of the visit of the US President was given 
due publicity in the Afghan media, Anis and Islah wrote that 
President Elsenhower was a great world statesman and President 
166 
of a great nation who was due to visit Afghanistan, An^s 
expressed the view that the proposed visit of President Elsenhower 
was significant on two counts. Firstly, because the countries of 
the region had differences on political and regional issues and 
secondly, the visit would help in ascertaining the US viewpoint 
167 
on significant issues. The paper further noted that the US 
President's visit to neutral Afghanistan was more significant 
168 
because it was not a member of any US sponsored military alliance, 
'« 
The visit of President Eisenhower to Afghanistan was very 
short - just for five hours. President Eisenhower reached Kabul 
on 9 December 1959, Welcoming the US President, the Afghan King 
Zahir Shah hoped that the visit would help in strengthening the 
169 
relations between the two countries. President Eisenhower, 
while praising the valiant Afghans, hoped that his brief visit 
165 Ibid, 
166 Cited in Dupree, n. 113 , pp. 6-7, 
167 Ibid,, p, 7, 
l6e Ibid, 
169 ^f¥ J.grK T4»g> 10 December 1959, 
170 
170 
wotild htUp in imderstandtog tht gr«at countxy of Afghanistan. 
The United States provided financial and technical assistance 
to develop Kandhar International Airport as a major refueling 
point for flights across southern Asia, The United States 
provided ^ 10 million in grants and j3 5 million In loans for 
Morrison and Knudsen to build the airport. Prior to the airport 
could be opened in December 1962, modem jets had come into use 
171 
and were speeding across the area without need to refuel, 
AfKnsB KteR a^iAr Stan' g n§i% %Q ? S 
The Afghan King, Zahlr Shah paid an official visit to the 
United States from 4 to 16 September 1963. During the course of 
his visit, the Afghan King had an exchange of views with US 
President, John P, Kennedy, on matters of mutual interest to 
Afghanistan and the United States and the contemporaiy world 
172 
situation. The joint communique issued after Afgljan King's 
visit to the US, noted that the US had followed with interest and 
synQjatty the efforts being made by Afghanistan under the leader-
ship of King Zahlr Shah, to achieve economic development and social 
173 
progress. President Kennedy assured the visiting Afghan King 
of the "continuing desire of the US to cooperate with Afghanistan 
in economic and technical fields by so doing to contribute to the 
success of the efforts which Afghanistan is making to provide a 
170 Ibid, 
171 Henry S. Bradsher, ATlteniStan apfl t^ ftff Spf ^ gt VU%<iJ\ (Durham, N.C, t Duke Press, 1983;, p , 29, 
172 Pwartaent of Statft Pttllettot 7 October 1963. 
173 Ib id . 
171 
174 
better life for Its people," The joint communique further noted 
that In the sphere of International relations both the countries 
were dedicated to the furtherance of the cause of world peace and 
to bring about the elimination of reduction of tensions between 
nations. Both countries expressed their deep conviction of the 
indispensable role of the United Nations in advancing the cause 
of peace and of the necessity of supporting its efforts directed 
175 
to that end* It also noted that "Afghanistan's traditional 
policy Is the safeguarding of Its national Independence through 
non-alignment, friendship and cooperation with all countries. The 
US for its part places great Importance on Afghanistan's continued 
176 
Independence and national Integrity,* Both Washington and Kabul 
agreed that the visit of Afghan King had contributed to better 
understanding between the two countries, / 
Mohammad Hashlm Malnwadwal, the Prime Minister of 
Afghanistan, visited the US from 25 March to 9 April 1967, He 
stayed in Washington from 28-30 March 1967 and held talks with the 
US President Lyndon B, Johnson and other US officials. The US 
President in his welcome speech on 28 March 1967 saldt ",,, 
Afghanistan is far from us in miles and hours as we meet this 
mornliMv But for uS it Is no longer a distant, far off remote 
place," The US President listed the following four commonalities 
between the two coun'-Driest 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid. 
177 I b i d . , 17 AprU 1967, p . 627. 
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(1) Your land, like our« has a strong tradition 
of freedom and independence} 
(11) your people, like ours, cherish diversity, 
while they seek unity in mutual respect and 
Justicei 
(lit) you,ltke us, are e^ perliBental in the art of 
governnent and social reform; 
(Iv) and we share in common dedication to peace and 
to the idea of a world community based on 
freedom, 178 
President Johnson further added that the relations between Kabul 
and Washington had been close and cordialt"Today they are warmer 
than ever before. It is a very great honour and privilege to have 
179 
you with us to discuss an even more productive future." 
The visiting Afghan Prime Minister in his reply thanked 
the US President for latter*s "kind expressions of friendship 
180 
toward Afghanistan". The Afghan Prime Minister further said 
that despite the considerable geographic distance separating us 
and Afghanistan,"our common belief and devotion to liberty and 
181 
respect for the inherent dignity of man has bridged this distance". 
The Afghan Prime Minister expressed his confidence that his visit 
would serve to strengthen and promote the friendly and cultural 
relations which so happily had prevailed between Afghanistan and 
the US, He also appreciated the role of US assistance in the 
development of Afghan econonor. The Afghan Prime Minister saldt 
"Afghanistan follows a policy of active nonalignment and is 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
ISO Ibid. 
181 I b i d . , p, 628. 
173 
detennliMd to exorcist the free judgeiBent in international 
affairs. It endeavours wherever possible to serve the cause of 
international peace and the rights of nations and peoples in the 
firm belief that only in peace can the progress of all nations^ 
including Afghanistan, be assured and that international under-
standing is the best way of insuring human prosperity throughout 
182 
the world*" 
The joint statement issued on 28 March 1967 noted that the 
two leaders talked about ctirrent developments elsewhere in Agia, 
part icularly the urgent need for peace and s tab i l i ty in South-Bast 
183 
Agia* They outlined their respective positions on the problems 
of Vietnam and agreed that a peaceful and Just settlement is urgently 
184 
needed* 
The United States and Afghanistan concluded an agreement 
on 19 July 1967 for the sales of agricultural commodities under 
title of the Agrictiltural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 
185 
1954* On 25 May 1969, the US Secretary of State, William 
Rogers, had a brief stopover in Kabul, on his way to Paris to 
attend the Sixteenth Plenary Session on Vietnam, In his statement 
issued on 9 May 196P prior to his reaching Kabul, Secretary Rogers 
saidt "I am also very pleased to be stopping in Kabul where I will 
be the first US Secretary of State ever to visit Afghanistan, The 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid*, p. 632* 
184 Ibid* 
IBS Ibid. , 28 August 1967. 
174 
Tlsit Will give me an occasion to express our friendship for 
186 
that countxy,* 
Then followed the visit of the then US Vice President, 
0|ilro Agnew to Afghanistan in oarly part of January 1970. On 
6 January 1970, Splro Agnew reached Kabul, In reply to a toast 
at a reception given by Afghan Prime Minister, Nur Ahmed Btemadl, 
the tIS Vice-President said that many Americans having known 
Afghanistan had "made us eager to see this beautiful and spirited 
land and to meet, at first hand, its proud people with their 
187 
strong tradition of freedom and jealously guarded independence". 
Referring to the geographical distance between the two countries, 
the Vice President further addedj "We share a kindred spirit and 
many of the same aspirations ,,, no vexing problems divide us nor 
diminish the respect we hold for each other nor lessen our ability 
188 
to work together," While making a reference to the striking 
similarities in the national character and outlook of the people 
between the two countries, Splro Agnew said that both Washington 
and Kabul shared common aspirations of deep traditional devotion 
to freedom and national independence. While praising Afghanistan 
for having longer history of maintaining such traditions, he saidi 
,», We Americans are proud of our association 
with Afghanistan over the years in working 
toward a brighter future for Afghanistan we 
feel confident that Afghanistan will continue 
its drive to utiliae Its resources to build new 
and better Institutions, to improve its 
186 Ibid. 
3S7 Ibid., 23 February 1970. 
188 Ibid. 
3L7S 
agriculture, to broaden Its industrial ba«e 
and create more educational and employment 
opportunities for its people, As Afghans persevere 
In their efforts, we look forward to assisting in 
any wgy we can, 189 
It was evident that the US Vice President had assured tl» 
Governnent of Afghanistan of continued TJS assistance. 
TheXAaU QtHsn^Jl^ste^r 
On 1 Kovenber 1P74, the then US Secretary of State Hexiry 
A, Kissinger, visited Afghanistan, During his visit, Kissinger 
had various rounds of talks with Afghan Head of the State and 
Prime Minister, Sardar I'ohairmed Dauod and other Afghan officials. 
The joint conHEunique issued after Kissinger's visit, the same day, 
at Kabul, noted that both the countries conducted frank discussions 
on a wide range of Issues in the friendly atmosphere that 
190 
"characterizes US«Afghan relations**. Both sides held talks 
on the wi(^ e ranging issues which included bilateral relations, 
recent developments in the Near Bast and South Asian region, 
progress in International detente and mutual interests of both 
191 
nations of securing a peaceful, stable and cooperative world. 
The Afghan officials apprised the visiting US Secretary 
of State about their Government's views on regional and global 
problems. Both countries agreed that "the way to find lasting, 
durable and peaceful solutions to existing problems and 
differences between states is through constructive and thorough 
189 Ibid, 
190 Ib id . , 25 November 1P74. 
191 Ibid . 
i7e 
192 
dlfcussions among all stidts concerntd**. WbH« expressing his 
appreciation for that opportunity to visit Afghanistan, Henry 
Kissinger affirmed his admiration for progress being made by the 
Government and people of Afghanistan. Both Washington and Kabul 
^ laid stress on the importance of international cooperation in the 
field of economic and technical development and "its major role in 
193 
sti-engthening International stability and peace**, Afghanistan 
expressed its "pleasure at the contribution towards this end being 
made by the United States in Afghanistan through bilateral economic, 
194 
technical and educational cooperation**. The US Secretary of 
State, Henry Kissinger, expressed his government's continuing 
desire to "cooperate with the Republic of Afghanistan In achieving 
195 
its economic development goals**. He further informed the Afghan 
Government that he would ask a senior official of the US Agency for 
International Development to visit Afghanistan In the near futiu^ 
to renewe with the Afghan authorities joint prograjrjnes and progress 
196 
in bringing projects to fruition. 
The US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger again visited 
Afghanistan on 8 August 1976 and held discussions with Sardar 
197 
Mj^ hammad Dauod, the then President of Afghanistan, The talks 
were held in the warm and friendly atmosphere. There was friendly 
192 
193 
194 
195 
196 
Ibid, 
Ibid. 
Ibid, 
Ibid, 
Ibid, 
197 Ibid., 6 September 1976» 
vn 
apd fruitful •xchangd of vl«vt l^ 9tw«»ii th« two sid«s on major 
International questions of mutual Interest, especially the 
development of situation in South Asia and the Middle East* 
Both the leaders also exchanged views on Afghan-US bilateral 
198 
relations and cooperation in different fields. Both sides 
also reaffirmed the ln5)ortance of the strengthening and 
expansion of friendship and cooperation between the two countries 
for preserving and consolidating the regional and world peace. 
The two sides noted the similarity of the "views and purposes of 
Afghan and American leaders and peoples regarding national 
199 
independence and integrity**. The Government of Afghanistan 
pointed out that its traditional policy - based on positive 
neutrality, nonalignment and friendship and cooperation with all 
peace-loving countries was guarantor of Afghan independence. The 
US Secretary of State said that his government appreciated 
200 
Afghanistan's position. 
In his discussion with other Afghan officials, Henry 
Kissinger, reaffirmed US interest in participating closely in 
Afghanistan's economic development and also noted with satis-
201 
faction the ongoing work In various spheres with American help. 
The Afghan Government expressed its satisfaction at US contribu* 
tlons which had been and were being made through bilateral 
economic, technical and educational cooperation. Both sides 
198 
199 
200 
201 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid* 
178 
expressed their desire to expand further existing cooperation, 
202 
particularly in the technical and economic fields. On this 
occasion, an agreement was signed between the two countries for 
203 
the sale of edible oil to AfghMiistan on concessional terne* 
The pattern of friendly relations between Afghanistan and the 
United States continued smoothly even after the advent of Carter 
administration in Washington, During the summer of 1977, the 
efforts were made by both the countries to arrange a visit of 
Sardar Dauod to the United States, And finally the visit of 
Sardar Dauod to the US was tentatively planned for September 19*^, 
a dream which never came true because of the Communist COUP in 
April 1978 in Kabul, Washington had rather started making 
preparations for the forthcoming visit of Sardar Dauod, A senior 
State Department expert on Soviet Affairs, Adolph Dubs, who was 
then overseeing South Asian Affairs in the State Department, told 
a House of Representatives Subcommittee on 16 March 1978, Just six 
weks before the cout^  in Kabul that "internally, the political 
situation is stable" in Afghanistan and "President Daud remains 
204 
very much in control and faces no significant opposition". 
The Communist's seizure of power in Kabul by staging a 
COUP in April 1978 served a blow to the rapidly growing ties 
between Washington and Kabul, The impact of April 1978 ypun 
and subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, 
on Afghan-US relations is analyzed in the next chapter. 
202 Ibid. 
203 xbld. 
204 Ibid., May 1978. 
Chapter V 
SoyiST IN?ASIOH CT; APQHMia'^^ ASP IKTiaaiATIONAL 
at^fiffiM! 
This Chapter Is an attempt to analyse the developments 
ieadiiQg to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan on 27 15e6effil)er 19*^1 
Its aftermath and the International response to get the Soviet 
aggression vacated from Afghanistan. The Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan was preceded by the seizure of power In Kabul by 
the People's Deirocratlc Party of Afghanistan in April 1978, 
The PDPA regime committed Kabul to Moscow. 
The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized 
power In Kabul on 27 April 1978 by overthrowing the government headed 
tiy Sardar Fohammad Dauod which had been saddled into power since 
17 JiiLy 1973• When Dauod had assumed power he had announced the 
replacement of monarchy by "a republican system, consistent with 
1 
the true spirit of Islam**. Dauod, a seasoned statesman and a 
strategic thinker, pursued a "l\&ewarm'' foreign policy in the 
initial years of his assumption of power. His endorsement of the 
Soviet plan of collective security in Asia was more governed by 
the domestic compulsions than a manifestation of the Afghan foreign 
policy. After securing his domestic position politically, he no 
more needed the "crutches'* of the leftist groups or others. He 
openly declared that he was not adopting a leftist attitude or 
Speech of Dauod cited in Hasan Kakkar, "The Fall of the 
Hiidle Eastern Studies, vol* 9, no* 2, May 1978, ?• 214. 
180 
Aceaptiiig the claims ©f suy iiltalogiCftX fact ion* On 28 February 
1974 Sardar Dauod saldt "We have no connection with any gxx)up, 
2 
and l inking TIS to any group or movenient Is a s i n . " 
on 87 April 1P78, a £Q^p was staged by the PIP A and the 
saiae day Kabul iiadio announced t h a t "for the f i r s t time In t h i 
h is tory of Afghanistan an end has been put to the su l tana te of 
the Mohammadzais ( the Afghan Royal Family) and power has passed 
3 
in to the hands of the masses", on 30 April 1P78, I t was 
announced tha t power in Afghanistan was being exercised by 
a Revolutionary Council comprising mi l i t a ry and c i v i l i a n s and 
headed by Noor Foharomad Tarakit On 1 May 1978i the names of 
other ministers of the new government in Kabul with t h e i r 
por t fo l ios were announced. Babrak K^jrmal was placed as number 
4 
two and Hafizullah Amin as number three af te r Tarakl . On 
9 May 1978, President Taraki while announcing the foreign pol icy 
of the new Afghan Government, promised a foreign policy of non-
alignment and good r e l a t i ons with a l l neighbours and a lso singled 
out such goals as " to fur ther s trengthen and consolidate f r iendly 
5 
r e l a t i ons and al l - round cooperation with the USSR", 
2 Fred Hall lday, "Revolution in Afghanistan", 
N^w Left Revleff no. 112, November-December 1978, 
?• 29. 
3 Kabul Radio, 27 AprU 1978 in 2 S t § ^ , 28 April 1978, 
p« 5 1 . 
4 Kabul Radio, 9 May 1978, in M § ^ » 10 May 1978, p . 5 1 . 
6 Thomas T. Hammound, %<? flujin ktg\mi^%m (Boulderi Westvlew Press , 1985), p« 82» 
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mHis^ States ana ^ tf ^ntm lit FiM 
There was no tmraediate official reaction by the United 
States to the Cosenxnlst eeim In Kabul* The W econoislc, cultural, 
educational and Peace Corps programose In Afghanistan continued* 
This studied silence maintained }sy Washington showed that It 
was "unconcerned that another country apparently had joined the 
Soviet bloc". While defending the US policy, Theodore Bllot 
wrotes 
The United States continued to keep an open mind 
toward assisting Afghanistan, maintained a dialogue 
in Kabul on possible new AID. Peace Corps or cultural 
programme and indicated a willingness to help to the 
extent proposals met out our legislative and develop-
mental criteria. This policy made sense because 
cutting off these programmes unilaterally would duly 
reduce Afghan options and drive the Afghan Government 
deeper into the Soviet embrace. 7 
This view was also shared by the then US Secretary of State, Cyrus 
Vance, who wrote in his memoirs? "I concluded that our best chance 
to maintain a measure of influence In Kabul was to continue limited 
economise aid. To cut off all assistance or refuse recognition 
8 
would almost certainly wealcen our position in Kabul.** 
The then National Security Adviser to the Carter Administra-
tion had approved of the restrained response to the CQU|^ in Kabul. 
He saidi "It was an Internal saau, there was no evidence of Soviet 
Involvement and hence there was no grounds of an Araorlcan protest. 
6 Theodore I*. Sliots, Jr., "The 1979 Afghan Revolution 1 Sone 
Internal Agpects", F;LetGher Foruiir vol. 3, no. 4, Spring 1979, 
p. 61. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Cyrus Vance, H ^ ?nQ4918 j, gr iU^alJ^Srs in Affl8|:i9a*s FoTjiign Policy Olfiv Ynrki Simon and Sahnstftv^ iQ«fl-> ^ 
p» 385. 
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The regiee was undefined and not In consolidation, there was 
doubt as to whether it could hold power* As long as we could 
have some influence in Kahul, why cut off aid? It was better 
9 
to wait and see how things worked out.** However former US 
ambassador to Kabul, Neumann told the W Department of ^ tate 
that he had known the new leaders of Afghanistan for years and 
they were definitely communists and would follow orders from 
10 
Moscow hence the US should stop all aid to the new regime. 
Cyrus Vance also later realized that the US reaction to the new 
regime was too mild. He wrote* 
In looking back I think we should have expressed our 
concern more sharply at the time of the April COUP 
that brought Taraki to power. There were reasons why 
we did not protest more vigorously. Although ttere 
was little question that Taraki government would make 
itself responsive to Moscow, there was room for doubt 
about whether the Soviets had planned the cpu^ or were 
involved in its execution. And there was reason to 
thixik the strong Afghan nationalism of Taraki, and even 
more of Hafizullah Amin, might keep Afghanistan from 
becoming a Soviet satellite,,. We concluded that our 
interests would best be served by letting Afghanistan 
continue to its traditional balancing act between Bast 
and West, The United States had few resources in the 
area and historically we had held the view that our vital 
interests were not involved there. Moreover, our friends 
in the region had adopted a wait and see attitude. There 
was no disposition on their part to add to the instability 
by supporting opponents of the Marxists in Kabul, Although 
\ we were contacted from time to time about Coup plots, my 
advice was that we not get involved. 11 
Though there was no official comnent or reaction by Washington 
to the advent of communist fifiaa In Kabul, the American press 
reacted very sharply to these developments. An editorial published 
9 Quoted in Hammound, n, 5, p, 63, 
10 Ibid. 
11 Vance, n, 3, p» 3S6« 
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in **»• May york TiriMi expressed concern tl[»t **a genuinely non-
aligned country had fallen to an avowedly communist one that Is 
12 
likely to tut towards Moscow*, The strategic analysts in the 
United States also quickly concluded that Afghanistan had been 
pushed Into Soviet affairs opiaedt "The great gaifie is over and 
13 
the Russians have won lt**« Leon 6, Poullada has also regretted 
that no attempt was made by Washington to break relations wl!bh 
the communist usurpers nor to express official disapproval of 
such a shift in political power in a strategic country like 
14 
Afghanistan* 
Links of PDFA leaders, who assumed power after the couPy 
with Soviet Union were very clear. It is worth mentioning here 
that at the time of COUP there were about 350 Soviet military 
advisers in Afghanistan who played a significant role in the 
15 
coup^ A broadcast from the Kabul Radio reported on 30 April 
1978 that one Puzanov of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul met Tarakl 
16 
and gave hitn a message of diplomatic recognition* Moscow Radio 
12 NfiSLlQiaLJiffigl* 6 May 1978, 
13 Drew Mlddleton, "How Afghans Govt, into Soviet Global 
Strategy*, lbld«, 24 June 1976. 
14 Leon B. PoTjillada, "The Failure of American Diplomacy In 
Afghanistan*, ^omhtt%l ' "' ' 
Winter 1982/1983, p . 247. 
i t f g t e n l 8 t a » * , _ | g | i O I £ | ^ (Washington), vol . 145, no. 3 , 
15 UK, f^fBfflyjf»« f^? gP^^f^ Invasion and Its^Consanuences 
for Byl^tiife SeCT^yitV fL^ndom Her Ma.1astv«s Stationery 
Office, 1980}, p . 6, Also see Washingf^ on Post. 6 May 1978. 
16 Renry S, Bradsher, AfgtilffJstW tp^ %V^ Sgfyl^t ?^lgn (Durham, N.C. t Duke Press, 1983)t p* 84» 
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finally reported on 3 Ma;f 19?8 about according Soriet recognition 
17 
to Taraki Governisent but it cited Kabul Badio as the source* 
On 3 May 1978 Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin sent "hearty 
congratulations" to the Taraki Governiaent and wished for its 
18 
great success* The ^ hrent ^  coEsr.miist regiB» in Kabul had 
certainly raised high expectations for Kremlin. The soviet daily 
Pravda while pronouncing the official Soviet attitude towards 
Kabtil, wrote on 6 May l?>78i "The interests of social development 
demanded a fundamental break with obsolete social relations,,, 
complex task of forming the now power, the intrigues of internal 
and external reactionary forces and struggling for a better future 
19 
for the Afghan people, lie ahead," The reports appearing in 
the Soviet media by raid-May 1978 indicated that Moscow was happy 
with the regime, 
Hafizullah Amln, the then Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, 
while on his way to attend the meeting of Foreign Ministers of 
the Hon^Aligned countries at Havana, stopped in Moscow on 18 May 
1978. He was greeted by the Soviet Foreign Minister Groizyko* 
The Soviet media, and the joint communique on their talks, 
identified the two men not only by their government position but 
also as mercbers of the politburos, that controlled their 
retpective parties, the coranunist party of Soviet Union (CPSU) 
20 
and Pr.pA, 
17 m s TrtRflff* 3 May 1978, p . 2. 
IB lags , 3 Hay 1978 in FBIS/SU, 4 May 1978, p . 11, 
19 gravdfi. 6 May 1^78 in FBI8/S?. 9 May 1978, p . J l , 
20 2i££, 19 May 1978 in FB|;S/SP, 19 May 1978, p . J l . 
^s 
l>urtiig Jane-^Tuiy 1978 Tarakl managed to get rid of the 
leading Parchamites by appointing them as Afghan ambassadors 
abroad, Nur Ahamad Nur was sent to the United States, Kannal to 
Caechoslovakla, Anahlta Ratebzad to Yugoslavia, A. Mahnud 
Barlalay, Kannal* s younger brother to Pakistan. 
During the Initial months of 1978 Moscow tried to keep a 
low profile In Afghanistan, In July 1978, an agreement to 
provide fS 250 million worth of Soviet weapons to Afghan armed 
22 
forces was neither made public nor Soviet media made ar^ 
reference to It, 
Despite Its overt silence, Moscow was making every attempt 
to see that the PDPA remained In power and consequently Kabid. In 
the Soviet orbit, A major milestone In this direction was laid 
dxirlng the first week of December 1978 when both countries signed 
a treaty of friendship and cooperation on 5 December 1978 at 
23 
Moscow, The treaty was signed during Afghan President Noor 
Mohammad Taraki's visit to the Soviet Union from 4 to 7 December 
1978, This treaty was used as a pretext a year later by the 
Soviet Union to Invade Afghanistan, Article 17 of the said 
treaty, IntCTralla saidt 
21 Kabul Radio, 11 July and 21 August 1978, In FBIS/MSy 
27 ^uly and 23 August 1978, pp, 61 and 53, 
22 The text of this agreement in Afghanistan f n, 15, 
Appendix A« 
23 For text of the Treaty see, ysIS/S^^ 6 December 1978, 
pp. Jrio-13, 
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Tha Mgh contracting parties, acting In th« 
Spirit of the traditions of friendship and good 
nelghbourness, a$ wtll as th«United Nation*« 
Charter, shall consult each other and take by 
agreement appropriate measures to ensure the 
security, Independence and territorial Integrity 
of the two countries* In the Interest of strengthen-
ing the defence capacity Of the high contracting 
parties, they shall continue to develop cooperation 
in the military field on the basis of appropriate 
agreement concluded between them. 24 
Under the treaty, though Moscow was not bound to prevent the 
downfall of the now comrunlst regime in Afghanistan, it was 
already preparing the possibility of Saving it from failure and 
keeping that country under Soviet influence esren by force if 
needed. After the conclusion of the treaty, Soviet leader 
Brezhn€fv said that the relations between the two countries "have 
assumed a qualitativ^y new chapter permeated by a spirit of 
25 
friendship and revolutionary solidarity. The treaty came into 
effect with the exchange of instruments ratifications on 27 May 
1979. 
The joint Coimaunlque issued after Tarakl»s visit observed 
that the contacts between the PDPA and the CPSu would be expanded. 
Along with the friendship treaty, another agreement was also 
signed between Kabul and Moscow to establish a permanent inter-
27 
governmental comnlsslon on economic cooperation. Thus Soviet 
Union had taken over the overall responsibility of Afghanistan's 
ecoiK)mLc and military responsibilities even in December 1978, 
26 
24 Ibid, 
26 Ibid. 
26 l^IS Trends. 13 December 1978, p, 6. 
27 Moscow Radio, 5 Dectober 1978, in FBIS/Sf^ 5 December 
li^ ?$i p. J12, 
3Sf 
Adolph Bubt, the US Ambassador In Afghanistan vat 
assassinated by four Afghans in Kabul on 14 February 1979. He 
had presented his credentials on 17 June l9'tB» Duba«s assassi-
nation cait a Spell on the already deteriorating US.Afghan 
relations as there were supposed to be many unresolved questions 
about the role of Afghan Government in the affairs and its 
consequent uncooperative attitude. 
The assassins of Dubs had held the US Ambassador as hostage 
in Kabul hotel and demanded from the Afghan Government the release 
28 
of the arrested some leftist members in exchange for Dubs, The 
US Btabassy in Kabul advised the Afghan Government to prolong 
the negotiations while applying rescue operations. But the Afghan 
forces along with Soviet advisers stormed the hotel room which 
29 
resulted in the death of Dubs and the kidnapped. According to 
Richard P, Cronint "Soviet security advisers appeared to be 
directing the operation and the Afghan government disregarded US 
30 
suggestion that an atteipt to rescue Dubs by force be delayed.** 
The Afghan Government tried to underplay the incident by blaming 
some groups. As Beverley Male has also opineds **Tha choice of 
groups as the culprit appears a convenient ploy to divert attention 
from the real beneficiaries of the kidnapping and murder of the US 
31 
Ambassador," However, the official organ, Kabul Times^ in a 
28 US Department of State, T^ l^ t<3naPPjLBg and VnVli gf, , 
fffittaffadgr ,AdgXpb Puj??? st^ apnary qt import ,9f liny^sUsatlQnff, 
(Washington, D,C,, 1980>* 
29 Ib id . 
30 Richard ^•pTonixu Af glantf taiii ^Qfin IWiUQU an4 g? 
«igt)Qnye (Washington, 1981}, p« 4* 
31 Beverley Male, l^YgaU&naiT ACgHatttstan t A ^t»PPrali?al (liondoiw c^ leiffi, 1982), p. i s i , 
r^oom 
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def€nstv« editorial wrot«l 
Tha terrorists and the enemies of the people of 
DBA (Democratic Hepublic of Afghanistan) by 
coraraitting such an inhiwan and cruel act may 
thiEk they would disturb or damage the ties 
between the two friendly countries,,. The people 
and the governn»nt of the DBA and thet USA are fully 
aware of the acts of their enesles. They know that 
such provocative acts will not undermine the 
friendly relations between the two nations, 32 
Such a defence in an official daily was nothing but a move by the 
comnunist regime in Kabul to absolve itself from the responsibility 
of being invEtlved in Dubs' murder and thus shift the blame to 
others. The outraged Carter Administration accused Moscow of 
involvement in the bungling that caused Dubs* death but Kremlin 
33 
denied It. The US economic aid to Afghanistan was slashed. 
On 23 July 1978 Washington announced the withdrawal of irost of 
its diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan because of "security 
34 
reasons**. Although the Carter Administration had announced a 
drastic curtailment of US economic aid to Afghanistan but it was 
not totally stopped until in August 1979, when President Carter 
signed PL 96-53, the International Development Cooperation Act 
35 
of 1979, into law. Section 505 of the said Act prohibited ai3y 
further assistance to Afghanis unless the President certified to 
the Congress that the Afghan Government had officially apologized 
and assumed responsibility for Ambassador Dubs and agreed to 
32 SaMJEiBeS* 15 February 1979. 
33 New Ygrlx. Times., 23 February 1979. 
34 Ibid., 24 July 1979. 
35 Cronin, n. 30, p. 4* 
as9 
proride suitable prottction for all US personn©! in Afghanistan. 
Thu«, in the aftermath of Duht* assassination, the US relations 
with Afghanistan had reached the lowest ebb. 
On IS September 1979, the Afghan Revolutionary Council 
announced that Taraki had asked to be relieved from party and 
37 
state posts on health grounds, and Haflzullah Amln became the 
new President of Afghanistan. 
SQY^gt .Pnlon ana Aaln %giiw 
Amin had developed a distrust towards Moscow especially 
after what happened on 14 September 1979 when an atten5)t on his 
life was made in the presence of Russian Ambassador, On 
17 September 1979, Soviet leaders, Brezhnev and Kosygin, while 
sending congratulations to Amin expressed the confideiwe that 
"fraternal relations between the Soviet Union and revolutionary 
Afghanistan will be further developed successfully on the basis 
38 
of the treaty of friendship'** The Moscow's message lacked the 
usual Soviet warmth. Another fact indicating Soviet disenchantnrent 
with Amin was that Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin after visiting in 
early 1979 on his way back to Moscow did neither stop over Kabul 
39 
nor send usual message of greetings, 
Shal ^ali, Foreign I^nlster in Amin»s Cabinet accused the 
Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, Puzanov not only of harbouring four 
36 Ibid, 
37 Kfibu^ TJges. 16 September 1979. 
38 Pyavd^. 18 September 1979, FBIS/SU. 19 September 1979, p . Dl . 
39 Hall iday, n , 2 , pp . 34-35. 
in 
40 
forffi«r »lalft«rs but also of being involved in a conspiracy 
to assassinate Anin and asked Moscow to recall the Soviet 
41 
ambassador which was done in November 1979, The new Soviet 
Ambassador in Kabul was Fikriat Akhmetdzhanovich Xaibeev who 
42 
assuiaed charge on 28 November 1979. 
Prior to his assumption of power Amin, as a Foreign 
Minister and later on as a Prlroe Minister under Taraki, had 
seldom shown his disenchantment for Moscow in his public 
pronouncements* He said on 22 July 19791 "Any person and any 
element who harms the friendship between Afghanistan and Soviet 
Union will be considered the enemy of the country, enencr of our 
people and eneny of our revolution. We will not allow ai^body in 
Afghanistan to act against the friendship of Afghanistan and the 
43 
Soviet Union," However, at the same time he also seemed worried 
about the increasing Soviet presence In Afghanistan, On 17 Jtily 
1979 he saldt "Those who boast of friendship with us, they can 
really be our friend when they respect our independence, our soil 
44 
and our prideful traditions,*' Male opines that Amin was too 
40 On 14 September 1979. four ministers, Major Sherjan 
MasBdooryap, Colonel Mohammed Aalam Wa tan jar, Colonel 
Syed Mohaaimad Gulabgoy and Asadullah Sarwari were 
dismissed by Amin and after the shoot out incident, 
they reportedly took refuge in Soviet Embassy in Kabul, 
See Hammond, n, 5^ p, 83, 
41 Cable no. 07444 froB US Embassy in Kabul to State 
Departaent, 11 October 1979, ibid., p, 86, 
42 SUauUCifflSS. 1 December 1979, 
43 Ibid,, 23 July 1979, 
44 Ibid,, 21 July 1979, 
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BRich ©f a re&ll«t to tnagtn© that the PDPA could survive without 
Soviet assistance and In any case too good a socialist to wish 
4S 
to see relations with the Soviet Union deteriorate further. 
According to Western political anaLys^a, l^scow was arorioui 
to draft Kannal as Tarakl^s successor and it could be done only 
after eliminating Ainin, And such planning was done in mid August 
46 
1979« Tarakl's visit to Moscow on 9 SeptemlDer 1979 had been 
utilized by the Soviet leadership to iniplenient it. Amln never 
made public his distrust or disenchantment with Moscow but he 
seemed to be equally concerned with increasing Soviet influence 
in Afghanistan. In early October 1979, Amln, while acknowledging 
the Soviet military aid, saidi "Soviet Union Is providing whatever 
we can use ••• (to defend Afghanistan) •,, but we will defend our 
country ,•• (and will) never give this trouble to our international 
47 
brothers to fight for us,** Thus it can be surmized that Amln was 
Interested in maintaining good relations with Moscow but at the 
not 
same time was/opposed to increasing Soviet Influence in Afghanistan, 
After Adolph Dubs death, Washington had almost become luke-
warm toward the communist regime in Kabul, On 11 September 1979, 
Amln had told %tim American Charge d* Affaires, J. Bruce Amstutz, 
48 
that he wanted to have "friendly relations" with the United States. 
45 Male, n, 3i, p. 184. 
46 Ibid. Also see Bradsher, n. 16, p. ll6. 
47 EBX8 yrendSy 3 October 1979, pp. 15*16. 
4B Cable no. 06789 from Kabul to State Department, 11 September 
1979, p. 1, cited in Rammound, n. 5, p« 87. 
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However Amstutz did not take It seriously. 
Following the assuBiption of power by Antn, on 15 September 
1979 the US State Department became more Interested In th© question 
of Amln's attitude toward the United States. Amstutz called on 
Amin on 27 September and found that the latter was "all charm and 
friendliness** and once more spoke In favour of better relatione 
49 
with the United States. Shah Wall, Foreign Minister In Amines 
Government, met the senior officials of US State Department In 
New York on 27 Septecaber 1979, In early October 1979, Archer 
Blood, a US diplomat went to Kabul and met Amln, The former 
told that Amln "wanted American aid without offering anything 
50 
In return**. 
The Carter Administration made the Issue of "violation of 
51 
Human Rights" In Afghanistan as a starting point with Amln. 
The violation of human rights took place when Amln was In power. 
The report prepared by the State Department devoted sis pages to 
violation of human rights in Afghanistan, The report contained 
sweeping generalizations without providing evidence of specific 
Instances of atrocities which could be documents or checked. 
Archer Blood in his assessment to the US Department of 
State reported that Amln was "content for the time being with 
a polite but limited relationship, which both countries would 
49 Cable no. 07218 from Kabul to the State Department, 
27 September 1979, p. 1, ibid,, p. 87. 
50 Cited in Male, n. 31, p. 200. 
51 US, Department of State, Cp^nte P^Pgrt^, OTl g^lTHftn, HIgnttfi 
for ic>7Q (Washington, D.C, : Governaent Printing Press, 
1980), pp. 707-12. 
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52 
r«fraln from exacerbating hy word or action*** Even the US 
Secretary of State, Cyrui Vance stiiraned up* "At maximum we regard 
our current dialogue with the Afghans as a means of exploring 
the possibilities for a less contentious relationship and \m 
are not overtly sanguine tlmt even thljs lisdted object!^ can 
53 
be sustained*** 
The above analysis reveals that the US missed a golden 
opportunity by not making the strategic advantages of the 
situation. As Poullada has aptly observed! **American weakness 
and complacence over development in Afghanistan convinced the 
Soviets that America had abandoned the field to them there, and 
that they could safely nwfve into the vacuum with tacit American 
54 
consent,** 
SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN 
The world was talc en by surprise by the events of 
27-28 December 1979 when sizeable number of Soviet troops 
equipped with sophisticated weapons invaded Afghanistan In 
which Hafizullah Amin was killed and Babrak Karmal was installed 
as a new ruler of Afghanistan* The foundations of Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan had been laid much earlier and the 
December end 1979 episode was the final act. 
52 Cable no. 07726 from Kabul to State Department, 28 October 
1979, w* l-3» cited in Haromound, n, 5, p« 287. 
63 Cable no. 282436, State Department to OS Embassy in 
Islamabad, 29 October 1979, p» 1» IMd*, p« 87* 
54 Poullada, n* 14,p* 248* 
lit 
AccordlMg to ThoBiis T. Harainond, the luforsiatlon for 
prolii&lnary planning by Moscow would hare been collected when 
General A. Bpishev, the head of the Main Pol i t ica l Administration 
of the Soviet armed forces, made an inspection tour of Afghanistan 
55 
in April 1979. This was followed by the v i s i t to Afghanistan by 
General Ivan G, Pavloski, Deputy Minister of Defence from August 
56 
1979 to October 1P79. Pavloskl had ear l ier undertaken a 
slBiilar mission in Czechoslovakia in 1968 prior to the Soviet 
invasion of tliat country and he led the Soviet troops into 
Czechoslovakia, Thus he was a logical choice to make the 
assessment for launching Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Along with preparation of such strategic planning, there 
was also augmentation in the presence of Soviet Bdlitary and 
c ivi l ian advisers in Afghanistan during October-Kovember 1979» 
The Afghans had almost lo s t control of the essential levers of 
power to 1,500 or more Goviet off icials in the c ivi l ian ministries 
and between 3,500 and 4,000 Soviet officials and technicians in 
57 
the Afghan armed forces. An estimated half of the 8|000 officers 
and non-commissioned officers of the Afghan army had been purged in 
68 
October 1979. 
In l a te November 1979, Moscow put i t s troops in a s ta te 
of a l e r t and reservists were called up to f i l l up understrength 
55 Hammond , n, 5, p» 9# 
56 j^HfijaaaisiaB, «• i s , pp. 37-38. 
57 US, Department of State, t^ffglfgtgKT Qf l^ <39?Hti 
iJCTlQPBIgBlls HffX9.t?4 %Q'M&\iaSil£^Uk (Washington, 
D.C, 1980), p# 4, 
68 | > i S<;ffinaM«t (I'ondon), 17 November 1979, pp. 68-69. 
19$ 
combat divisions In the central Asian military district. 
59 
Bridging equipment was moved to the Afghan border. The Warsaw 
Pact countries had also placed their troops on an advanced stage 
cxf readiness. By mLd-Deceaiber Moscow had airlifted about two 
battalions of troops with heavy weapons into Bagram Air Base. 
whose management had already fallen into the Russian hands, 
V/hlle making strategic and military preparations to Invade 
Afghanistan, Ibscow also continued efforts to make Amln agree to 
invite Soviet troops into Afghanistan, On 28 November 1979, a 
Soviet deputy minister of internal affairs, Lt# General 
7.S, Paputln arrived in Kabul to discuss "mutual cooperation and 
61 
other issues'* with the Government of Afghanistan, According to 
Thomas T, Hasijiiond, Paputln* s real mission was to help prepare 
Kabul for the invasion by getting control of the Afghan police, 
to pressuria© Amln to step aside In favour of Karmal, persuading 
Amln to invite the Soviet Union to send large numbers of Soviet 
62 
troops into Afghanistan, if all those failed, assassinating Amln, 
On 17 December 1979 there occurred a shooting incident at 
the official residence of Amln in which his n^hew, Asadullah 
63 
Amln was injured and then flew to Moscow for treatment, 
Asadullah was the head of Afghan intelligence service and Amln»s 
59 Patrick J, Garrity, "The Soviet Military Stake in Afghanistan 
1956.1979", Journal of the Roval United Services Institute 
for Defence Studies (London^^ vol, 125, no, 3, September 
1980, pp, 35-36, 
60 ibid, 
81 SatBl Tte9S> 1 December 1979, 
62 Bammond, n, 5, p , 98* 
63 Detailed account appeared in New York Times^ 2 January 1980, 
lf« 
top security aid© was thus removed. The airlifting of Soviet 
troops to Kabul had started by 23 December 1979 and by 27 December 
1979, their strength was sizeable enough to take control of 
Afghanistan, Thus by the evening of 27 December 1979, the 
Soviet forces had launched the invasion and asserted its control 
over Kabul and other strategic places in Afghanistan A late 
evening broadcast, on 27 December 1979 by Babrak Karmal as 
reported by Soviet news agency 2a§A» ^^.Id. t 
• •, who vipto the present have been subjected to 
intolerable violence and torture by the bloody 
apparatus of HafiziiLlah Amin and his minions, 
these agents of An»rican imperialism,,. The day 
of freedom and rebirth ,,, has arrived ••• The 
central Committee of the united Peoples Democratic 
garty and the revolutionary council party of the emocratic Republic of Afghanistan proclaim true 
peoples power,,, we have once again raised the 
banner of national Jiha^ ,,, a just war of the 
Afghan people for true democratic justice, for 
respect for the holy islamic religion ,,, for 
implementation of the alms of the glorious April 
revolution. 64 
In another broadcast on 27 December 1979 the Kabul Radio announced 
the request of Afghan Government for Soviet armed assistances 
Because of the continuation and expansion of 
aggression, intervention and provocation by the 
foreign enemies of Afghanistan, and for the purpose 
of defending the gains of s^i^ revolution, terri-
torial integration, national independence and 
preservation of peace and security, and on the 
basis of the treaty of friendship, good neighbour-
liness and Reoperation dated 5 December 1978, the 
Democratic f«|>ublio of Afghanistan earnestly demands 
that the tJStR i'^ ender urgently the political moral and 
economic assistance including militaiy aid to Afghanis. 
tan. The Government of the USSR has accepted the 
proposal of Afghan side, S5 
^ ZaiiEt 27 December 197f , in FBIS/Sg. 28 December 1979, pp.Dl-2, 
65 Kabul Radio, 27 December 1979 in S S I S ^ , 28 December 1979, 
P. 62, 
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Thl8 statesient was the Justification for Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan Implying that Afghanistan requested Moscow to send 
their armed forces and the latter compiled accordingly. Th« 
above sequence of events reveals that the Soviet Union occupied 
Afghanistan with the help of Its armed forces and Installed 
Babrak Karmal as a puppet In Kabul whose strings were In the 
hands of Kremlin. A statement published In Pravdf| on 31 December 
1979 stated that the Soviet Union had decided to grant 
Afghanistan*8I 
Insistent request ... (for) Immediate aid and 
ipport In the struggle against external 
tgression ••• and to send to Afghanistan a 
supp
aggr
limited Soviet military contingent that will 
be used exclusively for assistance In 
preventing the armed Interference from the 
outside. The Soviet contingent will be 
completely pulled out of Afghanistan when 
the reason that necessitated such an action 
exists no longer. 66 
By 1 January 1980f flfly thousand Soviet troops were In Afghanistan 
and more were on the way. Thus by January end 1980, the number of 
Soviet armed forces In Afghanistan was estimated between 80,000 to 
67 
100,000. 
The emergence of Karmal regime backed by Soviet troops 
pushed Afghanistan into Soviet orbit and its nonallgned status 
wal completely undermined. Bngineering of the April 1978 COUP 
and signing of the Afghan Soviet friendship treaty in December 
1978 were steps towards the final takeover of Afghanistan by 
Moscow in December 1979. 
66 Pravda,. 31 December 1979, FBIS/SU. 31 December 1979, pp. D7-10. 
67 Jaadr Phiiiip*, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan**, 
Baekgrauy^de^ (Washington, D.C. i Heritage Foundation, 
1980), p. 3; 
JC^C 
International R«^ 8T>Qn8e 
It Is one of Newton's laws that every action evokes 
reaction. Similar anology is applicable in international 
relations. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistaii took the world 
by surprise and it severely condemned and criticized. The 
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council have passed 
resolutions condemning the "aggression" in Afghanistan and called 
for the withdrawal of "all foreign troops from Afghanistan", 
Besides, the European Bconomlc Community (EEC), Organisation 
of Islamic Countries, Seventh and Eighth Nonaligned summits, 
and other countries have severely criticized the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan while calling for the unconditional 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, However the 
United States has played a leading role in this regard by not 
only condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but has taken 
certain st^s since 1980 to help resolve the tangle. The 
succeeding pages present an Indepth analysis of the inter-
national response evoked by Soviet Union by Invading 
Afghanistan, 
(A) Th9 ^ g flflfPgBf 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not only alarming 
but challenging as well for the United States, The US 
President Jimmy Carter, was surprise! and his reaction was 
severe and spontaneous. He said that "we are the other Super 
Power on earth and it became my responsibility ,,, to take 
action that would prevent the Soviets from (accomplishing) 
68 
this invasion with Inpunlty," A day after the Soviet invasion, 
m .iTf&l^^nUtA, PQgm?nU (Washington, D,C,), no, 16, 
14 January 1980, p, 41, 
1 ^ 
President Carter informed the leaders of France, United Kingdom 
(UK), west Germany, Italy and Pakistan about what had happened 
in Afghanistan and all leaders agreed that "the Soviet action is 
69 
a grave threat to peace". Sensing the magnitude of Soviet threat, 
President Carter^ during the first week of January 1980, said that 
the Soviet act in Afghanistan posed a grave threat to peace because 
of the threat of further Soviet expansion in to neighboiiring 
countries in South West Asia and also because such an aggressive 
military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout the 
70 
world. While refuting Soviet claim that they had not invaded 
Afghanistan but were "invited" President Carter saidi "«,.The 
Soviet claims, falsely that they were invited in to Afghanistan 
71 
to help protect that country from son© unnanrod outside threat.** 
President Carter did not confine US concern over developments in 
Afghanistan to making public pronouncements but also took up the 
issue with Soviet leaders. On 2B December 1979, President Carter 
in a message sent to Soviet leader Brezhnev called for the with-
drawal of Soviet troops and warned that if Afghanistan action was 
not corrected it **could have very serious consequences to United 
72 
States - Soviet relations". Finding that Brezhnev had not ^ iven 
a satisfactory answer, President Carter said on 31 December 1979 t 
69 Ibid,, no, 15, 31 December 1979, p. 2, Also see 
New York Times. 29 December 1979. 
70 Presidential Documents^ no, 16, 14 January 1980, p. 25. 
71 Ib id . 
72 New York Times. 30 December 1979, 
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He (Brezhntr) elaiatd that he had been inyit^ d^ 
hy the Afghan government to come In and pi'oterct 
Afghanistan from sone outside third-nation thl^t. 
This was obviously false because the person that 
he claimed Invited hlro In, President Araln, W s 
murdered or assassinated after the Soviets,pulled 
their coup. He also claimed that they would remove 
their forcts from itfghanlstan as soon as the 
situation Should be stabilized and the outsld* 
threat to Afghanistan was eliminated. So that 
was the tone of his message to me, which as I 
Say, was completely Inadequate and completely 
misleading, 73 
The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan also proved Instrumental In 
changing US perceptions about Moscow, As President Carter said 
that "the Soviets have seriously misjudged our own nation's 
strength and resolve and our unity and determination and the 
74 
condemnation that has accrued to them by the "world community** ,,, 
They underestimated the courage and the tenacity of feeedom in 
that country (Afghanistan), and they did not anticipate the 
75 
world's quick and forceful response to their aggression,** 
The US reaction to these developments irked Moscow and the 
Soviet media especially |>yavdft accused the United States of 
*»anti-Soviet hysteria reminiscent of the lamentable cold war 
76 
times**. To this, President Carter addedt *'We do not want 
to return to the cold war, we do not want to have a confrontation 
with the Soviet Union,,. The Soviets have tried to mislead the 
77 
world, they have failed,** However the Soviet media continued 
its criticism of Washington while concealing the real facts. 
73 Ibid,, 1 January 1980, 
74 Presidential Documents, no, 16, 28 January 1980, p. 111. 
75 Ibid,, no. 16, 25 February 1980, pp. 386-87. 
76 E£S24a> 8 January 1980, in FBIS/8U^ 10 January 1980, 
pp, A7-8. 
77 RrflSldgiattftl POCUaentg) no, 16, 3 March 1980, p, 387, 
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The above analysis reveals that th« Carter Administration's 
reaction to the Soviet Invasion was very sharp though belated. But 
now the question arises whether United States had prior information 
of what was goii^ to happen in Afghanistan and if so why it failed 
to preempt the Soviet move. An answer to this question lies in the 
analysis of US policy prior to the invasion. As we have seen in 
the preceding pages, the US had reacted mildly to the advent of 
communist COUP In April 1978 and uAtil the assassination of 
Ambassador Dubs, the United States' flow of economic assistance 
to Kabul continued and it was drastically curtailed only after 
February 1979» 
Between April 1978 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December end 1979, the US policy towards Afghanistan under Carter 
administration was mainly determined by Cyrus Vance, Secretary of 
State, Zbignlew Brzsenzlnski, the National Security Adviser and 
other top officials of the State Department, particularly, 
78 
Christopher and Marshall Shulman, besides Carter himself. The 
main difference of opinion towards Soviet Union existed bet%reen 
Vance and Brzenzinski, Cyrus Vance and his chief Soviet expert 
Marshall. Shulman were in favour of soft-pedalling towards Soviet 
Union to preserve the spirit of dete^l^ while Brzenzinski who also 
favoured detente was, however, less optimistic of any outcome. 
Vance was perhaps convinced that the US should continue appeasing 
Moscow to get agreements like Strategic Arms lilmttatlon Treaty II 
(SALT II) approved by it. Thus he said in April 1978t **The 
Soviets may find it difficult to understand some of the things 
78 Hammond, n, 5, p. 105* 
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we do. They do not like many of the things we stand for. The 
future is going to depend a lot on whether or not we can begin 
to Hiake progress on areas of central Importance. At the heart 
of this lies BALU^ If we can eventually reach a SALT agreement, 
which I believe we can, this will begin to change the whole 
79 
character of the relationship, put it on the right track again,** 
Vance was honest enough to admit that he and Brzenzlnskl had 
conflicting attitudes toward the USSRi "We have differences of 
view from time to time... A different perspective with respect 
to the Soviet Union Is the biggest set of differences, I believe 
It Is essential we try to find common ground (with the Soviets),,, 
we should not be fearful of everything they do and automatically 
80 
accept the thesis of the worst case motivations,•• 
On the other hand, Brzenzlnskl was of the opinion that the 
relationship between Washington and Moscow was Inherently 
competitive and even conclusion of any number of agreements 
including the SALT would not be able to alter Soviet determination 
to undermine the United States and make Itself the dominant power 
81 
on the globe. In his opinion Moscow did not want true "peaceful 
coexistence** with the West and could not be trusted. He also 
regarded Vance and Shulman as "accoraodationlsts" who were willing 
to go much too far in accommodating American policies to please 
82 
Moscow, in the vain hope that this would buy peace. 
79 jijift /K*" •«—J*v QA Ax^iX 1978, p, 20. 
80 Ibid., p, 21, 
81 Quoted in Hairmond, n, 5, p , 107. 
82 Ibid, 
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This difference In opinions among the advisers of Garter 
administration toward Soviet Union also determined their policy 
perspectives on Afghanistan after the Communist co^ i;^  of April 
1978. D«splte the increasing Soviet mllltaiy activities during 
1979, there were no public statements by ttm US State Department 
either to forewarn the US administration or to the world about 
lnq?endlng Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, It was not until 
21 December 1979, that the US State Department finally revealed 
that the Soviets liad assembled more than 30,000 soldiers on the 
Afghan border and had flown three battalions of troops to an air 
83 
base near Kabul, Though one State Department official told 
the New York Times that the "Soviet preparation on the Afghan 
84 
border show all the marks of a major military intervention** 
but Cyrus Vance, on being asked whether Soviets were going to 
invade Afghanistan, replied, "That would be on3^ speculation on 
85 
my part**. 
Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the House Sub-commtttee on Europe 
and the Middle East, in a l e t t e r to Marshal Shulman, on 18 March 
1980 asked that when the US Government knew in October 1979 about 
a high-level Soviet military v i s i t to Afghanistan, "then why does our 
government wait unt i l December (1979) to make any off icial presenta-
86 
tlon or protest to the Soviet government"? Shulman replied that 
83 New York Times. 22 December 1979. 
84 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
86 US Congress, House of Representatives, Sub-Committee on 
Surope and the Middle Bast, 96th Congress, East^ »West 
(Washington, D.c,, Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 115. 
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th* actual Scjvlet movement of troops and equipment towards 
Afghanistan was observed only In late November 1979 "prompting 
us to make December approaches to the Soviets,,, W© acted as 
87 
promptly and as forcefully as the evidence warranted", 
A detailed analysis of the divergent views among the 
policy makers of the Carter Administration towards Afghanistan 
prior to Soviet invasion, Is beyond the scope of present study. 
It suffices to say that the lack of decisive action by the 
Carter administration "may Imve been due In part to the 
tradition of US government, whether Democratic or Republican, 
88 
of looking upon Afghanistan as an insignificant country". 
By January 1980, the Carter administration had realized that 
the Soviet invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan posed 
a challenge to US strategic interests in the Gulf region and South 
West Asia and a direct threat to its security. As President 
Garter said on 14 January 1980J 
Our own nation's security was directly threatened. 
There is no doubt that the Soviets move into 
Afghanistan if done without adverse consequences, 
would have resulted in the temptation to move 
again until th^ reached warm water port or until 
they acquired control oggr a major portion of the 
world's oil supplies,,,**^ The Soviet Tinion has 
altered the strategic situation in that part of the 
world in a vary omnious fashion,-Q., It places the 
Soviets within aircraft striking range of the vital 
oil resources of the Persian OulXi It threatens a 
strategically located co\mtry Pakistan^ (and) It 
foses the prospect of increased Soviet pressure on ran and on other nations of the Middle Bast, 91 
87 I b i d , , p , 118. 
88 Hammond, n, 5, p , 11S« 
89 Prt?li<39nUal PQ<?^aQBt«, no. 16, 14 January 1980, p , 4 1 . 
90 I b i d . , no, 16, 28 January 1980, p . 165. 
91 I b i d , , p . 3B6. 
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Again on 23 January, President Carter In State of the Union 
address to the Congress, which was labelled as "Carter Doctrine", 
saldt "Let our position be absolutely clean An attempt by any 
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will 
be regarded as an assault on the v^ ital Interests of the United 
States, and such an assault will be repelled by any means 
92 
necessaiyj Including military force," 
The post-Dubs assassination and pre-invasion period had 
witnessed the mounting Soviet influence in Afghanistan which 
gradually led to the decline in Afghan-US relations. Jack C, 
Nikolas, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs, in a statement before the Sub-Committee on Asian 
and Pacific Affairs of the House of Representatives, said on 
15 May 1979 that US relations with Afghanistan had regrettably 
93 
deteriorated significantly. He further added that as the 
Soviet Union had become more directly involved in Afghanistan, 
"we have detected a corresponding decline in Interest in US 
programmes and in sensitively to our concerns,,,** Washington 
had made efforts to make clear to the Communist regime in Kabul 
that good relations were a two-way street which required concrete 
steps from both sides to demonstrate their interest in cooperatloni 
"Thii distresses us that this is not the case in US-Afghan 
relations, particularly, because we know that there is still a 
great reservoir of good will among the Afghan people for the US 
92 Ib id . , p . 197, 
93 Department of Stata Bullat i^^ ^ (WaShington,D,C,), October 1979. 
94 VoUt 
S@6 
and the Ansrleans, as there Is for Afghanistan In our country,,,** 
Hlklos further opined that the existing state of affairs was not 
th© US creationi 
lt% is the^nes^a^^Le result when one par4gr to a 
relationship shows no interest in giving life and 
substance to these ties,,. Because of the lack of 
interest we have reduced our economic assistance 
prograifflne, terminated our military tralnix^ 
programme and for the time being withdrawn our 
Pe^CQ Corps volunteers and staff, 96 
The increasing Soviet influence after the April 1978 coup in 
Kabul was detrimental to the United States' strategic interests 
in the region. Such an Indication was given by Harold H, Saunders, 
Assistant Secretary for Hear Eastern and South Asian Affairs in a 
statement before the Sub-Committee on /IsIan and Pacific Affairs 
of the House of Representatives on 26 September 1979 when he 
said, "Our effort to encourage peace and stability in that 
troubled region is clearly made more difficult-by Afghanistan's 
97 
Internal unrest and the exodus of refugees from Afghanistan,.,** 
The United Statss regretted the "reorientation in Afghan foreign 
98 
policy ••• away from its traditional genuine non-alignment,,, 
Washington also realized that direct interference in Afghanistan 
by any country including the Soviet Union, would threaten the 
integrity of that country as well as the peace in the region and 
99 
it wai a "matter of concern to the United States,,.** Saunders 
95 Ib id . 
96 I b i d . 
97 I b i d , , December 1979, 
98 I b i d . 
99 I b i d . 
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told tht Sub-Coimttte© that the tJS had no special interest In 
Afghanistan and at the same time "we have repeatedly inpressed 
on the Soviet Government the dangers of more direct involvement 
100 
In the fighting in Afghanistan,,•** 
As has been described in the preceding pages, when Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan, the United States not only condemned 
the Soviet aggression but also took some measures to persuade 
!foscow to vacate the aggression in Afghanistan, 
The specific US measures against the Soviet action in 
Afghanistan were envisaged in the announcement made by President 
Carter in his message to the nation on 4 January 1980 suggesting 
US measures in this regard* 
(i) Blocking grain sales to the Soviet Union beyond 
the 8 million metric tons already contracted. 
This means withholding an additional 17 million 
metric tons which the Soviets have already orderodf 
(ii) Stopping the sale of high technology and strategic 
items to the Soviet Union, including conputers and 
oil drilling equipment! 
(ill) Curbing Soviet fishing privileges in US waters,, 
The catch allowed to Soviet fishing fleets in 
1980 would be reduced from 350,000 tons to 
75,000 tons, resulting in an estimated Soviet 
economic loss of 0 55 million to ^  60 millloni 
(iv) Delaying the opening of a new Soviet consulate 
in New York and an American consulate in Kiev; 
(v) Postponing new cultural and economic exchanges 
between the two countries, now under consideratlonj 
(vl) Boycotting the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow,,, 101 
The United States imposed these sanctions while Its allies and 
other friendly countries did not follow the suit. A study 
100 Ibid, 
101 Ibid,, January 1980. 
2oe 
undertaken l^ the Congress Research Service (CRS) to assess the 
Impact of sanctions imposed by the Carter administration against 
Soviet Union, concluded that Carter's sanctions might have had 
political benefits buts 
the economic punishment to the USSR was quite 
limited ,., whUe navy nations suoported the 
Olympic boycott, no other nations followed 
fully the US embargo and restrictive actions. 
This illustrates the difference between the 
United States and the other western allies, 
which generally supported the political aspects 
of the sanctions while not supporting the 
principle of economic punishment adopted by 
the Carter administration ••• 102 
The United States did boycott the Moscow Olympic games and it 
claimed to have "helped to persuade 59 other countries to take 
103 -
similar action »,,•• However, despite the US boycott, about 
50 countries participated in the Moscow Olyrpic games and the 
Carter administration "could only be dissatisfied at the level 
of support for the boycott on the part of its traditional allies 
104 
in Western Europe,,»*» 
In the wake of sanctions declared by the Carter administra-
tion, the Soviet media launched a virulent propaganda against the 
United States. A statement issued on 6 January 1980 by Soviet 
ne%fs agency lifia declared that, *»If the White House decided to 
influence in some way the Soviet Union and its foreign policy, 
this is a hopeless undertaking. Such atteD:q;)ts flopped in the 
102 US, House SuboCommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 
An ASS^ fismant of the .^ fghAnlstan Sanctionst Imi?|ie^tlnn3 
for Tradft „ana PtoXoaagY in th? if?80? (Washington, igei), p.8. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid, 
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past and they will flop now,,,** The Soviet leader, Brezhnev 
in a statement published in Pravda dated 13 January 1980 said 
that Carter's steps "show that Washington again, like decades 
106 
ago, is trying to Speak to us in the language of the cold war**. 
The statement further contended thati 
the arrogation by Washington as some sort of 
a "right to reward** or **punish** independent 
Sovereign states raised a question of a 
principled character. In effect, by such 
actiond the US government deals a blow at the 
orderly international law system of relations 
among states ,,,the world is increasingly 
forming the impression of the United States 
as an absolutely unreliable partner in 
interstate ties ,,, These actions of th« US 
administration will not inflict on us the 
damage obviously hoped for by their 
initiators ,., they will hit back at their 
initiators if not today then tomorrow. 107 
It had become evident that Moscow did not care for the United 
States* move of imposing sanctions against ir or the criticism 
of the Soviet action in Afghanistan, 
On 28 December 1980, marking tlffl occasion of the first 
anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President 
Carter in a statement observed that the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and attempted forceful occupation *'of that fiercely 
independent non-aligned Moslem nation has had propoundly 
108 
negative impact on the international community**. President 
105 TasSf 6 January 1980, in FBIS/SU^ 2 January 1980, 
pp, Al»4. 
106 Pravda. 13 January 1980, in fBIS/SU^ 14 January 1980, 
pp. Al»8« 
107 Ib id . 
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Carter further ui'ged Iloscow to respond to those countries which 
were urging withdrawal of Soviet military forces and inviting 
Soviet cooperation in the search of a political solution to the 
Afghanistan crisisj "For our part, we have offered to join in the 
effort to find a political solution involving a Soviet withdrawal, 
109 
and we repeat that offer to-day.,.** 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had accelerated the 
process of reinforcements of some form of qualified globallsm 
for the US policy, '*The invasion appeared to challenge the 
United States to create a policy based on a new national consensus, 
one that required the necessary military power to support whatever 
110 
role it ^ eternlned to play". 
in \.981» when Ronald Reagan assumed the Presidency of the 
United States, the US policy toward Soviet Union on the issue of 
Afghanistan became more clear and practical. The main elements 
of President Reagan's policy towards Afghan crisis Included 
humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees seeking shelter 
in Pakistan, diplomatic support for a political settlement along 
the lines of the United Nations Resolution the resolutions passed 
by the Islamic Conference and Non-Aligned Summit Conference, 
The US Secretary of State, Alexander Halg said on 22 May 
3J981 that the United States was in favour of convening an 
international conference to focus the world attentioft on Afghan 
111 
crisis and take measures to defuse it. While cautioning 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 USICA, Press Releaie (New Delhi), 23 May 1981. 
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Moscow that It could not dominate the world by invading Afghanistan, 
Haig further added! "The people of Afghanistan overwhelmingly 
oppose the Soviet occupation and the Babrak Kannal regime. The 
vast majority of the world's nations are challenging the Soviets 
to come to the negotiating table, to agree to a political 
solution, to withdraw their forces and to restore Afghanistan a 
1X2 
non-aligned status,,,»» While urging the Soviet Union not to 
underestimate t\m potential Afghanistan resistance and inter-
national pressure he saidi **By supporting initiative such as 
that of the European community we offer the Soviet Union the 
113 
alt^'native of an honourable solution,,.•» 
The US Ambassador to the United Nations, J, Kirckpatrick, 
while addressing the UN General AgSembly on 16 November 1981 on 
resolution on Afghanistan, called fori 
(i) Immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces| 
<ii) Restoration of the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and nonalignment of Afghanistan! 
(Hi) Restoration of the right of the Afghan people 
to clwose their o%m form of government and 
economic and social system, free from outside 
intervention, coercion or restrained! and 
(tv) Return of the refugees to their homeland,,• 114 
She further added that Washington was firmly committed to the 
above mentioned terrast "The struggle of the Afghan nation for 
survival was consistent with the basic and most cherished purposes 
115 
of the UN,,,* 
112 USICA, Backgrounder (New Delhi), 12 August 1981, 
113 Ibid, 
114 Denartment of State Bullatin. January 1982, 
115 Ib id . 
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President Reagan also showed his grave concern over the 
developments In Afghanistan and the continued presence of Soviet 
troops on Afghan soil. While lauding the courage of Afghan people, 
President Reagan said that despite the presence of over 90,000 
Soviet combat troops, "the courageous people of Afghanistan 
116 
effectively deny Soviet forces control of most of Afghanistan,.•* 
He further urged Moscow sincerely implement tl^ proposals set 
forth by the UK General Assembly for the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan "so that an independent and non-aligned 
117 
nation can be re-established**. 
President Reagan issued a proclamation on 10 March 1982 
designating 21 March as "Afghan Day" in the United States, to 
commemorate the valoxir of the Afghan people and to condemn the 
continuing Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The proclamation 
said I "The international community, with the United States 
joining governments around the world, has condemned the invasion 
of Afghanistan as a violation of every standard of decency and 
international law and has called for a withdrawal of the Soviet 
118 
troops from Afghanis tan.,,** The message further added that 
*• Afghanis tan Day" would serve to recall not only these avents, 
but also the principles involved "when a people struggles for 
freedom to determine its own future, the right to be free from 
116 USICA, "President Reagan calls for Soviet Withdrawal 
ft;offl Afghanistan", Qfft?lal Tffit (New Delhi), 
29 December 1981. 
117 Ibid . 
laS USICA, "President Reagan's Afghanistan Day Proclamation", 
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foreign Interference and the right to practice religion 
119 
according to the dictates of conscience,,•" 
Keeping In view the continued Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, the question has been raised as to what can the 
United States do to prevent more such Cominunlst takeovers In the 
Third World countries. In this regard Thomas T, Hammond has 
suggested that *the US must be prepared to Intervene dlplomatl-
120 
cally, economically and, If necessary, militarily,,," 
The public opinion In the United States has strongly 
favoured the full US support to the Afghan freedom fighters. 
The National Association of pro-American, In Its resolution on 
"support for Afghan Freedom Fighters", passed on 21 April 1983, 
resolved that "President Reagan and the Congress should authorise 
support necessary to restore Afghanistan's Independence and 
121 
freedom,,." It also called for diplomatic and economic 
pressure to be brought against the Soviet Union to "Immediately 
122 
withdraw their forces from Afghanistan,,," Both the Houses 
of the US Congress . Senate and the House of Representatives, 
have also expressed their solidarity and support for the Afghan 
Mujahldeen, On 6 October 1983, the House of Representatives In 
a resolution passed unanimously observed that the Soviet Invasion 
of Afghanistan was the first Soviet seizure of an Independent 
119 Ibid. 
120 Thomas T, Hammond, "Afghanistan! The Road to the West", 
Xh^ Ha??ain«t9i;i ?<?-'»t> 20 January 1983, 
121 Confgresslonal Record (Washington), v o l , 129, no, 52, 
21 AprU 1983, p , 1757, 
122 I ^ i d . 
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territory since the 1^40's and represented "a dangerous development 
123 
in Soviet foreign policy,,," It further noted that the struggle 
for llheratton In Afghanistan could succeed "if those of us believed 
in freedom could render support ,,,*• The resolution envisaged 
that the policy of the US should be % 
(i) To encourage and support the people of 
Afghanistan in their struggle to be free 
from foreign dominationj 
(ii) To provide the people of Afghanistan if 
they so request with material assistance as 
the US considers appropriate to help them 
fight effectively for their freedomi 
(ill) To pursue a negotiated settlement of the war 
in Afghanistan based on the total withdrawal 
of Soviet troops and the recognition of the 
inalienable right df the Afghan people to 
choose thelx own destiny free from outside 
interference or coercion so that the four 
millions of Afghan refugees return to their 
country In safety and tn honour,,, 125 
The US U^dor Secretary of State, Lawrence Sagleburger, while 
addressing a forum on Afghanistan, sponsored by the US State 
Department and the Centre for Afghanistan Studies of the 
University of Nebraska, said that the Reagan Administration 
recognized that the invasion of and continued occupation of 
Afghanistan by Moscow was destroying the infrastructure of this 
poor country? "It has taken the lives of thousands of civilians 
while creating the world's largest refugee community - nearly 
126 
three million Afghans now living in exile,,," While summing up 
123 Ibid., vol, 125, no, 133, 6 October 1983, p, S.13791, 
124 Ibid, 
125 Ibid, 
12« USIGA, "US Unalterably Opposes Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan", Official Tert> 15 December 1983. 
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the tJS policy, Bagleburger saidt 
Om strategic Interests as veil as our humanitarian 
Inftlncts make It absolutely essential that the Soviet 
aggression he checked. We continue to look for slgntt 
that the Soviet Union Is willing to work seriously for 
a negotiated settlement that would return Afghanistan 
to its peopll. Until thsn, w© will c<Hitlnue t© support 
and he Inspired by the spirit of the Afghan Mujahldeen 
In their flghjb for freedoii»». 127 
The US support for Afghanistan, In the wake of Soviet occupation 
has been vigorous, constant and encouraging. It has increased 
with passage of time. While addressing the UN General Apsembly 
on 15 November 1984, the US Amibassador to the UN, J, Kir^patrlck, 
envisaged the American viewpolnti 
The elements comprising the honourable solution 
of Afghanistan ... immediate withdrawal of foreign 
troops, the preservation of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, political independence, 
non-aligned character of Afghanistan, the right 
of the Afghan people to determine their own form 
of government and to choose their economic. 
political and social system free from outside 
Intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint, 
and the creation of the necessary conditions which 
would enable tlie Afghan refugees to return voluntary 
to their homes.,• 128 
Even President Reagan on 27 December 1984, In a message marking 
the fifth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, said 
that the United States had told the Soviet leaders "that their 
occupying forces in Afghanistan constitutes a serious iirpending 
129 
to improving US.Sovlet relations,,,•• Recalling the five years 
of Soviet armed occupation of Afghanistan, the US President said 
127 Ibid. 
128 BQPartFiaBt Vg ?tatg Buli^^tn, December 1984. Also see 
ysicA, ?s A a t a s M Q f cxts^^ .^Qsg^ut^lgn pp, A|'Rtoi;^ g^t^ aB (N«w Delhi, 1984), p . 10. 
129 USXCA, **Reagan Calls Afghan Crisis as Impediment to 
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that the Soviet ATny had wag«d war In the proud and deeply religious 
people of Afghanistan and there was no end In sight as yet . **Thls 
fifth anniversary of Afghan defiance stands in stark contrast.,, 
yet there is a message of inspiration In the cauvel taXQ being 
330 
written,,,* While referring to the repeated condemnation of 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan by the United Nations, 
President Reagan saldi "For our part, the US has made clear ,., 
(that) we cannot and vill not remain silent on Afghanistan, We 
join our voice with other members of the world community in 
131 
calling for a prompt, negotiated end to this brutal conflict,. ,** 
He recalled that the history of Independent Afghanistan went 
back more than 2000 years and was far more being finishedi "My 
deepest hope is to speak of freedom restored to Afghanistan by 
132 
December 1985,•• While expressing the hope that the valiant 
struggle being waged by the people of Afghanistan would bear 
the fruits of success, the US President said: "we will not 
forget the people of Afghanistan who are struggling to live 
once again among the free nations of the world. These brave 
people will continue to have the support of all Americans In 
133 
their noble struggle," 
The present day Afghanistan is reeling under terror. The 
US Congressmen and media have denounced the blatant violation of 
130 Ibid, 
131 Ibid, 
132 Ibid, 
133 Ibid. 
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human rights by the Russians in Afghanistan, Mark D. Siljander, 
member of the House of Representatives, said on is September 1985 
that the "creeping cowardice syndrome" being played by the 
Russians in Afghanistan has gripped the 0S foreign policy since 
134 
Vietnam* 
The Congressman Jim Courter has strongly pleaded for 
supply of US arms and ammunition for the Afghan Mujahideen, He 
acknowledged the courage of Afglian freedom fighters when he 
said on 26 September 1985t "The Afghans have never before felt 
the crush of Red Army occupation. For 6 years now, they have 
resisted fiercely. Their pride and their religion are two firm 
135 
guarantees that they wish to continue to do so," On 8 October 
Gordon 
1985, Senatoi/Humphrey, moved a resolution (S, Res, 237) in the 
US Senate which while condemning the Russian violation of human 
rights in Afghanistan, jnt^r alia envisagedi 
(1) Strongly supports President Reagan's intent 
to discuss directly with the Soviet leaders 
American concerns with the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan! and 
(2) Calls upon the President to reiterate the 
desire of the United States to achieve a 
negotiated political settlement agreeable 
to all interested parties in Afghanistan, 
which settlement should include -
(A) the complete withdrawal of all foreign 
troops5 
(B) the restoration of the independent and 
nonallgned status of Afghanistanj 
134 Gftpgrassional Racord. 99th Congress, First Session, 
vol, 131, no. 117, p. S 4089. 
135 Ibid,, vol. 131, no, 131, 26 September 1985, 
p, S 4209. 
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(C) self-dtteratiaattoia for the Afghan people} 
(D) the return of Afglian refugees with safetiy 
and l»3nour, 136 
This resolution was passed by the US Senate unanimously on 
26 October 1985. 
While drawing the attention of the fellow Congressmen 
to the forthcoming Reagan-Gorbachov Summit meeting held In 
November 1985, Congressman, Norman D. Shunway told the House 
on 23 October 19851 "#.. As we look forward the November summit 
meeting between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary 
Gorbachev, I believe that the plight of Afghanistan should not 
137 
be pushed to the back of our minds,,,** 
On 31 October 1985, Congressman, Kenp, while introducing 
an identical resolution, as introduced earlier in the Senate 
(S, Res, 237) in the Eouse of the Representatives, urged the 
fellow Congressmen! 
,,, Join us in this resolution to honour the 
great struggle of the Afghan people and proclaim 
their right to democracy and self-determination. 
And let us pray that someday the forces of tyram^ 
will finally be lifted from the earth and all 
nations under God will respect the sacred and 
inalienable rights of mankind, 138 
On 12 November 1985, the US representative to the UN, 
while addressing the General Assembly expressed regret over 
the relentless war waged by **Soviet troops for almost six years 
134 Songrtgfftonal. PgQOrd - Sfflattt 99th congress. 
F i r s t Session, v o l , 131, no, 133, 8 October 1985, 
p . S,12925, 
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now, against everything in Afghanistan". He further added that 
using a combination of military terror on the one hand and 
psychological manipulation in the form of re-education and 
Indoctrination efforts on the other, "the Soviet forces have 
tried for six years - longer than the duration of the Second 
140 
World War - to break the Afghan spirit**. While expressing 
US support for the efforts of the W Secretary General and 
latter*s personal representative to find a just and viable 
settlement of Afghan crisis, the ns representative saldi *'The 
United States is prepared to guarantee a comprehensive and 
balanced settlement in A-f'ghanlstan, consistent with the General 
Assembly's resolutions and preciicated on a comrolet^  withdrawal 
141 
of Soviet troops in a fixed and reasonable length of time," 
On 13 December 19S5, both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives Jointly passed a resolution, which inter ^ia» 
(1) Condemns the six years of aggression waged 
against the independent countiy and people of 
Afghanistan; 
(2) urges expeditious conclusion of a negotiated 
political settlement based on —. 
(A) the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops; 
(B) restoration of the independent and noraligned 
status of Afghanistan; 
(8) celf-Goterralnation for the Afghan people; and 
(D) the return of the Afghan refugees with safety 
and honour, 142 
139 UN Doc, A/40/PV,72, 12 November 1985, p. 2, 
140 Ibid,, pp. 3-5, 
141 ^  ibid. 
142 iftiaressj.QRal %gffrd - Sfflat9» ^ t h Congr«ss, F i r s t 
session, vol , 131, no. 173, 13 December 1985, p . S, 17658. 
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It Is evident that the US Gesgress was seriously seized of the 
problem of Afghanistan In the wake of Russian aggression on 
that country. On 14 Decenih«»r 1985, a republished article in 
the Washington Post quoted the Deputy Secretary of State, John 
Whitehead, as having said that the US was pr^ared to pXs^ a reXs 
in guaranteeing provisions of a ceasefire and Soviet withdrawal 
143 
in Afghanistan. In this context, Senator Byrd said on 
2S December 1985 that he hoped that the Soviet leadership would 
144 
take up the US offer and thus end the stalemate over Afghanistan, 
The US President, Ronald Reagan, in his massage on Afghan 
Day on 21 March 1986, while reiterating his country's support 
for the Afghan Mujahideen saldi *'For the heroic Afghan people. 
It marks the beginning of yet another year in their struggle for 
national liberation against the ruthless Soviet military force 
145 
that seeks to conquer them,** While paying his tributes to the 
Afghan freedom fighters, tl« US President further added that the 
146 
sacrifices made by them could never be forgotten. The US 
President also raised the ipsue during his sumirlt meeting with 
Soviet leader Gorbachev at RA^ cvyk and urged the Soviet Union 
147 
to resolve the Afghan crisis as soon as possible. 
143 Jim Anderson. •nJS Ready for Role in Afghanistan 
Peace**, WasfeiijgiQILXaSJi* 14 December 1985. 
144, <2,9ngrflg?l0Bali %QOra» fSth congress, First Session, 
vol, 131, no, 176, p, S,17840, 
145 gftpartemt of state ^mi^Uni May i986, 
146 Ibi< .^ 
147 New York Ti^es. 9 September 1966, 
s^x 
On 17 Stptember 1986, Heliiut Sonnenfeldt, a US 
representative to the Conference on US-Sovlet relations at 
Riga, Latvia, said that the United States had no special 
intereet in Afghanistan except to see It nonallgned and at peace 
148 
with itself and with its surrounding neighbours. On 8 October 
1986, the US Defence Secretary Weinberger in an interview on ABC 
Television in Beijing said that the Soviet offer of withdrawal of 
Some of its troops from Afghanistan was only "a deceptive ploy". 
He further added that the Soviets had sometime ago inserted more 
troops into Afghanistan so that they could withdraw those same 
troops and leave their net strength the same. 
The Soviet proposal of withdrawing some of its troops from 
Afghanistan was only a "gimmick" because no exact information was 
made available about the modus operandi^ The Western and other 
Journalists, who were invited to cover the Soviet withdrawal of 
six regiments from Afghanistan, were kept under tight security 
160 
and followed a closely monitored schedule. On 30 October 1986, 
the Director of the US Defence Intelligence Agency while addressing 
a press conference at the Pentagon said that the United States had 
clear and convincing evidence that Soviet claims of having witb-
151 
drawn six regiments were a "sham and deception". According to 
US Defence sources, the Soviet troops strength had only been 
148 USICA, ^ g?^nt Pn^lQPBfflts 4n AffStollstan <^ew Delhi, 
1986), p. 11. 
149 Ibid,, p, 12, 
150 Ibid,, p. 13, 
151 Ibid., p. 15. 
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reduced by 2,000 and not tht 8,000 as claimed by Moscow. 
On 31 October 1986, the US President, Reagan, while conanentlng 
on the Soviet troop withdrawal accused Moscow of bad faith In 
Its conduct In Afghanistan and added that "phony book-keeping 
163 
wotad not end the war". 
The US Ambassador to the United Nations, Herbert Okuin, 
in his address to the General Assembly on 6 November 1986 
regretted that despite the repeated calls given by the UN 
General Asserobly for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had not bothered to comply with 
154 
these resolutions. While denouncing the Soviet military 
adventures in Afghanistan, the US Ambassador said that the 
Afghan Mujahideen were giving stiff resistance to Soviet forces. 
He further addedt 
The Afghan people will never surrender. The 
magnitude of the Soviet threat - not only 
militarily, bnt for traditional Afghan religious 
and cultural values — has forged a unity of 
purpose among resistance fighters unparalleled in 
Afghanistan's history. Today, the resistance is 
cooperating more closely together than ever before 
joining forces, coordinating attacks, and sharing 
intelligence and battle techniques. 155 
He further said that if Moscow wanted to demonstrate its Interest 
in a political settlement In Afghanistan, what It needed was to 
only respond to «even Genex*al Assembly resolutions which called 
for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces. While 
reiterating the US support for the efforts made by the UN 
15S N^y York Times.. 31 October 1986. 
153 USICA, n. 148, p. 16. 
154 USICA, Backgrounder. 6 November 1986, p . 3 . 
1$5 Ib id . , p . 5. 
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Secretary General and his personal representative In conducting 
negotiations aimed at achieving a political settlement, the US 
itetbassador saldi "»,, the United States firmly supports this 
process. We have made known our willingness, to writing, to play 
an aoproprlate guarantor's role with respect to a comprehensive 
and balanced settlement that protects the legitimate security 
156 
interests of all concerned»*» 
The Hew York Times in an editorial has questioned the 
legitimacy of the Soviet backed communist regime in Kabul to 
157 
Speak for the whole of Afghanistan in the UN General Assecbly, 
The editorial further added that there was a powerful case in 
logic, justice and precedent for seating the Afghan resistance 
because it spoke for more people and controlled more Afghan 
territory than the Kabul regime. On 28 November 1986, Samuel 
Wise, the Deputy Head of the US delegation to the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCB) in Vienna said that 
the Soviet conduct in Afghanistan called into question its 
commitments to every one of the solemn pledges it made in 
158 
signing the Helsinki Final Act (1975). The US delegated called 
upon the Soviet Union to stop genocide in Afghanistan and pave way 
for the political settlement of Afghan problem. 
The US President Ronald Reagan in a statement on 
27 December 1986 marking the seventh anniversary of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, called upon the Soviet Union to accept 
156 I b i d , , p , 6, 
157 New York Tlipae^ ^ 19 November 1986, 
168 USICA, n , 348, p , 19. 
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tbe necessity for a political solution and self-determination 
159 
for the Afghan people. He further saldi "If the Soviets truly 
want peace, let them present at Geneva realistic tiinetable for 
160 
the wlthdjrawal of their troops from Afghanistan," While 
reiterating US support for a negotiated political solution 
to the Afghan tangle, the US President said that the United 
States »*will place no barriers In the Soviet* s way should they 
decide to negotiate seriot:^ ly an end to their occupation of 
161 
Afghanis tan** • 
Th^ ?ntt?a ^ aUQRS Q^spfflg^  
The issue of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been 
engaging the attention of the United Nations General Agsembly 
and Security Council since January 1980. 
In the early days of Januaiy 1980, a six-Power draft 
resolution was introduced in the Security Council, The draft 
resolution was mildly worded and it avoided "condemnation**. It 
merely "deplored the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan** 
which it described as inconsistent with the fundamental principles 
of the UN Charter and it called '*for the withdrawal of foreign 
163 
troops from iifghanistan**, Tbe Soviet Union was not referred 
159 USICA, Official Text (New Delhi), 30 December 1986, p. 1. 
160 Ib id . , p . 2. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Tbese co»intrles VQTQI Bangladesh, Jamaica, Nigeria, 
the Pbiitppines, Tunisia and Zambia, 
163 K»P» Saksena. **Afghanl8tan Conflict and the United 
Hattona**, ^n^maUgPUl Stufl|,f8, vo l . 19, no. 4, 
October-December 1980, p , 66S, 
sss 
to by nanft In tho entire text of the draft resolution. When the 
Six-Power draft resolution was put to vote it failed to secure 
adoption because of the negative vote cast by Soviet Union, The 
164 
voting pattern was 13 ijj favour and two against. Consequently 
another draft resolution sponsored by 24 countries was introduced 
in General Asssmbly on 10 January IPSO which was adopted by an 
overwhelming majority on 14 January 1980, The voting was 104 in 
165 
favour to IS asalnst with 18 abstentions* The resolution 
strongly deplored "recent armed intervention into Afghanistan 
as Inconsistent with a fundamental principle of the Charter" and 
called for an "immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to 
determine their form of government and choose their economic, 
political and social system free from outside Intervention, 
166 
subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever**. 
The resolution also called for providiiig aid to the Afghan 
refugees through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and also 
urged the Security Council to consider ways and means to assist 
in the implementation of the resolution. 
on 20 November 1P80, the General Assembly again passed 
164 Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
voted against it, 
165 Those who voted against werei Afghanistan. Angola, 
Bulgaria. Byelorussia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic 
Yemen, Ethiopia, GDR, Grenada, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, 
Mozambique, Poland, the Ukrainian sSR, Soviet Union and 
Vlei^am* 
166 General Assembly resolution BS.6/2, 14 January 1980. 
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167 
resolution against the Soviet lufasion of Afghanistaa, But 
th# second resolution was weak as coinpared to the first one. 
It used the phrase "grave concern" instead of "strongly deplores" 
withdrawal of foreign troops, on ii February 1981, the then 
Secretary General of the IM, Kurt Waldheim, appointed .Javier 
Pereis de Cuellar, who is the current UN Seer a tary •General, as 
his special representative to seek negotiations over political 
settlement of Afghan issue in the context of the previous 
resolution passed by the General Assembly. 
On 6 November 1981, the Secretary GenoraL submitted bis 
168 
report on Afghanistan situation which stated that the special 
representative of the Secretary General had thrica travelled to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan on 12-16 April icjsi and 4-9 August 1981 
to hold discussions with the senior officials of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, The report added that an understanding had been 
reached in August 1981 on the substantive issues to be negotiated 
169 
but on their format. The report finally concluded that the 
approach adopted could facilitate the search for a fair political 
solution which would ensure that no Afghan people would be able 
to deterntne their own destiny, free from foreign intervention 
170 
and interference. 
167 UN. Official. Records of the General Aisemblv (hereaf te r 
QAom T T h i r t y - f i f t h sesaion^ Resolution 35/37. 20 November 
1980, p , 17, 
168 UN Doc, V36/6&3, 6 November 1981, 
169 Ib id , 
170 I b i d , 
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On 18 November 1981, tht Gtneral Assembly adopted & 
resolution 36/34 on Afghanistan situation by a recorded vote 
171 
of 116 to 23 with 12 abstentions. The countries which voted 
against the resolution were mainly the Soviet Union, its allies 
and client states. The resolution called for the iannediate 
witl^rawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and reiterated 
that preservation of that country's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity was essential for a peaceful solution of Afghan 
172 
tangle. 
The General Assembly has been continuously seized of the 
problem of Afghanistan, On 2© November 1982, the General 
AGsetably again adopted a resolution on Afghanistan, which 
UiX^AlX^ saidt 
(i) Reiterates that the preservation of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
independence and non-aligned character of 
Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution 
of the problemi 
(ii) Reaffirms the right of Afghan people to determine 
their own form of government and to choose their 
economic, political and social system free from 
outside intervention, subversion, coercion or 
constraint of any kind whatsoeverj 
(ill) Calls for the Immediate withdrawal of foreign 
troops from Afghanistan,.•, 173 
Abdul R»h»an Pazhwak, a former Afghan diplomat and permanant 
Afghan representative to the United Nations, in an interview 
171 fiifii* Thirty.sixth session. Resolution 36/34, 
18 November 1^1, p. 18. 
172 Ibid. 
173 For fu l l text see, USICA, •nJN Resolution on Afghanistan", 
^Cf t<SU3, T n t i « December 1^2 . 
2§S 
with the Voice of Amofrlca (VOA), which was latw published In 
a Pushtu language paper, urged for awre amendaients in the UN 
resolution of 29 November 1?»82, Referring to "Immediate with-
drawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan*, as envisaged in the 
DN resolution, Pazhwak said that instead the resolution should 
have included, "iimnedlate, total and unconditional withdrawal of 
174 
foreign troops*. He made various suggestions tlie incorporation 
of which could help the speedy solution of the Afghan problem. 
He laid eraph-asis on the fact that any solution to Afghan problem 
175 
could be had only by Involving the Afghan Mujahideen, He 
ftirther einphasized that any solution of Afghan problem without 
the participation of Afghan Mujahideen would be unacceptable to 
the people of Afghanistan. 
The General Assembly in its resolution of 15 November 
1984, called for the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops 
from Afghanistan and reiterated that "the preservation of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political Independence and 
non-aligned character of Afghanistan was essential for a peaceful 
17<J 
solution*. It also reaffirmed the right of the Afghan people 
to deterBolne their own form of government and to choose their 
economic, political and social syston free from outside 
174 A.R. Paxhwak, "The Basic Way for the Political Solution 
of Afghan Problefli'«.Af^ )ym WU.Iabeed (Peshawari, 
December 1982. 
176 Ibid. 
t 
jeeibM^ ifl^, P# 1* 
176 For ext of thf ?»solution see, VSS Information Centre, 
Tlt,.W.„y^ flgiMtV^ 3Lft1iflr (New f>elhi), vol. 35, no. 4, 
4 Dee nj er WSM* p«
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177 
intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint. This-
resolution was adopted by a record vote of 119 in favour to 
20 against with 14 abstentions. The resolution also recognized 
the significance of th© initiatives of the Organization of 
Islamic Conference and the efforts of the movement of non* 
aligned countries for a political solution. It also called 
t:?)on all parties concerned to work for the creation of the 
necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to 
return voluntarily to their homes in safety with honour. It 
also renewed its appeal to all countries and national and 
international organi25ations to continue to extend humanitarian 
relief assistance to Afghan refugees in coordination with the 
178 
UK High Comraissioner for Refugees, 
The General Assembly again passed a resolution in 
November 1982 with 122 votes in favour and 19 against with 
179 
12 abstentions. The similar pattern was repeated in 
180 
November 1986. The following table reveals the voting 
pattern. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
179 The W Weekly Newsletter. 25 November 1986. 
ISO Ibid., 30 November 1986. 
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m General Agseablv Voting P^tterna 
Dates Votes 
for 
Votes 
against 
Abstentions 
January 1S80 
November 
November 
November 
November 
November 
Noveanber 
November 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Sources 
104 
111 
116 
114 
116 
119 
122 
122 
IS 
22 
23 
21 
20 
20 
19 
19 
W nwtniY ctffan4<?lfl 1P{^ 0-3.9R§. 
18 
12 
12 
13 
13 
14 
12 
14 
The above table reveals that when the issue of Soviet interven-
tion in Afghanistan came up before the General Assembly In 
January 1980 It was supported by 104 countries and the number 
increased with the passage of time reaching upto 122 in 
November 1986» The number of countries voting against the 
resolution fluctuated between 18 to 23 and the majority of 
these countries belong to Soviet bloc, 
Howe^rer the number of abstentions decreased gradually. 
I» January 1980, there were 1«? abstentions which declined to 
14 In 1986. This shows tliat majority of the world community 
is opposed to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 
231. 
(^ipeva Talks on Afghanistan 
The "Geneva talks" Is a part of the UN in i t i a t ive to 
solve the Afghan tangle. 
The Geneva talks to find a po l i t i ca l solution to the 
Afghan question started in June 1982 in pursuance of the 
resolutions passed by the General Assembly, In the wake of 
Pakistan's refusal to recognize the Karmal Government in Kabul, 
the JM Secretary-General and his personal representative, Diego 
Cordovez, made hectic efforts during 1P81-82 to help hold 
'•proximity talks" between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, 
Diego Gordovez held indirect talks with the representatives of 
Pakistan and Iran which led to the f i r s t round of talks in Geneva 
in June 1982. Iran refused to take part in the negotiations. 
There was no outcoiae of the talks which led to I t s postponen^nt. 
However i t was agreed that the "proximity talks" veered round 
four main pointst (1) Withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Afghanistan; ( i t ) Non-interference in the internal affairs of 
s t a t e s ; ( H i ) international guarantees of non-interference; 
and (iv) voluntary return of the refugees to thei r homes, 
Soviet Union was a s i len t observer while Iran preferred 
to be slsiply "kept informed". Until the middle of 1983, both 
Islamabad and Kabul had not relented. The proximity talks held 
in June 1983 resulted in the preparation of 23-page draft 
162 
agreement for the consideration of "concerned par t i es" . The 
181 UN Doc, A/37/482, 27 September 1982, 
182 Hunawar Koorani, "Afghazii^tan negotiationsi In5>lications 
f o r t h e U* - * — •^- " "^  •• '" <'—••-»- *—-^ ^ 
Spring 19 
f r t eus d an ifl^asse", /(y^raii 9t ^9]]$^ AHm ana 
(Vlllanova), vo l , IX, no.3, 
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I3!l Special Representative Diego Cordovez claimed that 95 per cent 
183 
of the agreement was In hand. But there was no satisfactory 
outcome because of the differing opinions among the concerned 
parties* The fourth round of Geneva talks held in June 1985 
IBl 
also proved a f a i lu re . However the eighth roimd of talks 
held in Geneva in the beginning of August 1986 was adjourned 
185 
on 8 August 1986 in view of the reported Soviet proposal to 
••withdraw some troops". Though there has been no substantial 
outccme so far, but the efforts are being made by the ON Special 
Representative as well as the "concerned par t ies" to find a 
Speedy settlement, 
Q^  ];siajnio Confeyeyjc^ 
Ever since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) has been seized of 
the Afghan problem and the OIC has played a prominsnt role Ijy 
mobilizing the international public opinion against Soviet 
occi:5>atlon of Afghanistan, I t was but natural for the 
International Islamic CoEmunliy to express i t s sol idari ty with 
the people of Afghanistan who had been subject to Soviet armed 
aggression. 
The f i r s t extraordinary session of the islamic Conference 
of Foreign Ministers which met in Islamabad, Pakistan, from 
1S3 "An Accord in the Offing", FaT ^ast^rn .^fflgWlQ ^^^U, (Hong Kong), 9 June 1983) p . 28« 
184 New York Times. 28 June 1985. 
185 Larry Jagan, ^SmwLt S ^ r i s e ? " , 5cOT9inl<? ,p<^ Ps?.mgal 
W i^^ p„y (Bombay), vo l . XXt, no. 4, 23 August 1986, p . 1473, 
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27-29 January 1980 unanl»o\uily adopted a reaolutlon i/B©S which 
pitor alia noted that "the Soviet occiqpatlon of Afghanistan 
constitutes a violation of its independence, and aggression 
against the liberty of its people and a flagrant violation of all 
international covenants and norms, as well as a serious threat 
186 
to peace and security in the region and throughout the world*. 
While condeEning the Soviet military aggression against 
the people of Afghanistan, the resolution denounced and deplored 
it as a flagrant violation of international laws, norms of the 
Charter of the UN and the Charter of the Organization of the 
187 
Islamic Conference. It called upon all peoples and Governments 
throughout the world to ••persist in condemning this aggression and 
denounced it as an aggression against Human Rights and a violation 
188 
of the freedoms of people, which cannot he ignored**. Apart from 
demanding the "immediate and unconditional" withdrawal of all 
Soviets stationed in Afghan territories, the Conference reiterated 
that the Soviet troops should refrain from acts of oppression and 
189 
tyranx^ sr against the people of Afghanistan, 
The Conference took the bold decision of suspending the 
membership of Afghanistan in the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference and urged the member countries to withhold the 
recognition to the "illegal regime" in Afghanistan and "saver 
1S6 For full text of the resolution see, WI Doc. A/35/109, 
21 February 1980, pp. 16-19. 
187 Ibid., p. 17. 
IBS Ibid. 
3BS Ibid., p. 18. 
S34 
4tploo»ttc relations with that country iintU the complete %rlth» 
190 
drawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan*• It also called 
upon membei' countries to envisage through appropriate bodies 
not to participate "In Olympics Games being held In Moscow in 
July 1980 unless the Soviet Union In compliance with the call 
of the UK General Assembly and Islamic Conferencei withdraws 
191 
its troops forthwith from Afghanis tan**. 
The eleventh conference of Foreign Ministers of Islamic 
countries held in Islamabad in May 1980 adopted a resolution 
19/11 OG on Afghanistan which represented a substantial 
softening of the January I980's emereency conference's strong 
condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The 
resolution established a ministerial committee comprising 
Tunisia, Iran and Pakistan empoworlng them to open negotiations 
with all parties Involved in Afghanistan, Including Soviet Union, 
to solve the Afghan problem. It also called fori*(l) the 
Immediate withdrawal of Soviet ti'OopS| (11) recognition of the 
Afghan people*s rights to choose their own form of government and 
Socio-economic - political system^ (ill) respect for the 
Independence, territorial Integrity and ion-aligned status of 
193 
Afghanistan; and (IT) creation of conditions within that,** 
190 Ibid* 
191 I b i d . , p , 19, 
192 Cited in Hlchard P, Cronin, A|'g6an;Vstan,,...S,Qvt9t tRTasJOP,. 
ft^ d IIS Response (Washington, D,C, t Congressional Research ervice, 1980), p. 5, I 
193 Ibid,, p, 6, 
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The OIC has continuously taken up substantial decisions 
on Afghanistan in its period sessions. The Third Sunmdt 
Conference of the OIC held at Mecca, Saudi Arabia, from 
28»28 Januaay 1981 also adopted a resolution 3/3-0 (IS) on 
194 
the situation in Afghanistan. The Conference viewed with 
"grave concern" the continued Soviet military occupation of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the consequent inpediments 
"which stand in the way of the Muslim people of Afghanistan to 
exercise their right to determine their political future according 
195 
to their will". It strongly urged for the creation of 
appropriate conditions to enable the Afghan refugees to return to 
196 
their homeland in safety and honour. The resolution called 
for increasing all efforts to ensure that "Afghanistan remains 
an Independent and non-aligned state and to enable its people to 
exercise in all freedom their right to express their will as 
197 
regards the system of their own choosing." 
The coordinating meeting of the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs of the Organization of the Islamic Conference held at 
New tork on 10 October 19S3 while expressing its serious concern 
over the deplorable situation in Afghanistan resulting from the 
fact of the continuing foreign presence in that country, evinced 
its interest in the "efforts exerted by the Special Envoy of the 
194 For full text, see, UN Doc, A/36/138, 31 March 1981, 
pp. 36-^9. 
im Ibid,, p. 36. 
lief Ibid., p. 38, 
197 Ibid. 
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S«cr«tary»Seneral of the United Nations and by the Isianlc 
Republic of Pakistan, with a view to finding a solution for the 
probloin which this strife torn Muslim country ^ Afghanistanj^ 
19S 
is experiencing*. It further demanded the cessation of the 
armed intervention by *»ofeign forces in the internal affair* of 
their brotherly country, and the retreat of these forces from 
Afghan territory} and reaffirms right of the Afghan people to 
1S!*9 
adopt a System of government of their choice**. 
The fourteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 
was held at Dhaka, Bangladesh, from 6 to 10 December 1983 and 
200 
unanimously adopted a resolution 13/14-P. The resolution 
expressed serious concern over the continued Soviet military 
intervention in Afghanistan and the consequent impediment 
thereof* 
The Islamic Conference in its meeting held at Morocco 
in early February 1986 again called upon the Soviet Union to 
vacate its aggression in Afghanistan and also reaffirm the 
right of the Afghan people to adopt a government of their own 
201 
choice. 
J^ tffpqRgff Y^ the g^rop^an gponoil? cgromtty 
The European Bconomic Committee (EBC) comprising 10 member 
countries of Western Europe have also taken a serious note of 
198 UN Doc, A/36/236, 7 May 1984, p . 3 . 
199 Ib id . , p . 4 , 
200 For f u l l text see, UN Doc. A/3Q/133, 19 March 1984, 
pp. 47-50. 
201 1^9 Ttags (London), 8 February 1986. 
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Soviet Intervention In Afghawlstan, During Its annual meeting 
the ^EC has frequently expressed concern over the continued 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and calling for the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops. 
The Heads of State and Government and the Minis tets of 
Foreign Affairs of the ten members of the EEC, met at Maastricht, 
the Netherlands, in March 1981, The resolution on Afghanistan 
passed hy this meeting of the ESC noted with grave concern the 
military operations by Soviet troops against the Afghan people, 
202 
"who are resisting this external interference". The 
resolution further envisaged SEC»s call "for the withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Afghanistan to exercise freely their right 
to self-determination and for Afghanistan thtis to return to Its 
traditional status as an independent state, neutral and non-
203 204 
aligned." Similar stance was reiterated by the EEC in 1982 
205 
and 1983. It called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan and restoration of its nonaligned and independent 
status. 
On 14 May 1984, the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of the member countries of the EEC was held in Paris. 
The meeting adopted a resolution on Afghanistan which reiterated 
the attachment of the SBC countries to the principles set forth 
in the resolutions adopted by the UH General Assembly calling for 
202 UN Doc. A/36/153, 30 March 1981. 
203 I b i d . 
204 New York Timm*^ 28 March 1962. 
205 X^ld., 14 May 1983. 
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the withdrawal of foreign troops, self-determination of the Afghan 
people, voluntary rotmm of th® Afghan refugees and nonallgnment 
being the conditions for an honourable, just and lasting settle-
206 
ment for all the parties involved. The EEC also reviewed its 
appeal to Moscow to embark on that course and to contribute to 
the efforts undertaken to that end by the Secretary-General of 
207 
the United Nations. 
While, speaking on behalf of the EEC, as well as Spain and 
Portugal, the representative of Luxembourg told the General 
Assembly on 12 November 1985 that the'large scale Soviet military 
intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 was a shock to the inter-
national community and "it remains one of the most serious 
208 
violations of the Charter of the Unitod Nations", While 
expressing concern over the plight of Afghan refugees the 
Liixembourg's representative further added that "in order that 
a Satisfactory solution to this serious humanitarian problem may 
be found, it is necessaiy that the refugees be enabled to return 
209 
to their native land In dignity and safety". In his opinion 
such an eventuality could be facilitated if the Independent and 
nonallgned status of Afghanistan could be restored and the Afghans 
were allowed to exercise their right to self-determination. 
While alluding to the efforts made by the UN Secretary 
General and his personal representative with regard to a 
negotiated settlement of Afghanistan, the representative further 
206 UN Doc, V38/261, 17 Kay 1983, 
207 Ib id , 
208 UN Poc. A/40/PV. 71 , p , 63 , 
209 I b i d , , p , 58» 
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observed I "We note with Interest the report that they I'iare 
subimltted to the Assembly, which shows that technical progress 
has been achieved in developing several international Instruments, 
We shall continue to support those mediation efforts and we 
anticipate that rapid, genuine progress may be achieved, especiallT 
210 
towards an agreed timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops •** 
The nonaligned countries were also alarn^d over the Soviet 
Intervention in Afghanistan, This alarm was manifested In 
February 1981 when the conference of Foreign Ministers of 
nonaligned countries was held in New Delhi, The final coranunlque 
issued after the conference called for a political settlement on 
the basis of withdrawal of foreign troops and full respect for 
the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
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nonaligned status of Afghanistan, The communique also referred 
to the right of Afghan refugees to return to their homes in safety 
and honour. The conference urged all concerned to work towards 
such a settlement which would ensure that the Afghan people would 
free 
determine their own destiny/from outside interference and which 
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would enable the Afghan refugees to return to their homes. 
The Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the 
Nonaligned countries which met at Havana from 31 May to 6 June 
1982 reiterated the urgent call made at the New Delhi Ministerial 
210 Ib id . , p , 57. 
211 Government of India, Xi<}n»y»ftftt Y?^s of tbg Pfflaltogfl 
Mov^ m n^^  (New Delhi, 1986), vol , 1, p , 507» 
212 Ibid, 
S4D 
Conference held in February 1981, for a political settlement 
of Afghan prohlem on the basis of withdrawal of foreign troops 
and full respect for the independence, sovereignly, territorial 
213 \ 
integrity and nonaligned status of Afghanistan, The other 
part of the resolution was similar in words and content as df 
February 198 !• 
The final declaration adopted by the Seventh Conference 
of Heads of State or Govemctfit of Nonallgned Countries held in 
New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, viewed the situation in 
Afghanistan with grave concern. It reiterated the earlier calls 
given by the NAM Conferences for the withdrawal of foreign troops 
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from Afghanistan, The Heads of State or Government of the non-
aligned countries expressed their appreciation for the sincere 
efforts made in the search of a political solution in Afghanistan 
and extended their support to the constructive ste5>s taken in 
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this regard by the UN Secretary General, They regarded the 
discussions through the intermediary of the UN Secretary General 
as a step in the right direction and urged their continuation with 
a view to proinoting an early political settlement of the problem 
in conformity with the ideals and principles of the nonaligned 
216 
movement. 
The Similar s tance was r e i t e r a t e d in the f i n a l coninunique 
issued a f t e r the meeting of M n i s t e r s and Heads of Delegation of 
213 I b i d . , p . 571. 
214 Government of Ihdia, HWJXJJl'tUfJ&^T^ ,Qt 'tt]g ^g^^altgnga 
^vement (New Delhi , 198o), Vol, I I , p , 3 3 , 
215 I b i d , 
216 I b i d . 
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th« nonallgned countries held at New York from 1 to 5 October 
217 
1984» The meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the nonallgned 
countries which was held at Luanda from 4 to 7 September 1986 had 
818 
also reiterated the old stand on Afghanistan* 
The final communiqoe Issued by the meeting of t\m Ministers 
and Heads of Delegation of the nonallgned countries held at 
New York on 1 October 1985 while reiterating the earlier stand 
219 
of the i^'AM hoped for an early solution of the Afghan tanglet 
The Ministerial meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the 
nonallgned countries which n»t at New Delhi in April 1986, while 
reiterating the NAM stand on Afghanistan expressed appreciation 
for the sincere efforts made in the search for a political 
Settlement of the situation in Afghanistan and extended its full 
support to the constructive steps taken by the UN Secretary 
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General. It also called on all states to exercise restraint 
to avoid further endangering the peace and security of the region 
and to take such steps as would lead to the creation of conditions 
conducive to stable and harnonious relations among the countries 
of the region* 
The Nonallgned Summit lield in Harare, the capital of 
Zimbabwe in September 1986, reiterated its earlier stand on 
Afghan issue and called for the earlier solution of the Afghan 
217 Ibid., pp. 118-19. 
21S Ibid., p. 184. 
219 Ibid., p. 291, 
220 Government of India, Mlni^tgapiRl Mi^ f^^ w of the 
DelG, 1^6) , p . 45. ' 
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pi^blem. I t also appreciated tli» efforts of the UK flecretary 
ho 
22 
General In this regard and expressed the pe that the solution 
to Afghan problem would «oon be achlered. 
The foregoing analysis reveals that the Soviet intervene 
tion in Afghanistan in December 1979 and the continued presence 
of Soviet troops in Afghanistan have been widely condemned by 
the United States, another Super Power, United Nations, Islatelc 
Conrnmnily, European Economic Community and the Konaligned 
Movement (NAM)« 
221 Nqy Xort Ttoft'i 14 September 1986. 
The Soviet Invaston of Afghanistan In Dacember 1979 and 
the continued pres«ice of Soviet troops on Afghan so i l since 
then i s unprecedented in the annals of international re la t ions . 
Afghanistan i s an ancient country,, whose history dates hack to 
over 5000 years . Since i t s emergence as a modem po l i t i ca l 
entity about 25 decades back, Afghanistan has been the nerve 
centre of Si^jor Power rivalry* The geo-strategic location of 
Afghanistan makes i t share border with the Soviet Union, 
Despite the severe pressures of Anglo-Russian r ivalry prior 
to the Second World War and Soviet-United States (US) r ivalry 
in the post-war period, Afghanistan has always warded off the 
overtures of Super Powers by pursuing the policy of s t r i c t 
neutral i ty and genuine nonalignnent. Thus, i t also managed 
to safeguard i t s independence, sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l 
in tegr i ty , Afghanistan had pursued th is smooth course for 
caiturLes and even the change of regime did not affect the 
basic tenets of Afghan foreign policy. 
However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979 changed the entire course of Afghan history and an 
Independent and ncaaaligned country became a " sa t e l l i t e of 
Soviet Bcplre", The background of Soviet Invasion wai la id 
down during the l a s t week of April 1978 when the People's 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power, with 
Soviet help, by overthrowing and siiiultaneously k i l l ing 
Sardar MDhammad Daoud, Between April 1978 and December 1979, 
the Soviet military advisers, and troops had started reaching 
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Afghanistan for a virtual takeover. The PDPA regime had 
departed from the traditional path of genuine nonalignment 
and Afghanistan was gradually pushed Into the Soviet orbit. 
The Soviet invasion in the last week of December finally 
sealed the fate of Afghanistan as an Independent and sovereign 
country. Today's Afghanistan is a client and satellite state 
of Soviet Union, 
The existing norms and practices of international 
relations and international law as well as the principles 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Hatlons are opposed to 
the invasion and occupation of one country by another country, 
Afghanistan throughout the course of its history has always 
pursued the policy of strict neutrality and genuine non-
alignment. Besides, the pursuit of peace and friendly relations 
have always been the main bulwai^ of Afghan foreign policy. It 
has never harboured territorial designs against any country, 
especially its neighbours. Rather, Afghanistan had been the 
victim of foreign aggression, three times by the British and 
three times by Soviet Union, prior to the Second World War 
and again by Soviet Union In December 1979, 
Even during the heydays of Anglo-Russian riva^.ry, 
Afghanistan never fell a prey to either Soviet or British 
overtures nor it allowed its territory to be used by either 
side against the other. The Afghan rulers were convinced that 
they could retain the independence and territorial integrity of 
Afghanistan by pursuing a policy of strict neutrality. Even 
during its hostilities with the British, Afghanistan never 
accepted the Soviet help but defended Itself with its own 
S4S 
indiginaouf resourcts* In the immediate aftermath of the 
conclusion of the Second World War, the Sovlet»US rivalry for 
winning newly* independent countries to their respective 
"spheres of Influence" gave rise to the emergence of cold war 
which Was followed by the founding of military alliances. 
Afghaanistan remained aloof from the power politics of the 
cold war and did not ;Joln any military alliance. It pursued 
the policy of gaaulne n<»allgnment» 
In the wake of these developments, the Soviet invasion 
and its consequent occi:5)ation of Afghanistan is irery perplexing 
and unwarranted* There was not even a slightest provocation on 
the part of Afghanistan which could pron5»t the Soviets to invade 
Afghanistan, Itoscow for long had been cherishing the goal of 
reaching the "hot waters" of the Indian Ocean through the 
Indian subcontinent or through Persian Gulf. The strategic 
location of Afghanistan was most congenial for Soviet Union to 
fulfil its centuries old dream. The Soviet action proves that 
Moscow, for long, had been harbouring territorial designs on 
Afghanistan and was looking for an opportunity which came in 
April 1978 and culminated in fulfilling Soviet aspirations In 
December 1979• 
By invading Afghanistan, Soviet Union has violated its 
bilateral agreements with Afghanistan, violated the principles 
of the United Nations Charter and defied the world public 
opinion. But for the December 1978 Soviet Afghan treaty, all 
earlier treaties signed in 1921 and 1926 between Moscow and 
Kabul had reiterated Soviet affirmation in the Independence and 
territorial integrity of Afghanistan, The Treaty of Neutrality 
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and Non->aggre8slon signed betwein Moscow and Kabid. on 31 August 
1926 enjoined upon both the countries to maintain neutrality in 
case either of them was involved in a militaiy conflict with a 
third country* It also provided that both countries would 
refraija from Interfering in the internal affairs of each other. 
Before the advent of communist regime in Kabul in April 1978t 
the Afghan policy towards Russia had been based on good 
neighbourliness, mutual respect, and principles of peaceful 
coexistence. This policy was vigorously pursued by different 
regimes in Afghanistan. All the joint statements and joint 
communiques issued by the two coimtries prior to April 1978 
had reiterated the faith of two countries in these principles. 
The Afghan-Soviet friendship treaty sighed on 5 December 1978 
envisaged under Article 17 that both countries sought continually 
to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of 
appropriate agreements and also provided for consultations 
between the two coimtries and for the initiation of appropriate 
measures by mucual consent to ensure their security, independence 
and territorial integrity. It was under the pretext of thlji 
clause that the Soviets justified their invasion of Afghanistan* 
The Soviets claimed that they had been "invited" by the Kabul 
regime to defend Afghanistan against the "foreign intervention". 
It is worth noting that the advent of the Soviet-back^ 
communist govemmait in Kabul in AprH 1978 was followed by 
exodus of Afghans opposed to the conmunist takeover from 
Afghanistan into neighbouring Pakistan and Iran, The people 
1 For full text of the treaty see, Soviet Review 
(New Delhi), vol, 16, no, 58, 21 December 1978, 
pp« 31«34, 
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of Afghaniitan also organized thtuselves Into resistance groups 
to launch armed struggle against the Soviet occupation* Thus 
the Russian backed communist reglne In Kabul was aliBost near 
collapse and Moscow also saw an opportunity to fulfil Its l<»ig« 
cherished ambition of reaching the hot waters of the Indian 
Ocean by occupying Afghanistan, Consequently the Soviet Union 
Invaded Afghanistan In the last week of December 1979 using 
the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1978 as a pretext. 
The resolutions passed by the General Assembly have called 
for the Inmedlate and total withdrawal of "foreign troops** from 
Afghanistan. But the Soviet Union has not cared to comply with 
tlK>se resolutions which are only recommendatory In nature. 
Moscow, being the permanent member of the Security Council, has 
alread^r vetoed a resolution on Afghanistan on 7 January 1980 
and can veto any such resolution which it deem® detrimental 
to Its Interests* However In General Assembly where Moscow 
cannot Influence every member, has passed several resolutions 
calltog for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan 
and even condemned the Soviet Invasion on Afghanistan* This 
shows that the Soviet action In Afghanistan is In utter 
violation of the principles of the UN Charter and has dared 
to be unconcerned about what the General Assembly has called 
for* 
Besides, the Soviet Union has also shown utter disregard 
for the international public opinion. The Soviet Invasion and 
continued occupation of Afghanistan has been widely condemned 
by the nonaligned Summit Conferences held In New Delhi in 1983 
and at Harare in 1986, by the Organization of Islamic 
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Countries, Eiux>pean Bconomlc CowExmtisy (EEC) and other regional 
organizations Ilk® ASSAU, Arab l»eagiit| OPEC etc* The sal ient 
points common to the resolutions passed by these organizations 
hare called for the limne^ate Bm6 to ta l withdrawal of ^o^iet 
troops from Afghanistan, the return of the Afghan refugees to 
the i r homes with honour and dignity and the restoration of the 
Independent and noneligned status of Afghanistan, All such 
urglngs and appeals liave fallen f l a t on Soviet ears . 
Under the contemporary International re la t ions , act of 
one Super Power can be counterbalanced by the other Super Power. 
After a l l the countries of the Third World have been the victim 
of the Super Power r ival iy which threatens the i r existence. 
The United States can de f in l t ^y help In entangling the Afghan 
knot. The reaction of Washington to the developments in Kabul 
between April 1978 and December 1979 had bean liikewarm. The 
Carter Administration also took time in imposing US sanctions 
against the Soviet Union, However, the US was I tse l f engaged 
in the US bostages* affair In Iran durtog that period. These 
sanctions were softened by the Reagan Administration, 
The advent of diplomatic relations between Kabul and 
dates 
WaShlngtoVback to early 19408 but efforts in this direction 
were in i t ia ted as early as the second half of the second decade 
of the present century. The lUkewarm US response to the Afghan 
endeavours to establish diplomatic relat ions between the two 
countries during 1920s and 1930s did not deter Kabul which 
continuously availed every opportunity to convince the policy 
nakers in Washington of Afghanistan's anxiety and eagerness 
to establ ish diplo«atic relat ions between the two countries. 
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The establlsbment of diplomatic relat ions between 
Afghanistan and the United States in 1942 coincided with the 
zenith of the Second World War« The United States was involved 
in the war. However, Afghanistan maintained the policy of 
s t r i c t neutral i ty throughout the period of Second World War, 
The Afghan policy of s t r i c t neutra l i ty during the war period 
was highly appreciated by the Allied powers especially in 
United States . 
The post-Second World War period witnessed the growth of 
cordial and friendly relat ions between Kabul and Washington, 
Afghanistan got economic and technical assistance from the 
United States which proved helpful in the economic and industr ial 
development. In the wake of the onset of cold war hotly chased 
by the United States and Soviet Union to win over the newly 
independent countries to the i r respective "spheres of influence", 
Afghanistan pursued a genuinely nonaligned policy and maintained 
an Independent posture in international a f fa i r s . Keeping in 
view the cold war situation and Afghanistan's proximity to 
Soviet Union, the United States failed to properly appreciate 
the geo-political significance of Afghanistan for US strategy. 
The US foreign policy under Dulles ignored Afghanistan, 
Afghanistan's requestifor US arms during 1950s were also 
Ignored, Itoscow seized th is opportunity to win Afghan favour 
by pixjviding increased economic aid especially after mid 19508, 
This does not mean that Afghanistan abandoned i t s t radi t ional 
policy of genuine nonalignment and toed the Soviet l i n e . 
But Bore «illghtened US foreign policy during the Dulles 
period could have made Afghanistan less dependent on Soviet 
Union for economic and isillltary assistance. 
ss@ 
The Afghan Is tan-US relat ions thrived uninterruptedly since 
the beginning of early 1940s t i l l the advent of Russian-backed 
coimnunlst 9pup in Kabul In April 1978 on the basis of nrcitual 
respect for each othor, non-laterference and peaceful 
coexistence. The United States provided substantial economic 
and technical assistance to Afghanistan during th i s period* 
There had been exchange of v i s i t s by the leaders of the two 
countries. Both countries shared coinmon views on global and 
regional issues, Afghanistan had great admiration for tJS role 
In maintaining international peace and security while the United 
States greatly valued Afghanistan's policy of genuine non-
alignment. 
However the lukewarm reaction by the United States to 
the aavent of pro-Moscow coimnunlflt regime in Kabul In April 1978 
allowed the developments to take a decisive turn in December 
1970 wh®n Soviets Invaded Afghanistan, A s tem action in the 
form of diplomatic and economic sanctions against Moscow and 
s t em warning to Moscow not to Interfere into the internal 
affairs of Afghanistan could have prevented Soviet Union from 
Invading Afghanistan in December 1979, 
In the wake of Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Carter 
Atelnistration took belated measures by imposing sanctions 
against the Soviet Union and warning the l a t t e r to "keep hands 
off from the Persian Gulf", By the time US sanctions were 
announced, the tens of thousands of Hussian troops had entrenched 
their position in Afghanistan, An early and immediate strong 
action by Carter Administration could have saved the situation 
fr©» further deterioratlon# 
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However, the United States under fieagan Administration has 
rendered valiiable hananitarlan assistance to the people of 
Afghanistan In their just struggle against Soviet invasion. 
Washington has condemned the Soviet act of aggression In the 
United Hations and its consistent stand on Afghan Issne has 
helped in boosting the morale of Afghan freedom fighters. 
Though United States has rendered diplomatic and humani-
tarian assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen, yet this alone is 
not sufficient to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan, The US 
should take more tough stand in the United Nations and other 
international fora against the Soviet Union so that the latter 
should realize that its action In Afghanistan wo\ald strain its 
relations with the United States. Besides, the Reagan Adminis-
tratlon should give direct economic and other types of assistance 
to Afghan Mujahtdeen and not through any third party. It Is 
worth mentionljng here that it was the tough stand of Washington 
Moscow 
which conqpelle4/to withdraw its troops from Iran in 1946. The 
Soviet Union should be made to realize that it would not be 
allowed to usurp Afghanistan. The US should re-impose severe 
diplomatic and economic sanctions against Soviet Union in order 
to pressurize Moscow to vacate the aggression in Afghanistan. 
Another hope of defusing the Afghanistan crisis is the 
United Nations. Afghanistan is one of the founding members of 
the UN. It has played very active and constructive role in 
strengthening the world body. The moral support rendered by 
Afghanistan to the United Nations in tackling the crucial global 
issues has been instrumental in consolidating the constructive 
role of the world body in maintaining international peace and 
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Security, But when one of Its members • Afghanistan * has been 
invaded by another powerful member - Soviet Union - the world 
body has failed in discharging its basic duty of safeguarding 
the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Afghanistan, 
The First resolution passed by the General Assembly in 
January 1980 condemned the Soviet Union by name for invading 
Afghanistan and called for the "withdrawal of Soviet troops" 
from Afghan soil. But the subsequent resolutions passed by 
the General Assembly beginning with December 1980 resolution 
became mild in their condemnation of Soviet Union and called 
for the "withdrawal of foreign troops" from Afghanistan, It 
seems that Mbscow succeeded in influencing the functioning of 
the General Assembly which is reflected in the softening tone 
of UH resolutions on Afghanistan, If such a state of affairs is 
allowed to continue the faith of the countries in the UN would 
be eroded. 
The resolutions so far passed by the General Assembly 
suffer from many weaknesses. In the first instance, the 
invader (Soviet Union) is not mentioned by name. The Soviet 
troops are stationed on Afghan soil and the reference in the 
resolution to "withdrawal of foreign troops" defeats the very 
purpose of the resolutions. Instead, reference should be made 
to "immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Russian 
2 
troops from Afghanistan". 
A,R, Pazhwak, "Basic Way for the Political Solution of 
Afghan Problem", Afghan Mulahld (Peshawar), Special Issue, 
no, 38, December 1982. 
2S3 
Sicondly, though the resolutions passed by the General 
Assembly have recognlssed that Afghan problem Is of political 
nature and it needs political solution, yet all the belligerent 
parties hav9 not been invited for the negotiations. The 
connnunist regime in Kabul does not represent the entire 
population of Afghanistan but only the minority government 
backed by Moscow, More than one third of Afghan population are 
living as refugees In Pakistan, Iran and other comitries, and 
the Afghan Mujahideen represent all Afghan people. Hence, the 
Afghan Mujahideen should be represented in the United Nations 
and not the pro-Moscow regime in Kabul* Thus the resolutions 
passed by the General Assembly do not reflect the genuine 
aspirations of the people of Afghanistan. 
Soviet Union being a Super Power and one of the founding 
members of the United Nations owes a greater responsibility to 
abide by the principles of the UN Charter and safeguard the 
interests of the world body. Besides being the permanent 
member of the Security Council, it devolves on Moscow a special 
responsibility to see that the resolutions passed by the 
Security Council are iinplemented in letter and spirit. 
Paradoxically, Soviet Union has defied the basic principles 
of the UN by invading Afghanistan, a fellow member and 
misused its veto power to conceal its own political 
mlsadventurismk 
The resolutions passed so far by the General Assembly 
have asked for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" and do not 
mention the withdrawal of "Soviet troops" from Afghanistan. It 
seems that Moscow has used pressiire tactics to influence the 
^ 4 
resolutions of the General Assembly, Besides, the resolutions 
have also failed to mention clearly the inalienable rights of 
the people of Afghanistan to safeguard the independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of their homeland which 
has been jeopardized in the wake of Russian aggression. 
The resolutions passed by the General Assembly have not 
condemned Russia as an aggressor by name. Besides, these 
resolutions are not asking for ••complete, unconditional and 
3 
inanediate" withdrawal of Russian troops. 
There is also no objection to the representation of the 
Soviet backed comnunist regime in Kabiil in the UN in these 
resolutions. The resolutions passed by the General Assembly 
recognize that the question of Afghanistan needs a political 
solution. Any negotiations designed to seek the solution of • 
political nature Involves the participation of all belligerfflit 
sides. However the UH resolutions have failed to provide a 
belligerent status to the representatives of the Afghan 
4 
Mujahideen in the Geneva Talks, The Afghan Mujahideen are 
fighting against the Russian aggression. These freedom fighters 
represent the bulk of Afghan population. Any resolution seeking 
political settlement of Afghanistan without the participation of 
Afghan Mujahideon would be unacceptable to the people of Afghanistan, 
Apart from this, the UN resolutions have referred to 
'•safeguarding security, national sovereignty, independence and 
3 A,R, Pazhwak's statement quoted in Afgh^ Muiahidf 
Special issue, no, 2, l April 1983, 
4 tn&'i 
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territorial Integrity of Afghanistan", In reality, the 
resolutions shouljd aSk for the "restoration of all rights" of 
the people of Afghanistan which have been curbed and violated 
in the wake of Russian aggression. After having restored all 
the rights of Afghan people, then only the question of 
preservation of Independaice, sovereignty and territorial 
5 
Integrity of Afghanistan should be taken up. 
The incorporation of these basic points is very essential 
and they form the basis of "resto^jitlon" "safeguarding" and 
preservation of national Interest of Afghanistan, Any arrange-
ments without the inclusion of these provisions would not be 
acceptable to the people of Afghanistan, 
Thus it devolves on the UN General Assembly to provide 
representation to the representative of the Afghan Mujahideen 
who are the sole, legitimate and true representative of the 
people of Afghanistan, to present the Afghan case. Any 
resolution adopted by the General Assembly seeking the 
political solution of Afghanistan problem without the 
participation of Afghan Mujahldeen would not be acceptable to 
the people of Afghanistan, And such arrangement would be 
unjust and unlnq}lementable. 
The hopes raised by the Geneva Talks have also been 
belled. In I98l the General Assembly had asked the UN Secretary 
General to hold talks with Soviet Union, comttiunlst regime in 
Kabul, Pakistan and Iran to erplore the possibility of finding 
a political solution to Afghanistan problem. In early 1982, 
5 Ibid, 
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the UN Secretary General appointed the TIN Under-Seeretairy 
General, Cordovez, as his Special Representative, to hold talks 
with the concerned parties. This has come to be known as 
"Geneva Talks**. The special Representative of the UN Secretary-
General have held seven round of talks with the representatives 
of Kabul regime and Pakistan while Iran has been kept Informed 
about the ongoing progress made in the talks. 
The UN Secretary General in his report on Geneva Talks 
6 
submitted to the General Assembly on 7 October 1986 said that 
in May 1986 an understanding was reached at between Kabul and 
Islamabad that the political settlement should consist of a set 
of instruments that would Include a bilateral agreement on non-
interference and non-intervention, a declaration on international 
guarantees! a bilateral agreement on the voluntary return of the 
refugees and an instrument that would set out the inter-
relationship between the aforementioned instruments and the 
solution of the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops 
in accordance with an agreement to be concliaded between 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, 
However, the possibility of such an agreement to be 
accepted by the Afghan Mujahldeen is very remote because they are 
not represented in the Geneva Talks. Neither the Special 
Eepres«ntative of the UN Secretary-General nor the other 
countries party to the talks have ever bothered to ascertain 
the standpoint of Afghan Mujahldoen, Any agreement with regard 
to Afghanistan without the participation of Afghan Mu^ahldeen 
6 UN Doc. V40/709. 
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would not be acceptable to the people of Afghanistan, 
The emphasis In UN resolutions and the Geneva Talks 
Is on the withdrawal of "foreign troops" and the International 
guarantees of non-interference and non-intervention into 
Afghanistan. The Soviet Union and the cocsnunlst regline In Kabul 
which Is surviving on Moscow's support, have relegated the Issue 
of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan to a secondary 
place by laying stress on international guarantees. It is clear 
that Moscow and its puppet regime In Kabul have been overawed 
by the stiff resistance put up by the Afghan freedom fighters. 
Thus their pretext of international guarantees is nothing but a 
ploy to thwart the endeavours of the Afghan Kujahideen, Pakistan 
or any other country is not supporting in any way the Afghan 
freedom fighters. They are fighting themselves with their own 
resources. And though the United States has offered to give 
"international guarantee" but the Soviet Union has neither 
accepted the US guarantee nor is willing to withdraw Its troops 
from the Afghan soil. The United States and other permanent 
members of the UN Security Council should lii5>ress upon the Soviet 
Union to secure a guarantee from Moscow to immediately withdraw 
its troops from Afghanistan unconditionally under the auspic^es 
of the Security Council, The basic CT\X of the whole issue 
is the unconditional! iMBedlate and complete withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan, The only pressing problem Is 
the presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan, Once the 
Invading forces are withdrawn, the Afghan refugees would 
automatically retuni to their homeland. It is a humanitarian 
issue which is the outcome of Bussian Invasion, The independent 
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and nonallgned status of Afghanistan should also he restored 
immediately • 
The Geneva Talks were in i t ia ted after having acknowledged 
the fact that Afghan problem i s of po l i t i ca l nature and i t needs 
a "pol i t ica l solution". Thus, i t warranted the participation of 
a l l bell igerents as equal part ies in the negotiations. Like 
General Assembly resolutions, the Geneva Talks have ignored the 
part icipation of the Afghan Mujahideen as the sole legitimate 
representative of the people of Afghanistan. When none of the 
bell igerents —> Russia as an invader and the Afghan freedom 
fighters as a defender are represented, then the very purpose 
of Geneva Talks becomes self-defeating. 
The problem of a po l i t i ca l nature needs a po l i t i ca l 
solution. The negotiations concluded in th i s regard ca l l for 
the equal representation of a l l bell igerent groups concerned 
with a view to provide legitimacy and acceptability to such a 
solution under the eocisting norms and principles of International 
law and diplomacy. The mere consultations or proximity talks 
between puppet government in Kabul and other non-belligerents 
without the participation of Afghan Mujahideen have rendered 
Geneva Talks as infructuous and thus unaccet>table to the people 
of Afghanistan. 
From the Soviet side, the participation of Kabul regime 
in Geneva Talks, which does not have any Independent s tatus 
in negotiations but to support Soviet Union, i s advantageous to 
7 
Moscow. Such a move also helps the Soviets to be absolved of 
7 A*R* Pazhwak in an interview with Afghan ^vlahld, 
1 April 1983# 
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taay responsibility. The Afghan Mujahldeen ar« th« trus 
representatives of the people of Afghanistan and not the 
communist government In Kabul* 
Besides, even If t>h& base for participation in Geneva 
Talks is the neighbours of Afghanistan, then all the neighbours 
are not represented In Geneva Talks, Only Pakistan Is represented 
while Iran is only kept informed. This criterion is also invalid 
8 
because all neighbours are not Involved in the negotiations. 
Secondly, If the base or criterion is the Islamic countries, 
then only two Islamic countries — Pakistan and Iran — are 
involved. While Pakistan is participating in the proximity 
talks, Iran is only "k^t informed". Islamic countries numbering 
over forty have neither been consulted nor participants to the 
Geneva Talks, This renders it as invalid. 
Furthermore, if the base is regarded the presence of 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, the Afghan refugees are 
present in the other countries as well. The refugee problem is 
a humanitarian issue which has emerged because of Russian 
Invasion, The Soviet emphasis on Afghan refugee problem being 
of humanitarian nature is only a diversion from the basic issue 
which is of political nature, Moscow wants to mislead the 
international public opinion by such diversions. Thus, there 
is a dire need to be cautious of Soviet manoeuvres and not to 
be misled hy lt» 
Besides, if the base of participation In Geneva Talks 
is political parties, thai oftly one party • the People's 
8 Ibid* 
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D^ffiocratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) which i s to power to Kabia 
should not be 
with Soviet help L represented in the talks? There are several 
other po l i t i ca l part ies to Afghanistan who should be equally 
represented. I t i s well known that when PDFA seized power to 
Kabul to April 1978 with the lielp of Soviet Union, the ent ire 
Afghan nation stood to revolt agatost it# The massive number of 
over five million Afghans who are l ivtog to Pakistan, Iran and 
other countries i s a testimony to the fact that the people of 
Afghanistan are opposed to the present pro-Moscow comcnunist 
regime and the presence of Soviet amy on Afghan s o i l . Thus 
the PDPA i s not the true represcmtative of the people of 
Afghanistan. I t s very representation to the Geneva Talks is 
against the accepted norms of totematlonal law. 
The question of Afghanistan i s absolutely and purely a 
po l i t i ca l question of Russian tovaslon. I t s only solution is 
the vacation of Russian aggression. The f i r s t condition for 
the po l i t i ca l solution of Afghan problem i s the unconditional, 
con5)lete and immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan, This also entai ls the coc^lete and immediate 
withdrawal of Soviet non»raLlitary personnel, Warsaw Pact forces, 
dismantling of Soviet military bases and i t s propaganda machtoeiy 
10 
to Afghanistan. 
Then follows the restoration of conplete todependence, 
national sovereignty, t e r r i t o r i a l totegrity and the nonaligned 
status of Afghanistan, This i s the basic and toalienable right 
9 Ib id . 
10 Ihid; 
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of the people of Afghanistan to select their o«n polltlcali 
econontc, social and cultural system without &w outside 
11 
interference or intervention. 
All these above laentioned bases are recognized under 
international law anti all nations should respect arid honour 
them. Thus, it devolves on every country to support the cause 
of Afghan people to help resolving the present crisis. 
However, it is ironical that the response of the nonaligned 
movement (NAM) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
has been very mild to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan* 
Afghanistan has been the oldest nonaligned country. It hai 
played a pivotal role in founding the NAM and furthering its 
cause, Afghanistan played a significant role in th© Asian 
Relations Conference and the Bandung Conference, Afghanistan's 
role In the nonaligned summit conferences since Belgrade (1961) 
to Colombo (1976) has been commendable. Following the advent 
of pro-Moscow communist regime in Kabul in April 1978, the non-
aligned status of Afghanistan was eroded because it was 
represented in the Sixth NAM Summit at Havana in 1979 where it 
endorsed the Cuban thesis that Soviet Union was the "natural 
ally" of the nonaligned countries. According to A,R, Pazhwak, 
the participation of Noor Mohammad Taraki as the leader of 
Afghanistan at the Havana summit was a "severe blow to the NAM 
12 
as well as to Afghanistan", 
11 Ibid. 
12 Interview with A,R, Pazhwak, 6 February 1986, 
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Th8 New Delhi NAM Stamalt (1983) and the eighth NAM summit 
held at Harare (1986) have also failed to assuage the aspirations 
of the Afghans. The resolutions adopted by the New Delhi NAM 
summit and the Harare summit on Afghanistan have been ambiguous 
and veiy mild. The failure of the NAM to condeim the Soviet 
Invasion of Afghanistan Is a severe blow to the basic 
principles of the nonallgned movement. Today a nonallgned 
Afghanistan has beeaa the object of Soviet aggression, tomorrow 
other nonallgned countries would be the target of Soviet 
expansionism. The best course for the NAM would have been to 
oiUBt the representative of the present Kabul regime and a 
representative of the Afghan Mujahldeen would have been 
represented. Besides, the NAM should have condemned the 
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan In strongest terms, Emplaasla 
could have been laid on the restoration of the nonallgned 
status of Afghanistan, 
The Organization of Islamic Conference In Its meeting 
In 1980 took a commendable step by expelling the Communist 
Government of Afghanistan from the membership of the OIC 
and adopted a strong resolution on Afghanistan, However, 
the «ubsequ«it resolutions adopted by the OIC became mUd 
In their criticism of Soviet Union, After having expelled 
the communist representative of the DRA, the OIC should have 
initiated the representative of the Afghan Miijahlde«i to 
represent Afghanistan, Besides, the Islamic countries should 
Impose severe diplomatic and economic sanctions against Moscow 
until the latter withdraws Its forces from Afghanistan, 
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Besides, the Nonallgned Summit Conferences, Organization of 
Islamic Conference (QIC) and other Inteniatlonal forums should 
amend the weak points of the i r resolutions on Afghanistan as 
suggested supra. This will ref lect the strong disapproval of 
the Soviet action in Afghanistan by the international public 
opinion and will also be an expression of sol idari ty with the 
people of Afghanistan, 
Under the prevailing circumstances the member countries 
of NAM, Islamic Community and United Nations should suggest and 
support the convening of an international conference on 
Afghanistan, This conference on Afghanistan should be held 
under the auspices of the United Nations in which a l l the 
permanent members of the Security Council and the representatives 
of a l l the po l i t i ca l par t ies of Afghanistan, Including the 
Communist Party of Afghanistan as a po l i t i ca l party, should be 
Invited, This conference should woife out a concrete and 
effective programme to ensure the immediate, unconditional 
and conplete withdrawal of a l l Soviet troops, advisers and 
civi l ian personnel from Afghanistan, 
After having the most urgent task of the conplete 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan been achieved, 
then the conplete Independence, sovereignty, t e r r i t o r i a l 
Integri ty and nonallgned status of Afghanistan should be 
restored. The people of Afghanistan should be allowed, without 
13 A,R. Pazhwak's interview with Mujahld Wollas (Norway). 
H©^  54, 21 April 1986, ' 
14 Ib id . 
15 Ibid; 
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any outside interference or Intervention, to decide their own 
political, economic and social system keeping in consonance 
with the Afghan traditions. The Afghan Mujahideen should also 
imite themselves by sinking their differences and form a 
Govemmeit in exile. A Lava Jirgt^^ or Parliament should be formed 
which should include the people living inside Afghanistan, 
Afghan refugees living in Pakistan, Iran, USA, Europe and 
other parts of the world and the Afghan freedom fighters, 
Tl» Lova Jlrgah Should then select a '•Council** and develop 
16 
«*a political personality**, which should work as Afghan 
Government in exile. Then all freedom loving countries of 
the world should accord recognition to Afghan Government In 
exile. This will help in giving legitimacy to the struggling 
people of Afghanistan In their cause in the United Nations, 
Islamic Community, NAH and other international forums. 
Besides it will be an effective and legitimate instrument 
to seek the speedy solution of Afghan question more 
effectively. 
16 A.-R,- Pazhwak»« interview with Mujahld Wollas (Norway). 
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AMIR AKANULLAH KHAN OF AFGHANISTAN TO PRESIDSRT 
HARDING 
To Mjr GREAT FRIEND MR. PRESIDHIT OF THB UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA t 
Sspresslng my friendly feeling to Your Excellency, I 
intend to inform Your Excellency* s high Government about w 
coronation. 
After the tragic death of my father His Majesty Amir 
Habibullah Khan who was killed during His Royal Territorial 
excursion, I cam to the throne of Afghanistan, as it was ny 
right and all public desire of Afghan nation. 
For the expiession of friendly feelings of my Government, 
I sent one of my Generals G» Mohammed Wali Khan as Bictraordinary 
Ambassador to Your Excellency's high Government. 
As I used to have the sincere wish to establish a 
permanent friendly relation between Afghanistan and high 
Govemnent of the United States, I expect that Your Excellency's 
High Government may be satisfied with the keeping of this 
friendly relation too. 
Sending to Your Sxcellency my sincere greeting I beg 
to express heri^ith to Your Excellency and Your ibccellency's 
high Governmeht my highest esteem. 
AMIR AMANULLAH KHAN 
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PRESIDENT HARDING TO AMIR AMANULLAH KHAN 
OF AFGHANISTAN 
GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND t I have received from the hands of 
G, Mohammed Wall Khan, the letter by which Your Majesty advised 
me of the death of your father, his late Majesty Amir Hablbullah 
Khan, and of your ascension to the throne of Afghanistan, as well 
as of your desire to establish diplomatic relations between the 
United States and Afghanistan. 
While I have learned with sorrow of the tragic death of 
Your Majesty's father, and offer to you my sincere sympathy in 
this great affliction, I congratulate your Majesty on your 
ascension to the throne and trust that your reign will rebound 
to your Majesty's glory and the prosperity of Afghanistan, 
It is my wish that the relations between the United States 
and Afghanistan may always be of a friendly character and I shall 
be happy to cooperate with your Majesty to this end, I am 
constrained, however, to confirm to your Majesty what was stated 
orally to G. Mohemmed Wall Khan, that with respect to the United 
States the question of the creation of a Diplomatic Mission and of 
the appropriate action to that end by the Congress of the United 
States must be reserved for future consideration. 
In thanking Your Majesty for your friendly sentiments, I 
desire to assure you of my good wishes for your personal happiness 
and for the prosperity of your country. 
Your Good Friend 
Warren G, Harding 
W«fhlngton, July 29, 1921, 
Sdurcei US, FOT9rg.^?3i»ttog XQ tne Egpto.R^laUgng a£ ^ 
'Wgg 3.f?8I> Vo3.> I (Washington, D.Ci iKTKTtSlSCrt Government Pr in t ing Office, 1936), pp . 260-61, 
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Appendix B 
AFGHAMISTAN-SPyiET UNION TREATY i 9SK Pebniflrv 1021 
With the InteAtlon of strengthening the friendly relations 
exletlng between Russia and Afghanistan and to protect the real 
Independence of Afghanistan, F«S,F,S«R, on the one hand, and His 
Majesty's Government of Afghanistan on the other, decided to make 
the following Treaty thanselves. And to this end they have 
appointed as their plenipotentiaries the followlngi 
For His Majesty's Government of Afghanistan! 
Mohammed Vail Khan, Mlrza Mohammad Khan and 
Gholam S©ddlgh Khan f 
For the R,S,F»S, Government of Russia t 
Georgy Vasslllevlch Chlcherln, and Lev 
Mlkhallovlch Kara Khan. 
These plenipotentiaries have agreed as follows! 
I. Bach of the High Contracting Parties recognl25es the 
Independence of the other and undertakes to respect It and 
enter into proper political relations with the other, 
II, Bach of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to 
enter Into any military and political agreement with a third 
govenaent that may be against the Interest of the other of the 
High Contracting Parties, 
i n . The legations and consulates of the High Contracting 
Parties will equally and respectively possess the customary and 
international political privileges. 
First explanation of the above t (a) the right to 
fly a government flag. 
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(b) The iBHBunlty of the Xlsted members of the 
legations and consulates, 
(c) The Intnunlty of political despatches and of courier 
services and any mutual assistance in this connection. 
(d) The right of telegraphic, teaephonlc and wlrelesf 
coumunlcatlons, in accordance with the privileges of diploraatlc 
representatives. 
(e) The legation and consular buildings of each of the 
High Contracting Parties on the territory of the other will 
possess extraterritorial privileges, but cannot become an 
asylum for those persons who are considered outlaws by the 
local government. 
Second explanation! The legations of the High Contracting 
Parties will each have a military attache. 
IV. The High Contracting Parties agree that the R.S.F.S. 
Government of Russia will have five consulates in the territory 
of Afghanistan and His Majesty's Government of Afghanistan will 
have seven consulates in the Russian territory including five 
consulates in Russian Middle Asia. 
Explanation t The High Contracting Parties will be 
free to open other consulates in the territory of each otber, 
in addition to the number mentioned above, after special agreement, 
7, The Russian consulates will open in the towns of Herat, 
Mezar-i-Sherif, Kandhar, Kaznein and Heimeneh. The Consulate 
General of Afghanistan will be opened at Tashkent, and the 
ccmsulates in Petrograd, Kazau, Khokand, Samarkand, Merv, and 
Krashavodsk. 
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Bsplanationt Tha manner and the time of the actual, opening 
of the Russian consulates in Afghanistan and the Afghan consiilates 
in Russia will he fixed according to a special agreement in each 
instance. 
VI, Russia consents to free and uninterrupted transit of all 
goods going to Afghanistan from Russia including goods brought 
in Russia through governmental departments as well as those 
bought abroad direct. 
V n , The High Contracting Parties agree to respect the freedom 
of the nations in the Bast on the basis of plebisclty and self-
government* 
VIII, In accordance with Article VII of the present docuirfint 
the High Contracting Parties recognize the independence and freedom 
of the Government of Bukhara and Khiva under any form of government 
that may be desired by their nationals, 
IX, In order to accomplish the promise given by the R,S,F,S, 
Government of Russia through its President, Mr, Lenin, to the 
Minister of His Majesty's Government of Afghanistan, which promise 
being to the effect that the Government of Russia agrees to 
return to Afghanistan all the lands situated in the frontier 
xone, and which had belonged to Afghanistan in the past c«itury, 
it ii hereby agreed that a separate agreement will be signed by 
the plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting Parties on the 
basis of the plebiscite of the nationals living in those lands, 
X, In order to further the friendly relations existing 
between the High Contracting Parties, the R,S,F,S, Government 
of Russia undertakes to give material and financial assistance 
to the Government of Afghanistan, 
285 
XI* This Treaty Is vr l t t«n in Persian and Russian tcocts, 
each of which shall have equal va l id i ty . 
H I , This Treaty wil l become effective after i t i s ra t i f ied 
txy the respective Govemmets of the High Contracting Parties^ 
and the exchange of ra t i f ica t ions will take place in Kabul, 
Leonard Shapiro (ed . ) , Snyiet TrgatY 
Sgrlggi-IP]7-1ffat Vol. I (Washington, 
D»C, i The Georgetown University Press^ 
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Appendix C 
nmffl-s9V|^j§g^ggg„NWTg/HTt m> 
The Government of U.S.S.R, and the exalted Government of 
Afghanistan, with the object of confirming the friendly relations, 
and of strengthening the neighbourly ties which fortunately exist 
and on the basis of the Treaty signed in Moscow on 28 February 
1P21 • said Treaty to preserve its force in all its parts, 
irrespective of the continuance or cancellation of the present 
Treaty - both exalted Parties have authorized i His Sxcellency 
Mr, Leonid Stark, Minister Plenipotentiary of U.S.S.R, in 
Afghanistan an*' His Bscelleoy Mr, Mohammed Beg Khan Taral, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the exalted Government of 
Afghanistan, who »,, with the object of strengthening the 
friendly relations and insuring the peace between the two 
Governments, have framed and signed the Articles belowt 
I, In case of war or military action between one of the 
Contracting Parties and one or more third powers, the other 
contracting Party undertakes to observe neutrality towards 
the first Party. 
IX, Bach of the Contracting Parties undertakes to abstain 
fromi all kinds of aggression against the other and will not, 
on the territory under its own occupation, take any such steps 
which may cause poUti.cal or military injury to the other 
contracting Government, In particular, each of the Contracting 
Parties undertakes not to Join any other state or states in any 
political or military alllancs or union directed against the other, 
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In addition, should the ptfi^ of a third state or states "be 
hostile In Its action to either of the Contracting Parties, the 
other Contracting Party shall undertake not only to abstain from 
assisting such hostile policy, but also to prev«at the said policy 
and hostile actions and their inception within its ovn territory, 
III, The High Contracting Parties, mutually recognizing the 
sovereignty and Integrity of the other, undertake to abstain from 
all kinds of armed and unarmed interference in the internal 
affairs of the other Contracting Party and also not join or 
assist any other state or states which may take steps against 
or interfere with the other contracting state. 
The Contracting Parties will not permit any groups or 
individuals in tlMir own territories to establish or to prosecute 
activities detrimental to the other Contracting Party| to take 
steps for the subversion of the established Government of the 
other Contracting state} to take any action against the integrity 
of the territory of the other Contracting Party? to mobilize or 
collect armed forces against the other Contracting Party; and 
will prevent them from taking said actions. Similarly the 
Parties will not countenance the transit through their territories 
of any arsied forces, arms, firearms, ammunition or the supply of 
ary kind of war materials intended for use against the other 
Contracting Party and likewise will take active steps to prevent 
the same from passing through its territory. 
17. The Contracting Parties agree that within four months 
they will enter into discussions to determine principles for 
the' •0liition of differenets which may arise between them, 
<^09 
which cannot be settled through the ordlnarj dlploinatlc 
channels* 
V* Bach of the Contracting Parties outside the llmLts of 
und&t^taklngs tto conditions of which are defined In this Treatyi 
has freedom of p.ctlon In taking steps to form any kind of 
relations and any kind of agreement with other states, 
VI # This Treaty will have the force of law and will renain 
In force for three years following the date of ratification 
which should take place within three months following the date 
of signature of the present Treaty, After the expiration of 
the said period it will be understood that the Treaty will 
continue in force for an additional year automatically unless 
either of the Contracting Parties has notified the other that 
it desires to terminate the enforceE^nt of this Treaty six 
months before the eKplration of that period. 
711, Two copies of this Treaty hare been written in Persian 
and in nuaslan and both texts will have equal force. 
pp. 322-.23', 
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Appendix D 
AGREEKENT BETWEEN TIIE UNITED STATES OF AKERICA 
AND THE KINGDOM OF AFGHANISTAN IN REGARD TO 
FRIENDSHIP, DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR REPRESENTATION-
JURIDICAL PROTECTION AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS t 1935 
I, There shall be a firm and enduring peace and sincere 
friendship between the United States of America and Its 
citizens and His Majesty, the King of Afghanistan, his 
successors and subjects, throughout all their territories 
and possessions* 
II, The diplomatic representatives of each country shall 
enjoy In the territories of the other, the privileges 
and Immunities derived from generally recognl25ed 
International law. The consular representative of each 
country, duly provided with ezequatar, will be permitted 
to reside In the territories, they shall enjoy the honorary 
privileges and the limnunltles accorded to such officers by 
general International usage? and they shall not be treated 
In a manner less favourable than similar officers of any 
other foreign country. 
III, Subjects of His Majetsy, the King of Afghanistan In the 
United States of America, Its territories and possessions, 
and the nationals of the United States of America, Its 
territories and possessions, in the King of Afghanistan 
shall be received and treated In accordance with the 
requirements and practices of generally recognized 
International law. In respect of their persons, possessions 
and rights, they shall enjoy the fullest protection of the 
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laws and authorities of the countxy, and they shall 
not he treated In regard to their persons, property, 
rights and Interests, In any manner less favourable than 
the nationals of any other foreign country. 
17, In respect of liqport, export and other duties a»d charges 
affecting connnerce, as well as in respect of transit 
warehousing and other facilities, the United States of 
America, Its territories and possessions, will accord to 
the Kingdom of Afghanistan, and the King of Afghanistan 
will accord to the United States of America, its territories 
and possessions, unconditional most-favoured nation 
treatmait. Every concession with respect to any duty, 
change of regulation, affecting commerce now accorded 
or that may hereafter be accorded by the United States of 
America, its territories and possessions, or by the Kingdom 
of Afghanistan to any foreign country will become immediately 
applicable without request and without compensation to the 
commerce of the Kingdom of Afghanistan and of the United 
States of America, its territories and possessions 
respectively, 
V, The stipulations of this agreement shall not extend to 
the treatment which is accorded by the United States of 
America to the commerce of Cuba under the provisions of 
the Commercial Convention concluded between the United 
States and Cuba on Dec«nber 11, 1902 or the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreement concluded on August 24, 1929, or the 
provisions of ar^ other Commercial Convention, which 
hereafter may be concluded between the United States of 
8§3L 
A»»rie» and Cuba, Such stipulations^ »or«o'trert shall net 
extand to tha treatment which Is accorded to tha commerc© 
betvean the United States of America and tha Panama Canal 
Zona or any of the dependencies of the United States of 
America or to the coranerce of tho dependencies of the 
United States of America with one another under aclstlng 
or future laws. 
Nothing In this agreement shall be construed as a 
limitation of the right of either Goveitxment to lE?)ose, 
on such terms as It may see fit, prohibitions or restrictions 
of a sanitary character designed to protect human, animal 
or plant life or regulations for the enforcement of police 
or revenue, laws. 
Nothing In this Agreement shall be construed to affect 
existing statutes of either country in relation to the 
Immigration of aliens or the rights of either Govemmant 
to enact such statutes* 
VI, The present stipulations shall become operative on the 
day of signature thereof and shall remain respectively in 
effect until the entry into force of a definitely treaty 
of coBinerce, or until thirty days after notice of their 
termination shall have been given by the Government of 
either country but should the Government of the United 
States of America be prevented by future action of its 
legislature from carrying out the terms of these stipulations, 
the obligations thereof shall thereupon lapse. 
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VJCI. In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized 
thereto by their respective Governments, have signed 
this agreement, In duplicate, at Paris this ••••••• 
day of •••••••« one thousand nine hundred and 
thlrtyflve. 
Sourcei United States, garslna ,^ §aiat3LQng Qf tUe 
u^ashlngton, D.C, t Government Printing 
Office, 15>53)» pp. 557-59, 
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Appendix 8 
THE TREATY OF FRIHJIDSHIP, GOOD MEEGHBOURLINBSS 
AND COOPERATION, 5 DECEMBER 1978 
Article 1 
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare their 
determination to strengthen and deepen the Inviolable friendship 
between the two countries and to develop all-round cooperation 
on the basis of equalltyi respect for national sovereignty, 
territorial Integrity and non-interference In each other's 
Internal affairs. 
Article 2 
The High Contracting Parties shall make efforts to 
strengthen and broaden mutually beneficial economic, scientific 
and technical cooperation between them. With these alms In view, 
they shall develop and d^pen cooperation In the fields of Industry, 
transport and communications, agriculture, the use of natural 
resoiirces, development of the power-generating Industry and 
other branches of economy, to give each other assistance In the 
training of national personnel and in planning the development of 
the national economy* The two sides shall trade on the basis of 
the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and most-favoured 
nation treatment. 
Article 3 
The High Contracting Parties shall promote the development 
of cooperation and exchange of expertise in the fields of science, 
cultarei art, literature, education! health services, the press. 
S94 
radioi teX«irlslon, clxiwna, tourism, sport and other fields* 
The two sides shall facilitate the expansion of cooperation 
between organs of State power and public organizations, enter-
prise, culture an* scientific institutions with a view to 
making a deeper acquaintance of the life^ work experience and 
achievements of the peoples of the two countries. 
Article 4 
The High Contracting Parties, acting in the spirit of 
the traditions of friendship and good neighbourliness, as well 
as the UN Charter, shall consult each other and take by 
agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, indeptn* 
dfioice and territorial integrity of the two countries. In the 
interests of strengthening the defence capacity of the High 
Contracting Parties, they shall continue to develop cooperation 
in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements 
concluded between them. 
Article 5 
The USSR respects the policy of nonalignment which is 
pursued by the DRA and which is an iijportant factor for 
maintalniBg international peace and security. The DBA respects 
the policy of peace pursued by the USSR and aimed at strengtlnenlng 
friendship and cooperation with all countries and people. 
Article 6 
Bach of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares 
that it shall not join any military or other alliance or take 
part in ar^ y groupings of states as well as in actions or measures 
4iFeoted against the other High Contracting Party. 
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Article 7 
The High Contracting Parties shall continue to make eveiy 
effort, to defend International peace and security of the peoples, 
to deepen the process of relaxation of international teMloni to 
spread It to all areas of tire world, including Asia, to translate 
It into concrete forms of mutually beneficial cooperation among 
states and to settle international disputed issues by peaceful 
means. The two sides shall actively contribute towards general 
and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under 
effective international control. 
Article 8 
The High Contracting Parties shall facilitate the develop-
ment of cooperation among Asian states and the establishment of 
relations of peace, good neighbourliness and mutual confidence 
among them and the creation of an effective security system in 
Asia on the basis of Joint efforts by all countries of the 
continent. 
Article 9 
The High Contracting Parties shall continue their 
consistent struggle against machinations by the forces of 
aggression, for the final elimination of colonialism and 
racism 1B all their forms and manifestation. The two sides 
shall cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving 
states in supporting the just struggle of the peoples for 
their freedom. Independence, sovereignty and social progress. 
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Article 10 
The Hlgb Contracting Parties shall consult each other 
on all major International issues affecting the interests of 
the two countries. 
Article 11 
The High Contracting Parties state that their commitments 
under the existing international treaties do not contradict the 
provisions of the present Treaty and undertake not to conclude 
any international agreements incompatible with it. 
Article 12 
Questions which may arise between the High Contracting 
Parties concerning the interpretation or application of any 
provisions of the present Treaty, shall be settled bilaterally 
in the spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and respect. 
Article 13 
The present Treaty shali remain in force within 20 years 
of the day it comes Into effect unless one of the High Contract-
ing Parties declares six montha before the expiration of this term 
of its desire to terminate the Treaty it shall remain in force for 
the next five years until one of the High Contracting Parties 
warns in writing the other Party, six months before the expiration 
of current five year term, about its Intention to terminate the 
Treaty, 
Article 14 
If one of the High Contracting Parties expresses the 
wish in the course of the 20-year term of the Treaty to terminate 
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it liefore Its e}cpiratlon date, it sbilX notify in writing 
the other Party, six months before its suggested date of 
expiration of the Treaty, about its desire to temlnate the 
Treaty before the expiration of the term and may consider the 
Treaty terminated as of the date thus set* 
Article 16 
The preaettt Treaty shall be ratified and take effect on 
the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification, which 
is to take place In Kabul, 
Done in Duplicate, each in the Russian and Dari 
languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
Done in Moscow on 5th December 1P78. 
For the USSR For the DBA 
L, Bx-ezhnev N, Mohammad Taraki 
Sourcei S a M .Ttef 8» ^ December 1978• 
